Recommended Weekend Reads

The National Security Implications of the US Industrial Base, China’s Ongoing Demographic Crisis, The US-Venezuelan Crisis and Bonds, and the Growing Global Debt Crisis

December 5 - 7, 2025

The US Industrial Base and National Security

• Building Greater Resilience and Capacity in the US National Security Industrial Base  Brookings Institution

  In the current policy landscape, virtually every stakeholder—from federal agencies to industry groups—calls for classifying a widening swath of economic activity as “national security.” The impulse to broaden what counts as critical has gained momentum not only with each new global disruption, but also with each new report highlighting U.S. exposure to China in key sectors, making “national security” a catchall for fears that range from supply interruptions to cyber threats.  While this instinct reflects real vulnerabilities, it leaves policymakers struggling to prioritize and risks making the label so expansive that it ceases to have sharp policy meaning. This paper cuts through that noise. We agree with the notion of expanding the concept of national security to include production supply chains, the interruption of which by a hostile foreign actor could directly imperil large numbers of American lives or the functioning of society. Our approach, however, is not simply whether to broaden the concept of national security, but how to realistically scope it—especially when it comes to supply chains.

• The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025     The White House

  On Friday, the White House released a report entitled “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2025.”  In it, the report makes clear that securing access to critical supply chains and materials is of paramount importance to the Trump national security strategy, along with reindustrialization, balance of trade, and reviving the US’s Defense Industrial base.

• Acquisition Reform vs. Congress: Who Will Win?    War on the Rocks

  Weeks ago, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth gave a speech announcing the Pentagon’s intentions to embrace more aggressive acquisition reforms. One of the most significant changes is to shift from a program focused acquisitions to portfolio concepts. According to Hegseth: “We will shift funding within portfolios’ authorized boundaries swiftly and decisively to maximize mission outcomes. If one program is faltering, funding will be shifted within the portfolio to accelerate or scale a higher priority. If a new or more promising technology emerges, we will seize the opportunity and not be held back by artificial constraints and funding boundaries that take months or even years to overcome.”  But the biggest obstacle to shifting the Department of Defense to a portfolio management structure comes from congressional appropriators. Regardless of party affiliation, appropriators jealously guard their role as the arbiters of spending allocation in defense and other Federal roles. They have consistently opposed giving the Pentagon this degree of flexibility. A knock-down, drag-out fight between the Trump Administration and Congress now looms.

Latin America

• The US-Venezuela relationship as seen through the price of an oil-linked bond   Reuters

  The ramp-up of U.S. pressure on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro's government is bringing fresh attention to the nation's defaulted bonds, including those of the state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, known as PDVSA.  Venezuela defaulted on its debt in 2017 but PDVSA continued to pay holders of a specific bond maturing in 2020. It was issued in 2016 under a swap offer that replaced debt maturing the following year. This bond is secured with a pledge of 50.1% of refiner Citgo Holding through PDVSA’s wholly-owned subsidiary PDV Holding. But payments stopped after the opposition-led National Assembly declared the bond contract illegal in October 2019.

• The Hidden Cost of Your Avocado    Ioan Grillo/New York Times

  In recent years, Mexico’s cartels have diversified from drug production to a portfolio of criminal rackets, from human smuggling to stealing crude oil — and, increasingly, extorting civilians. The shakedowns, known here as “cobros de piso,” rob workers, from mom-and-pop shop owners to farmers to truck drivers, of their earnings and force up the prices of goods in Mexico and abroad. One business association estimates that such protection rackets cost Mexican enterprises around $1.1 billion this year as of September.

China’s Demographic Challenge

• China's Demographic Dilemma    Pekingology Podcast: On Chinese Politics/Center for Strategic and International Studies

  In this episode of Pekingology, CSIS Senior Fellow Henrietta Levin is joined by Philip O’Keefe, Professor of Practice at the University of New South Wales Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research and one of the world's leading experts on demographic trends in China and across Asia. They unpack the rapid aging of Chinese society, exploring the impact of a shrinking population on China's politics, economy, and innovation ecosystem, as well as its trade imbalances and Beijing's global ambitions.

• China Is Trying to Boost Fertility. It’s Not Working     Rand Corporation

  China's population is aging rapidly, and its birth rate is declining. These trends have resulted in a shrinking workforce and growing pressure on social services. In response, Beijing has rolled out a series of pronatalist policies.  A new RAND study finds that these efforts have been unevenly implemented and largely ineffective. This shows the limits of government attempts to influence family decision-making.  These findings have implications for the United States, where fertility rates are also declining. Rather than trying to increase the population's desire to have children, it may be more effective to help those who already want to grow their families. Such an approach might include removing structural barriers by improving access to affordable child care and housing.  As the authors write, “The United States should learn from China’s failed pronatalist policy.”

 Geoeconomics

• The Global Debt Crisis Builds    Robin Brooks Substack

  Fed cuts aren’t pulling down long-term yields: if you look at the long end of the yield curve properly by stripping out front-end yields, things look very worrying. 10y10y and 10y20y forward yields are near their highs and the gap of both metrics with 10-year yield has grown. The buyers’ strike for longer-dated Treasury debt looks like it’s getting worse. There’s many idiosyncratic trouble spots: a key feature of the recent rise in long-term yields is that there’s many fiscally distressed countries that run into trouble at different points and for idiosyncratic reasons. Italy, France and the UK are all part of this dynamic and have very elevated 10y20y forward yields. Traditional safe havens are failing: in the past, Japan and Germany would have been safe harbors in this kind of environment, but these days they’re at the heart of the rise in long-term yields.

•  The State of Generative AI Adoption in 2025    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis “On the Economy” Blog

  In September 2024, we presented results from the first nationally representative U.S. survey of generative AI adoption at work and nonwork settings, conducted in August 2024. Since then, we have conducted our survey—the Real-Time Population Survey—on a quarterly basis. In this blog post, we share an update on the state of generative AI adoption by U.S. workers and look for evidence of this technology’s impact in the broader economy.

Recommended Weekend Reads

What Next for Russian-Ukrainian Peace Talks?  Russia’s Shadow War on Europe, The U.S.–Saudi Critical Mineral Deal, and the Great Reallocation in the U.S. Supply Chain Trade

November 28 -30, 2025

We hope you had a wonderful Thanksgiving holiday!   Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting.  Hopefully, you will find them interesting and useful as well.  Have a great weekend.

The Ukraine Peace Negotiations

• Is there any peace deal that Putin would accept?        Vox

  In recent weeks, President Trump has offered a 28-point peace plan, which is now a 19-point peace plan.  Hard bargaining is going on between the US, Ukraine, and the EU.  But at this point, nobody seems to have any leverage over Russian President Vladimir Putin.  Which is why the question of whether this war will end soon comes down to what terms Putin finds acceptable.  This raises the depressing question of whether peace is possible at all as long as Putin is alive and in power.
  

• A Ukraine Plan that Would Actually Work    Hal Brands/Bloomberg Opinion

  President Donald Trump’s new peace ploy in Ukraine will likely fail. He has a chance, in the coming months, to craft an approach that might succeed. Real peacemaking could be possible in 2026, because the strains on Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s economy and army are getting worse. But policymakers in the US, the European Union and Ukraine will have to overcome their own hesitations and weaknesses — or Putin will still be able to settle this war on his terms. But if this round of peacekeeping proves abortive, the next one could go better — if Ukraine and its supporters properly prepare. Putin seems confident that Russia is on the road to victory. Yet his position is weaker than it seems.
  

• This Might be the best Ukraine can Hope For     Jamie Dettmer/Politico EU

  As it stands, there is scant grounds for optimism that, for all its heroism, Ukraine can turn things around. The country is unlikely to emerge from its most perilous winter of the war in a stronger position, better able to withstand what’s being foisted upon it. In fact, it could be in a much weaker state — on the battlefield, the home front, and in terms of its internal politics. Indeed, as it tries to navigate its way through America’s divisive “peace plan,” this might be the best Ukraine can hope for — or at least some variation that doesn’t entail withdrawing from the territory in eastern Ukraine it has managed to retain.
  

• War Without End: Russia’s Shadow Warfare    Center for European Policy Analysis

  Even as Ukraine continues to suffer under wave after wave of bombardment and an ever-deepening occupation, Europe as a whole is under a sustained assault from Russia of a different kind. This report explains the who, what, why, and how of Russian shadow warfare, uncovering the nature of the forces Russia brings to bear against Europe itself, their governance structures, and, critically, the implicit doctrine that shapes strategic and tactical decision-making. This analysis shows that Russia’s shadow warfare is not simply a covert strategy, developed to take advantage of Western soft spots or fecklessness. Rather, it is the reflection of a deeper ideological and institutional logic, a neo-Stalinist threat framework that sees warfare as continuous and ubiquitous, that fuses domestic and foreign threats, and that understands everything and everyone as a potential target. This is an approach to warfare that generates escalation not by mistake, but by design. Unless Europe can impose discipline on the Russian shadow-warfare machine through clear deterrence, the likelihood of full-scale war between Russia and NATO will only increase.

 The Americas

• Russian Disinformation Comes to Mexico, Seeking to Rupture U.S. Ties The New York Times

  Russia’s disinformation efforts across Latin America have intensified over the last two years, partly aimed at sowing discord between the United States and its allies in the region, according to an American diplomatic cable and new report by watchdog groups.  The campaign is spearheaded by Kremlin-owned media outlets like Sputnik and RT, officials say, describing an effort to stoke anti-American sentiment, especially in Mexico, the world’s largest Spanish-speaking nation and Washington’s biggest trade partner.

• Tension in the Caribbean reverberates in Havana: ‘Venezuela is crucial for the Cuban political elites’    El País

  With the USS Gerald R. Ford, the world’s largest aircraft carrier, positioned in the Atlantic, and Puerto Rico militarized with at least 5,000 of the nearly 15,000 troops mobilized for the operation, the specter of the Cold War — this time against drugs — seems to have resurfaced in the region, and Havana is beginning to worry.  If Venezuela falls, Cuba would lose its most important point of reference in the Southern Cone at a time when Latin American democracies, with their electoral volatility, are transitioning from progressive governments — which could be potential allies — to right-wing governments. More than an economic loss, Cuba would lose an ideological and symbolic ally.

The Latest on the Global Race for Critical Minerals

• What’s in the New U.S.–Saudi Minerals Agreement?    Center for Strategic and International Studies

  The visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Washington, D.C., marks a high-profile moment in the strategic partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The visit represents a major step forward in the bilateral minerals’ relationship. The two countries established a Strategic Framework for Cooperation on securing uranium, metals, permanent magnets, and critical mineral supply chains, which is designed to facilitate two-way investment in this vital sector and serve as a "cornerstone" of the bilateral strategic partnership. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense (recently renamed the Department of War) also announced that it will finance a 49 percent equity stake in a new rare earths refinery in Saudi Arabia. Given the kingdom’s substantial reserves of heavy rare earth elements, this partnership between the Department of War, Maaden, and MP Materials will play a critical role in reducing dependence on China, particularly following a year of pronounced volatility in global access to heavy rare earths.

• The Global South and China’s Mineral Power         Jesse Marks/Rihla Research & Advocacy LLC

  Abstract: This paper examines how Chinese scholars and policymakers interpret the accelerating contest over critical minerals and what it reveals about Beijing’s evolving approach to supply-chain power in the Global South. It shows how China increasingly views minerals as strategic assets foundational to national strength and industrial autonomy. Chinese analysts frame resource security as an integrated system that blends state-backed finance, diplomacy, and co-development with host countries to secure and diversify supply, while mitigating external pressure from U.S.- and EU-led “de-Sinicization” strategies. At the same time, they acknowledge China’s own vulnerabilities, defined as heavy import dependence, exposure to political risk in resource-rich states, and a global shift toward resource sovereignty that raises the bar for local processing, technology transfer, and joint ventures. The result is a more contested, politically charged mineral landscape in which Beijing seeks both secure access to mineral resources, as well as a more concerted effort to shape the rules, governance models, and industrial pathways of the next generation of mineral economies.

Geoeconomics 

• What Is a Tariff Shock? Insights from 150 years of Tariff Policy   Regis Barnichon/Aayush Singh/Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

  Widely touted by the White House, this paper looks at 150 years of tariff policy in the US and the estimates it has on macro aggregates.   Starting in 1870, the study shows that a tariff hike raises unemployment (lowers economic activity) and lowers inflation. Using only tariff changes driven by long-run considerations—a traditional narrative identification—gives similar results. We also obtain similar results if we restrict the sample to the modern post-World War II period or if we use independent variation from other countries (France and the UK). These findings point towards tariff shocks acting through an aggregate demand channel.

• Analyzing Japan’s $550 Billion Pledge to Invest in the U.S.    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

  In July 2025, the United States and Japan reached a major trade agreement that includes Japan’s pledge to invest $550 billion in U.S. industries in return for lower tariffs on Japanese imports. The details of this investment pledge became clearer on Sept. 4, when U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and Ryosei Akazawa, then Japan’s top trade negotiator, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU).  In practice, this structure makes Japan’s commitment resemble a loan rather than an equity investment, since Japan does not become a shareholder in the projects. The interest rate of this “loan” is called “deemed interest rate,” which is based on a benchmark rate plus a spread that depends on the project’s risk profile. Once the principal and accrued interest are fully repaid, Japan begins receiving returns through its 10% profit share. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what would happen if Japan were unable to fully recoup its deemed allocation amount. In that case, the “loan” would likely become unrecoverable, and Japan would have to write it off.
  

• An Anatomy of the Great Reallocation in US Supply Chain Trade    Laura Alfaro and Davin Chor   National Bureau of Economic Research

  Since 2017, China has experienced a large and persistent decline in its share of the US import market. The main gainers have been Vietnam, Mexico, and (more recently) Taiwan. It is well-documented that China’s share in US direct imports fell from around 21% in 2017 to 16% in 2022. Figure 3 reveals a further drop in the US import market share held by China to around 13% by 2024. The decoupling that started under the first Trump administration thus extended through to the end of the Biden presidency, rather than undergoing any reversal. Figure 3 further hints at how these large shifts in the sources of US imports have persisted post-Liberation Day. By July 2025, China’s share in US direct imports had fallen by another 4pp relative to 2024, declining from 13% to roughly 9%. To put this in perspective, China’s share in total US imports stood at approximately 9% in 2001, in its accession year to the WTO. This climbed steadily over the next 16 years, peaking at 22% in 2017. The drop back to a 9% import share by mid-2025 thus represents a remarkable unwinding, in just half the time it took this share to reach its pre-trade war peak.
  

• The Predictability of Global Monetary Policy Surprises  Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research Working Paper

  Surprise changes to short-term interest rates around central bank announcements—commonly termed “monetary policy surprises”—have been shown to be predictable using information available before the announcements. This is notable given the profit opportunity this predictability presents in such an important market. This paper investigates the predictability of monetary policy surprises in an international context. The author constructs a data set with monetary policy surprises across nine central banks—covering Australia, Canada, the euro zone, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and around 2,000 announcements.

Recommended Weekend Reads

Understanding Trump’s Latin American Military Buildup, The Secret and Massive Drug Smuggling Routes into the US, Young Adults Are Spending Less Time Together, and The Desperate Search for Safe Havens

October 31 - November 2, 2025

Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting.  Hopefully, you will find them interesting and useful as well.  Have a great weekend.

The Americas

• Understanding Trump’s Military Buildup in Latin America    Americas Quarterly Podcast

  The recent deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford, the U.S. Navy’s largest aircraft carrier, has intensified speculation about Washington’s true objectives in the Southern Caribbean. In this episode of the Americas Quarterly Podcast, we examine what’s really behind the Trump administration’s escalating military activity. Is it a hardline campaign against drug cartels, or the opening moves of a broader effort to pressure Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro? What do we know about dynamics within the Venezuelan military? And to what extent could this impact Washington’s relations with Colombia and other countries in the region? Our guest is Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

•  From Posture to Purpose: Rethinking U.S. Strategic Aims in Venezuela    FIU Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy  

  The U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean reflects a strategic confusion between counter-narcotics and regime-change objectives in Venezuela. Current operations project power but lack coherence, risking escalation without achievable outcomes. A sustainable strategy must align U.S. means and ends, favoring intelligence, law enforcement, and targeted financial tools over military coercion. Even limited “surgical strikes” risk hardening regime cohesion, triggering regional instability, fueling migration flows, and creating governance vacuums with grave humanitarian consequences. To avoid these pitfalls while focusing on transnational criminal organizations, Washington should prioritize multilateral law-enforcement cooperation, expand Coast Guard and intelligence capabilities, and strengthen sanctions enforcement targeting the regime’s illicit revenue streams. Aligning coercive, diplomatic, and economic instruments toward realistic, proportional goals offers the only path to sustainable results without deepening Venezuela’s crisis on entangling the United States militarily.

• After Argentina’s Midterms, a New Chapter for U.S.-Argentina Relations  Center for Strategic and International Studies

  Argentina’s midterms may also herald a new era of U.S. relations with the country and Latin America as a whole. In the weeks leading up to the election, the United States announced a major financial assistance package, giving Argentina access to a total of $40 billion in U.S. dollar currency swaps, with $20 billion coming from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund, and a further $20 billion from banks and sovereign wealth funds. In addition to this, the Trump administration announced plans to purchase Argentine beef, a move that was deeply unpopular with U.S. ranchers but offered a powerful signal of the importance Washington places on its relationship with Buenos Aires

• See the Secret Networks Smuggling Drugs to the U.S. From Latin America   The Wall Street Journal

  These interactive reports and accompanying maps show how demand in America for illegal drugs such as fentanyl and cocaine fuels sophisticated systems for smuggling them in. Traffickers deploy everything from fast-moving fiberglass boats to stealthy “narco-subs” to cargo ships to get their products to users without losing shipments to seizures or couriers to arrest. With decades of experience, according to U.S. counternarcotics officials, the traffickers are usually a step ahead of America and its allies in Latin American and Caribbean waters

 Youth and Family Trends and Their Future Impact on the Economy

• Cognitive Skills Beyond Childhood    The Economic Journal

  Data from a British birth cohort followed since 1958 show that cognitive skills early in life predict wages at age 50 better than cognitive skills at age 50. Early cognitive skills likely allow for higher educational attainment or on-the-job learning.
  

• Young Adults Are Spending Less Time With Friends       Institute for Family Studies

  In post-pandemic America, young adults are spending a record amount of time alone. But even before the pandemic, young adults began spending less time with friends. In 2010, young adults ages 18 to 29 on average spent 12.8 hours a week with friends. By 2019, that number nearly halved, falling to 6.5 hours a week. The pandemic exacerbated this trend with a low point of 4.2 hours a week with friends in 2020.  And while we’ve seen a slight increase since, socializing has not nearly recovered. Today, young adults spend just 5 hours a week with friends. Lingering effects of pandemic-era isolation are certainly at play, but the role of technology cannot be ignored.

•  Mind the Fertility Gap: Why people stopped having babies and how economic freedom can help     Institute for Economic Affairs

  n a new paper published by the Institute, British women are falling at least 0.4 children short of their own stated family goals, according to fertility data through 2011, with this gap likely widening as fertility now hits record lows of 1.44 while desired family size remains stable at 2.2.  New report shows how pro-natal policies that focus on cash incentives, such as baby bonuses, subsidies, and maternity pay, may have some short-term effect but are often found wanting and prohibitively expensive.  Evidence shows policies affecting economic freedom, including Labour market, childcare and housing liberalization, can have profound effects on fertility through their impact on work-family compatibility

Geoeconomics & Financial Markets 

• The Role of Single-Family Rentals in the U.S. Housing Market    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

  When homeownership and home sales plummeted in 2010 in the wake of the housing market collapse, investors responded by purchasing single-family homes and renting them out to households that could not afford to buy such homes but still desired this type of housing. Subsequently, investor-owned single-family rentals (SFRs) increased as a share of total single-family properties, and they continue to increase as a housing supply shortage and higher mortgage rates make homeownership difficult for many first-time homebuyers. This blog post summarizes economic research that has been done on the role of investor-owned SFRs in the U.S. housing market.  Such research has found that the vast majority of SFRs are owned by small-scale investors. Properties owned by large-scale investors tend to increase prices of nearby homes,  while ownership by small-scale investors appears to have the opposite effect.  Research has also found that investor-owned SFRs expand housing options available to renters but may negatively impact renter welfare in terms of eviction filings4and rent increases.

• The Desperate Search for Safe Havens     Robin Brooks Substack

  Countries with low debt burdens are outperforming ones with lots of debt. The right chart above shows this dynamic. Since Jackson Hole, the Swedish Krona (red line) is the best performing currency against the Dollar, followed by the Norwegian Krone (orange line) and Swiss Franc (black line). The Euro (pink line) is flat against the Dollar, no surprise since it consists mostly of high-debt countries, with Germany’s recent move to soften up its debt brake and pursue big fiscal stimulus a major destabilizer for the region. The Japanese Yen (blue line) is down over two percent against the Dollar, no surprise given that gross government debt is 240 percent of GDP. The fact that Sweden is at the top of the pack makes sense. The Krona is massively undervalued (it’s at the same level against the Euro as during the global financial crisis), while Sweden has also managed to steer clear of endlessly rising debt levels that so bedevil the Euro periphery.

• As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting   The Economist

  According to the Citizens Budget Commission New York state’s share of American taxpayers reporting more than $1m in income declined from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022. Such people paid $34bn in income tax to the state and city in 2022, a figure that would have been $13bn higher if New York’s share of millionaires had held up. Estimates from Goldman Sachs suggest that fully 10% of households in New York City with incomes of more than $10m established residency elsewhere between 2018 and 2023. As the ultra-rich have headed for the exit, the city’s employment growth has become concentrated in much worse-paid industries than finance. Since the end of 2019, New York has added more than 268,000 jobs in health care and social assistance, particularly home health care. Employment as a whole rose by just 220,000 over the same period, meaning that, if it was not for that industry, overall employment would have shrunk.

Recommended Weekend Reading

Looking at U.S. - China Policy Challenges in Advance of the Xi-Trump Meeting, Will the AI Data Center Boom Threaten the Trump Manufacturing Revival?, and Looking at the Supply Chain Chokepoints in Quantum

October 24 - 26, 2025

Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting.  Hopefully, you will find them both interesting and useful.  Have a great weekend.

A Look at Major Policy Issues for Both the U.S. and China

• China’s Two Economy Problem    Semafor

  At a glance, China’s export-focused manufacturing sector is buoyant, racing away from the US and other advanced economies in areas including batteries, robotics, and biotechnology. And yet its domestic economy is in deep crisis, suffering from spiraling levels of joblessness, plunging consumer confidence, and falling business investment in the midst of a real estate collapse.  To understand China is to believe all these things to be true. It is an economy moving fast and slow at the same time, a tech superpower that creates opportunities for PhD scientists but not its underclass of rural workers, a nation that manufactures a third of everything made in the world but can’t stir demand at home. Its growth model is so lopsided it is unbalancing the global economy. In short, China is at war with itself; taking the long view, the current US-China trade spat is a sideshow.

• How China Raced Ahead of the U.S. on Nuclear Power     New York Times

  While U.S. nuclear construction costs skyrocketed after the 1960s, they fell by half in China during the 2000s and have since stabilized, according to data published recently in Nature. (The only two U.S. reactors built this century, at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Waynesboro, Ga., took 11 years and cost $35 billion.) China’s nuclear companies build only a handful of reactor types, and they do it over and over again. That allows developers to perfect the construction process and is “essential for scaling efficiently,” said Joy Jiang, an energy innovation analyst at the Breakthrough Institute, a pro-nuclear research organization. “It means you can streamline licensing and simplify your supply chain.”

• Taiwan Is Not for Sale       David Sacks/Foreign Affairs

  When U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the coming weeks and months—likely starting next week at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in South Korea—the immediate focus will be on how to de-escalate the latest round of export restrictions and tariff threats that the United States and China have wielded against each other. But Trump and Xi are also likely to consider a more ambitious deal to reset bilateral relations, which would seek not only to stabilize economic ties but also to reevaluate geopolitical flash points—above all, Taiwan.

• How U.S. Can Outcompete China   Daniel Bob/RealClearWorld

  Leadership in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, robotics, advanced materials, biotechnology, and aerospace will determine who leads the world economically and strategically in the decades ahead. These technologies spur productivity gains, provide supply chain resilience, and shape military strength that sustain national security and prosperity.

• China Against China     Jonathan Czin/Foreign Affairs

  Thirteen years after Xi Jinping ascended to the top of China’s leadership hierarchy, observers in Washington remain deeply confused about how to assess his rule. To some, Xi is the second coming of Mao, having accumulated near-total power and bent the state to his will; to others, Xi’s power is so tenuous that he is perpetually at risk of disgruntled elites ousting him in a coup.

Technology, Trade, Immigration, and Geopolitical Power

• The Fiscal Impact of Immigration       The Manhattan Institute

  Using a methodology aligned with the congressional budget window, this report estimates the fiscal, economic, and population effects of immigrants by age, education, and category of admission. It updates previous Manhattan Institute research by incorporating more recent census data, more precise life-expectancy and fertility adjustments, economic and capital stock growth, and the fiscal effects of the descendants of immigrants. This report estimates fiscal impact in nominal dollars over a 10- and 30-year horizon. This report also updates and fixes several assumptions from previous research on the fiscal impact of immigrants, including the calculation method for interest on the debt and correctly adjusting tax credits for inflation. It uses an updated method for accounting for public-goods spending.  Overall, the average new immigrant reduces the federal budget deficit and expands the economy, but this is not true of all categories of immigrants. Immigrants without college degrees receive more government benefits than they pay in taxes, even when we consider only their preretirement years. By contrast, immigrants who finished college or obtained an advanced degree contribute millions of dollars more in federal taxes than they receive in government benefits, and they save substantial amounts of interest on the debt while growing the economy.

•  AI Data Center Boom Threatens Trump’s Manufacturing Revival   Bloomberg

  The AI boom is coming to America’s industrial heartland, which speaks to how the economy is being transformed—even propped up—by a surge in investment in software, chipmaking and data centers. But the Lordstown plant’s reinvention raises the question: Is the exuberance around the technology that Trump has enthusiastically endorsed getting in the way of his goal of making America great again at churning out things like gasoline-powered cars, steel and furniture? Access to capital, power and people is key to the success of any construction or manufacturing project—and right now AI is gobbling up all three.

•  The Supply Chain Chokepoints in Quantum      War on the Rocks

  As quantum technologies move from proof-of-concept to deployment, supply chain resilience becomes just as critical as qubit coherence times. Resilience includes redundancy, domestic capacity, and timely alternatives when foreign manufacturers face disruptions or reprioritize their customers. Expertise and capital are key to driving technological innovation, but mean little if a company or research lab does not have access to the necessary inputs and reliable supply chains.  Lack of access to one aspect of the supply chain can grind further research and development to a standstill, a red flag for investors and potential researchers. If the United States is to remain on the leading edge of quantum technologies, ensuring companies, government labs, and academic projects can consistently access critical supplies is a prerequisite.

Recommended Weekend Reads

China’s New Latin American Playbook, Russia’s Increasingly Desperate Search for Soldiers, Who Will Succeed Xi as China’s Next President?,  and Geopolitical Implications of the Race for 6G

October 17 - 19, 2025

Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting.  Hopefully,  you will find them of interest and useful as well.  Have a great weekend.

Latin America

• China’s New Playbook for Latin America         Americas Quarterly

  China has entered a new phase in its engagement with Latin America.  It is one still characterized by extensive resource-seeking and market-seeking activity, features of the relationship for more than three decades now. As China invests and trades in Latin American raw materials and builds markets across the region for everything from its toys and textiles to ultra-high-voltage transmission lines and cloud services, overall trade continues to rise.  At the same time, the relationship is rapidly evolving toward a more targeted, strategic approach. For all the recent attention given to China’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects, Latin America’s relative share of investments under the plan is falling for the third consecutive year. The region received a little more than 1% of Beijing’s global BRI construction spending and 0.4% of outbound investment in the first half of 2025. Growth in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region is also slowing. Whether those trends hold remains to be seen. But the days of Beijing showering the region with loans and large-scale infrastructure projects may be over, or at least diminished, replaced by more deliberate engagement and a focus on specific sectors of Chinese interest, especially at the higher end of the value chain.
  

• How China’s Energy Investments Provide Durable Influence in South America  Henry Zeimer/Center for Strategic and International Studies

  China’s growing presence in South American energy generation and distribution has largely gone underreported, even as it risks placing critical infrastructure under foreign influence. Properly grasping the nature of this influence is of particular importance as the United States finds itself in the midst of a shift to a more competitive stance in its foreign policy approach in the Western Hemisphere.

• What Is Mexico’s Amparo Reform? Everything You Need to Know    Moments in Mexico

  Mexico’s democracy is again on the precipice of a key inflection point. This time, it entails the Sheinbaum administration’s efforts to reform the amparo, a tool of the Mexican legal system that grants individuals the right of redress in the case of constitutional and/or human rights violations. There is no direct counterpart to the Mexican amparo in the United States; however, its functions are roughly carried out through a combination of civil rights litigation, judicial review, injunctions, and the writ of habeas corpus. The amparo and associated processes are complex. This piece is intended to provide a cursory overview and highlight the changes that the Sheinbaum administration seeks to impose.

Russia

• Putin Seeks More Foreign Fighters Amid Mounting Russian Losses in Ukraine   Atlantic Council

  As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the four-year mark, Moscow is facing increasing difficulties replenishing the ranks of its invading army. With fewer Russians now prepared to volunteer, the Kremlin is seeking to recruit more foreign fighters to serve in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s colonial war. A number of recent media reports have highlighted the growing role of foreign nationals in the Russian military. In early October, an Indian citizen was captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting for Russia. The 22-year-old claimed to have been arrested in Russia while studying and pressured into signing a contract with the Russian army in order to secure his release from prison. After just two weeks of basic training, he was sent to the front lines of the war in Ukraine. Also in early October, the Los Angeles Times reported that Russia may have recruited tens of thousands of foreign fighters via social media, with many coming from disadvantaged countries across the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. The article detailed how many of these recruits are allegedly enticed with offers of generous benefits including large salaries and Russian citizenship in exchange for military service in non-combat roles. In practice, however, most are soon sent straight into battle.

• The Shooting Party: Russia’s Evolving Threat Perceptions Since 2002    Center for Naval Analysis (CNA)

  In this paper, the authors examine how Russian military thinkers interpret and operationalize the threat perceptions defined by the country’s political leadership. Despite nearly four years of war in Ukraine, Russian security concerns regarding US military capabilities remain largely unchanged. Russian military thinkers continue to perceive US ballistic missile defense and Prompt Global Strike programs as the main threats to Russia’s security, believing these programs to be designed to degrade Russia’s retaliatory strike capabilities. The war in Ukraine has exposed gaps in Russia’s military capabilities, heightening Russian anxiety about the military contingents from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Baltic and Black Seas, particularly potential US deployments to Finland and Sweden. Viewing the substantial US and NATO military assistance to Ukraine as part of a broader strategy to weaken Russia, Russian military thinkers are particularly alarmed by Ukrainian offensive operations within Russian borders or those that target mainland Russia. Russian military thinkers believe that the United States and NATO are preparing for a long-term confrontation with Russia, which reinforces their views on the importance of maintaining and enhancing Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities.

• ·Russia’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Criminality as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare in Europe    GLOBSEC/International Centre for Counter-Terrorism

  This report takes stock of Russian hybrid warfare in Europe in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine. While doing so, it offers more than a catalogue of kinetic incidents attributed to Moscow. The report shows the extent to which criminality – whether through direct reliance on criminals to conduct attacks or through the “spook-gangster” nexus – constitutes a central pillar of Russia’s hybrid warfare. It opens with an overview of the phenomenon and traces Russia’s experience with hybrid tactics back to at least the 1920s. It then explores Moscow’s enduring use of criminality as a tool of domestic control and foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the post-2022 period.

China

• Xi Jinping's Successor and the Future of China    The Foreign Affairs  Interview Podcast

  When Xi Jinping took over the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, he began a new chapter in China’s history—one that would come to be defined above all by his grip on power. Xi overhauled not only the CCP but also China’s economy, military, and role in the world. Yet no matter how secure his power may be—and no matter his recent hot-mic musings about living to 150—what comes after Xi, and how it comes, is an increasingly central question in Chinese politics. As the political scientists Tyler Jost and Daniel Mattingly wrote recently in Foreign Affairs, “For any authoritarian regime, political succession is a moment of peril . . . and for all its strengths, the CCP is no exception.” And that’s not just a risk for the future. The uncertainty and the jockeying that the succession question spurs is already starting to shape China’s present. To Jost and Mattingly, there’s more at stake than just the matter of who will follow Xi. They note: “The drama created by a struggle over the succession . . . is unlikely to stay inside China’s borders.” They joined Deputy Editor Chloe Fox to discuss the nature of Xi’s rule, his attempt to define his legacy, and what that will mean for China in the coming months, years, and decades.
  

• Stabilizing the US–China Rivalry    Rand

  The geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China embodies risks of outright military conflict, economic warfare, and political subversion, as well as the danger that tensions between the world's two leading powers will destroy the potential for achieving a global consensus on such issues as climate and artificial intelligence. Moderating this rivalry, therefore, emerges as a critical goal, both for the United States and China and for the wider world. The authors of this report propose that, even in the context of intense competition, it might be possible to find limited mechanisms of stabilization across several specific issue areas. They offer specific recommendations both for general stabilization of the rivalry and for three issue areas: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and competition in science and technology.

Geoeconomics, Technology, Global Food Policy, and Dealing with Student Absenteeism

• 6G isn’t about speed. It’s about sovereignty    The Strategist

  The race to 6G isn’t just about bandwidth. It’s about control over spectrum, standards, supply chains, and the values underpinning tomorrow’s infrastructure. If 5G taught us anything, trust and interoperability need to be built in from the start.  The Indo-Pacific is already the world’s most contested connectivity environment. Through submarine cables, cloud platforms, and national 5G rollouts, governments are already making decisions that will shape how their citizens communicate, how their economies function, and who sets the rules. The shift to 6G only sharpens that contest.  Reporting from the Financial Times makes clear that China is moving fast. Beijing is systematically excluding European vendors from its domestic telecommunications networks. Ericsson and Nokia, already reduced to a 4 percent market share, now face opaque security reviews that stretch for months. The message is that foreign firms aren’t welcome, while domestic vendors are being positioned as the only trusted suppliers for national infrastructure. They are backed by policy, shielded from competition, and expected to dominate the market at home and abroad.
  

• Why Have Inflation Expectations Surged Recently? A Historical Perspective  Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

  Average near-term household inflation expectations in the Michigan Survey of Consumers have peaked higher than 8% four times in the past 60 years: twice in the 1970s, during the 2021-2022 post-pandemic inflation surge, and since spring 2025. Coincident sharp increases in gas and food prices, along with underlying broad-based inflation, explain a large share of the 2021-2022 spike in inflation expectations; those factors also accounted for about two-thirds of the 1973-1975 surge. The 1978-1980 increase in inflation expectations was much larger than the increase that rising prices usually would imply, consistent with the de-anchoring of inflation expectations at that time. Rising prices can barely explain the 2025 surge observed in the Michigan Survey of Consumers, which may signal that the risk of de-anchoring is larger than it was in the pre-pandemic period.
  

• Is the U.S. in an Above-Target Inflation Regime?    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

  Since January 2012, the Federal Reserve has adopted an explicit target of 2% inflation, measured as the 12-month change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index.1 And yet, after several years of below-target inflation prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation rose above 2% annually in March 2021 and has persisted above 2% ever since. According to the latest data available (August 2025), inflation remains significantly above target, at 2.7%. In previous blog posts, I have analyzed these dynamics and their likely origin. In this blog post, my analysis suggests that we may be in a persistent above-target inflation regime.
  

• The Challenge to Feed the World in the 21st Century: Useless, Harmful, and Helpful Policies  American Enterprise Institute

  Hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity remain significant global problems, but instead of working toward solutions, Western governments are implementing policies guaranteed to reduce food production. Environmental benefits often attributed to policies that support biofuels, organic agriculture, land conservation programs, and similar strategies appear to be moderate or disappear once their impacts on the conversion of forested lands to agriculture are considered. The United Nations and the European Commission propose reducing food loss and waste and eating fewer animal products as strategies to combat food scarcity, but neither approach would likely be effective. To address world hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity, the United States and other rich countries must stop enacting policies and supporting production practices that reduce agricultural yields, divert production from food to fuel, and encourage the conversion of forested lands to agricultural production across the world.

• Need Not Be a Surprise: Early-Warning Systems for Chronic Absenteeism     Nat Malkus/Sam Hollen – American Enterprise Institute

  The COVID-19 pandemic drove up chronic absenteeism in nearly every school and student demographic, making district leaders’ task of targeting resources difficult. Whom do you help when every student is a candidate? Existing work shows that it is possible to predict absenteeism in advance, but past approaches are largely proprietary or hard for district leaders to use. We present a series of early-warning systems, starting very simple and adding complexity, with district leaders’ needs and constraints in mind.

Recommended Weekend Reads

Listen to Venezuelan Opposition Leader Machado Learn She Has Won the Nobel Peace Prize, Preparing for Putin’s Death, How Ukraine has Crippled Russia’s Oil Lifeline, Where Could Reshoring Manufacturers Find Workers?

October 10 - 12, 2025

Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you.  Below is this week’s curated collection.  We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.

Latin America

• Recording of the Nobel Prize Director calling Machado to inform her She has Won the Nobel Peace Prize    Twitter

  “Oh my God… I have no words.” Listen to the emotional moment this year’s laureate, Maria Corina Machado, leader of the Venezuelan democracy movement, finds out she has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Kristian Berg Harpviken, Director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute, shared the news with her directly before it was announced to the world.

• Escalation Against the Maduro Regime in Venezuela: Puerto Rico’s Emerging Role in U.S. Power Projection   Center for Strategic & International Studies

  The United States is overseeing a seismic reordering of defense priorities and assets to the Western Hemisphere. At the time of this writing, four destroyers, one cruiser, one nuclear-powered attack submarine, one landing helicopter dock, two amphibious vessels, and one special operations platform, alongside a host of enablers and support vessels, are present in the Caribbean. In total, more than 10 percent of all deployed U.S. naval assets are currently located in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. These forces are more than a mere show of force; since the first warships entered the region in August, the U.S. military has conducted at least four lethal strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats in international waters, killing at least 21.  The next phase of operations could witness strikes within Venezuelan territorial waters or even on land. Reportedly, the Trump administration has already drawn up strike packages for such contingencies, which are currently being reviewed by the president. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has notified Congress of his determination that the United States is involved in a “non-international armed conflict” against drug trafficking groups now designated as foreign terrorist organizations, suggesting that the tempo of operations will only increase in the coming weeks.

• Understanding Trump’s Shift on Brazil    Americas Quarterly

  Donald Trump’s Brazil strategy was not working. Instead of helping former President Jair Bolsonaro avoid prison or be allowed to run again in 2026, a barrage of U.S. tariffs and sanctions was having the opposite effect—hastening Bolsonaro’s conviction while boosting the popularity of his rival, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Brazil’s economy seemed to handle the strains surprisingly well, while a procession of business leaders to the White House in recent weeks warned of risks to U.S. inflation from coffee, beef, and other goods. So the U.S. president did what he has on other occasions: He listened. And then he changed course. Trump’s brief encounter with Lula at the United Nations, after which he proclaimed they had “excellent chemistry,” was not a chance meeting. And then they had a phone call. What comes next? 

Russia 

• Preparing for Putin’s Death     The Rand Corporation

  Vladimir Putin is the longest-serving Russian ruler since Joseph Stalin. He turns 73 on Oct. 7, old for a Russian, but even if he is fanatical about his health, he cannot continue indefinitely. It is essential to consider who might succeed him.  This is a challenging task—under Putin's rule, the Russian political system has, once again, become an authoritarian dictatorship bearing some of the features of a personality cult. Under these conditions, Putin has not, as far as we can tell, been publicly grooming a successor, presumably because his personal authority would begin to ebb to them, and because they would become a target for others who fear losing their influence.

• How Russia Recovered    Dara Massicot/Foreign Affairs

  The story of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been one of upset expectations and wild swings in performance. At the start of the war, most of NATO saw Russia as an unstoppable behemoth, poised to quickly defeat Ukraine. Instead, Russia’s forces were halted in their tracks and pushed back. Then, outside observers decided the Russian military was rotten, perhaps one counterattack away from collapse. That also proved incorrect—Ukrainian offensives failed, and Moscow resumed its slow advance. Now, plenty of people look beyond Russia to understand the state of the battlefield, blaming Kyiv’s troubles on insufficient external backing instead.  What many policymakers and strategists have missed is the extent to which Moscow has learned from its failures and adapted its strategy and approach to war, in Ukraine and beyond. Today, the military is institutionalizing its knowledge, realigning its defense manufacturers and research organizations to support wartime needs, and pairing tech startups with state resources.

• Ukraine’s Drone War Is Crippling Russia’s Oil Lifeline   National Security Journal

  Ukraine’s expanding long-range drone fleet has knocked nearly 40% of Russia’s oil refineries offline. According to an analysis by BeefeaterFella, with refined fuels yielding far higher margins than crude, Russia could be losing $3–6 billion annually in revenue, while shortages, rationing, and black markets spread at home.  Since January, 21 of Russia’s 38 major refineries have been struck, with successful Ukrainian attacks already 48% higher than in all of 2024, according to the BBC. The cascading effects are being felt far from the battlefield. Owners of small petrol stations in Siberia told Russian media they were forced to close due to supply shortfalls, with one manager in Novosibirsk comparing the crisis to the hyperinflation of post-Soviet Russia.

Trade, Tariffs, and Reshoring of Manufacturing

• Where Could Reshoring Manufacturers Find Workers?    Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

  The announcement of new tariffs this year has reignited the discussion of whether the United States can expand its manufacturing employment by millions of workers. Reversing decades of manufacturing job losses is one explicit goal of the new higher tariffs. This District Data Brief presents measures of employment and demographics as context around the current and potential employment in US manufacturing. Raising manufacturing employment by 4 to 6 million workers would constitute a large increase relative to current levels. However, an increase of this scale would not be large relative to the global growth of manufacturing employment in recent decades, the current US labor force size, or the number of US adults not engaged in high-paying work

• SORCE Insights: Tariff-Related Uncertainty and Pass-Through to Pricing   The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

  In the Survey of Regional Conditions and Expectations (SORCE) fielded in June 2025, the Cleveland Fed asked respondents a set of special questions about the impact of tariffs and tariff-related uncertainty on costs, selling prices, staffing, and capital expenditure plans. Most respondents (64 percent) said that they were incurring costs caused by uncertainty over tariff rates, the direct expenses of paying tariffs, or both. Of these respondents, 68 percent expected to pass through at least some of those costs to their customers. About one in five firms said that they had scaled back plans to hire staff or make capital expenditures because of uncertainty over tariff rates.

• Who Will Pay for Tariffs? Businesses’ Expectations about Costs and Prices   Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

  Amid evolving global trade policy and rising tariff uncertainty, understanding how small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) form expectations about future costs and adjust their pricing is critical for assessing how the recently imposed tariffs on US imports could impact consumer prices. To that end, this brief analyzes several waves of a survey of owners and other decision-makers at a nationally representative sample of US SMBs. It focuses on waves conducted during the period of December 2024 to August 2025. Key Takeaways from this paper include:

  • From December 2024 to April 2025, the share of SMBs expecting larger tariffs increased considerably; expectations about the size of future tariffs also increased over time. 

  • In the August 2025 survey wave, SMBs whose costs are affected by the new tariffs reported paying an average tariff rate in July 2025 (11.4%) that was nearly double the average rate they paid in January 2025 (6.5%). 

  • SMBs that believe the new tariffs will persist for a year or longer expect to pass through as much as three times more of their cost increases into consumer prices compared with SMBs that believe the new tariffs will be short-lived. 

  • A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests a 0.75 percent near-term increase in core consumer prices stemming from recent tariff increases on directly imported consumer goods.

Recommended Weekend Reads

America’s Secret Weapon for its Critical Weapons Strategy, How China’s Economy is Weathering the Economic Storm, AI’s Exponential Growth is Not Impacting the Labor Market, and What Impact Pharma Tariffs Will Have on Healthcare Costs

October 3 - 5, 2025

Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you.  Below is this week’s curated collection.  We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.

Updates on the Global Race for Critical Minerals

• The Secret Weapon in America’s Critical Minerals Strategy    Hudson Institute’s “First Breakfast”

  Since 1980, leaders in Washington have stressed the need to secure rare earth supply chains to achieve strategic independence from America’s adversaries.  In the coming weeks, Congress will decide on legislation reauthorizing the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the little-known agency established during the first Trump administration as a counterweight to China’s predatory investment practices under its Belt & Road Initiative. The DFC maintains a dual mandate to advance U.S. foreign policy and economic development by mobilizing the private sector abroad, injecting capital, and offering insurance to support projects that further U.S. strategic goals. Given the great demand for rare earths and their refined products here at home, the DFC presents an opportunity to work with our foreign partners and American businesses to bolster our supply chains abroad. This is not a new idea; the creators of the BUILD Act, which authorized the DFC, envisioned the agency investing in key industries like mining, energy, and logistics. Unfortunately, results in the mineral sector have fallen short of these aspirations. Since operations began in December 2019, the DFC has made nearly 650 investments, fewer than a dozen of which are in mining-related projects.

• Leveraging US-Africa critical mineral opportunities: Strategies for success   Brookings Institution

  The U.S. is highly dependent on imports of critical minerals, but existing supply chains are vulnerable, plagued with high geographic concentration, slow mine development, and under-researched reserves. The authors argue for why Africa is uniquely positioned to partner with the U.S. in a supply chain realignment, given the former’s significant reserves, existing mining and refining infrastructure, and business opportunities along development corridors. With other countries such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union entering into the African critical minerals sector, the U.S. should not be left behind.  The authors provide actionable recommendations to both the U.S. and African countries for creating and growing a mutually beneficial critical minerals partnership.

Russia & China 

• Changing Course in a Storm: China’s Economy in the Trade War     China Leadership Monitor

  China is weathering deflation, a property-sector collapse, and renewed trade tensions with the United States through calculated restraint rather than panic. Exports remain resilient via market diversification and price cuts. Chinese leaders are deploying targeted fiscal interventions, pursuing supply-side reforms, and combating “involution”–destructive race-to-the-bottom competition eroding profits across industries. This strategic patience reveals Beijing’s fundamental gamble: accept short-term economic pain to build long-term technological dominance and self-sufficiency. The leadership believes that the emerging high-tech sectors will ultimately replace both lost export markets and the crumbling property engine. This is a high-stakes bet on China’s ability to transform its economic model under pressure.

• With Putin in Charge, Russia’s Vassalage to China Will Only Deepen     Carnegie Politika

  Moscow should be looking for ways to correct its course and restore balance in its foreign policy, instead of putting all its eggs in the China basket. But Putin is no pragmatic decision-maker, and the deepening vassalage to China is his own choice.

• Global FDI is uncoupling from China   Robin Brook’s Substack

  Brooks writes: “A few weeks ago, I wrote a post about how foreign investors have been putting less money to work in China, with non-resident flows into China a lot weaker since the invasion of Ukraine. Weaker foreign flows into China stand in contrast to flows to the rest of EM, where inflows have rebounded to very robust levels. This suggests that global markets - in the wake of the Ukraine invasion - are paying closer attention to geopolitical risks and are taking a more cautious approach to China.”

•  Don’t Overestimate the Autocratic Alliance     Foreign Affairs

  No moment captured the shifting global balance of power more vividly than when Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un walked in lockstep on the red carpet at China’s military parade in early September. The three autocrats, despite a long history of mutual suspicion, projected a show of unity against Washington. The message behind the carefully managed scene was unmistakable: China is at the center of a rising anti-Western bloc, while the United States is adrift—divided at home, faltering abroad, and rebuffed by its rivals.   But beneath this show of solidarity, China, North Korea, and Russia remain uneasy partners. What the three countries have is a tactical alignment rooted not in trust or shared values but in overlapping grievances and necessity. History demonstrates that they are not natural allies. Each state remains wary of entrapment and is unwilling to subordinate its national interests to those of the others. And crucially, each still seeks something from the United States—leverage that Washington must wield wisely.

Geoeconomics

• Evaluating the Impact of AI on the Labor Market: Current State of Affairs    The Yale Budget Lab

  The Yale Budget Lab looks at how AI is impacting employment – specifically, whether it is causing an increase in unemployment.  Their report shows that overall, their metrics indicate that the broader labor market has not experienced a discernible disruption since ChatGPT’s release 33 months ago, undercutting fears that AI automation is currently eroding the demand for cognitive labor across the economy.
  

• The Geoeconomic Interconnectivity Index        Bertelsmann Stiftung/ECIPE

  In today’s European neighborhood, trade, investment, and economic policy have become deeply entangled with geopolitical competition — involving the EU, the United States, China, and Russia as leading geoeconomic actors. The Geoeconomic Interconnectivity Index brings together a wide range of indicators across trade, investment, and economic policy in an accessible, comparable format. Covering the years 2010 to 2023, it provides a clear picture of evolving patterns of economic engagement.  The Index is designed to support timely and informed debate on the EU’s external policies — offering insights that matter in a geoeconomic age.

• How Pharmaceutical Tariffs Will Affect US Health Care Costs       Alex Brill/AEI Economic Perspectives

  Tariffs on pharmaceuticals are under consideration following a Section 232 investigation into imports of medicines and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). With US imports in 2024 totaling $210.8 billion in finished medicines and $36.2 billion in APIs, the threat of tariffs puts nearly $250 billion in trade at risk. Tariffs could raise list or net prices for pharmaceuticals, drive up insurance premiums, increase the risk of drug shortages, elevate costs for US producers using imported APIs, and reduce the competitiveness of US exports of finished drugs.

•  War, Geopolitics, Energy Crisis: How the Economy Evades Every Disaster   The Economist

  The world economy appears impressively and increasingly shock-absorbent. Supply chains in goods—widely believed to be a source of fragility—have shown themselves to be resilient. A more diverse supply of energy and a less fossil-fuel-intensive economy have reduced the impact of changes in the oil price. And across the world, economic policymaking has improved. According to the conventional narrative, the “great moderation”, a period of steady growth and predictable policymaking, ran from the late 1980s to the global financial crisis of 2007-09. But perhaps it did not die alongside Lehman Brothers.  This year, just 5% of countries are on track for a recession, according to IMF data—the least since 2007. Unemployment in the OECD club of rich countries is below 5% and close to a record low. In the first quarter of 2025, global corporate earnings rose by 7% year on year. Emerging markets, long prone to capital flight in times of trouble, now tend to avoid currency or debt crises (see chart 3). Consumers across the world, despite claiming to be down in the dumps, spend freely. On almost any measure, the economy is basically fine. 

Recommended Weekend Reads

The Geopolitics of Trump’s War on Drugs, America Loves Cocaine Again,  What is Stablecoin?, How Many Manufacturing Jobs Will Tariffs Create, and The Growing Link Between Marriage, Fertility, and Partisanship

September 26 - 28, 2025

Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you.  Below is this week’s curated collection.  We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.

The Geopolitics of Trump‘s War on Drug Cartels 

• The Wrong Way to Fight the Cartels    Ryan Berg/Foreign Affairs

  Since returning to the White House, U.S. President Donald Trump has pledged to defeat the Western Hemisphere’s violent drug traffickers by any means necessary. In a March address to Congress, Trump declared, “The cartels are waging war in America, and it’s time for America to wage war on the cartels.”  Washington has left behind its traditional conception of the fight against transnational criminal organizations as a matter of law enforcement with its threats of “war” and consideration of military action against the cartels.  A militarized approach may be a politically attractive way for Trump to project strength. And indeed, the United States can, and should, draw on many valuable lessons from the last two decades of counterterrorism missions during the “war on terror” in its campaign against the cartels. But there is a more productive path forward than drastically shifting the rules of engagement with transnational criminal groups.

• The Geopolitics of Trump’s War on Drugs     Americas Quarterly

  Half a century after former U.S. President Richard Nixon launched the war on drugs, global cocaine output and consumption are at record highs. According to the UN’s latest drug report, cocaine production jumped roughly a third in 2023 to over 3,700 tons, with usage rising to an estimated 25 million people. Over the past decade, narcotics supply chains have diversified, and demand has hardly blinked.   President Donald Trump’s second term has repackaged the drug war with sharper geopolitical edges. While fentanyl from Chinese sources seemed to be the president’s main focus during his campaign, the more traditional target of cocaine has lately become more prominent. Washington has pledged to “disrupt the supply chain from tooth to tail” and to “partner with – or otherwise hold accountable” source countries, language mirrored in the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) National Drug Threat Assessment 2024. 

•  America Loves Cocaine Again—Mexico’s New Drug King Cashes In    The Wall Street Journal

  Cocaine sold in the U.S. is cheaper and as pure as ever for retail buyers. Consumption in the western U.S. has increased 154% since 2019 and is up 19% during the same period in the eastern part of the country, according to the drug-testing company Millennium Health. In contrast, fentanyl use in the U.S. began to drop in mid-2023 and has been declining since, according to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  For new users, cocaine doesn’t carry the stigma of fentanyl addiction. Middle-class addicts and the tragic spectacle of homeless crack-cocaine users in the 1990s helped put a lid on America’s last cocaine epidemic.

Geoeconomics

• ‘Capital absorption’ is big in economic development. But what is it?   Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

  The term “capital absorption” is not well-known or easily understood. But it’s critical in the local economic development world, and I recently heard an analogy I think can help people understand it. Picture an irrigation system designed to direct the flow of money to the projects that need it most. Such a system frees communities from merely hoping that the unpredictable “rainfall” of funding falls in the right place. Instead, the system guarantees it gets there. That’s what capital absorption is. It’s coordination that helps local places absorb capital investments in the kinds of projects that can literally change what these places look like – things like child care centers, or housing, or downtown building renovations. Reliable systems are established and run by prepared partners to accept the funding when it appears and move it exactly where it’s needed, so the work can get done in ways that strengthen local economies.
  

• How Many Manufacturing Jobs Will Trump’s Tariffs Create? And at What Cost?    AEI Center for Technology, Science, Industry, and the State Project

  Secular decline in the share of manufacturing jobs in the labor force largely reflects the shift of consumer expenditures from goods to services. High tariffs cannot restore manufacturing jobs to the 27 percent share of the labor force experienced 60 years ago. Achieving Trump’s objective for eliminating the trade deficit in manufactures would require tariffs at least twice as high as those imposed through September 2025. The annual cost to American consumers of shifting each job from service employment to manufacturing employment through high tariffs exceeds $200,000.

•  What is a Stablecoin?      McKinsey & Company

  In the rapidly evolving world of digital assets, one innovation stands out for its potential to bring stability and reliability to the historically volatile blockchain-based currency market: the stablecoin. As the name suggests, a stablecoin is a type of digital currency designed to maintain a stable value. These digital currencies are pegged to a traditional fiat currency like the US dollar. Stablecoin use has increased significantly in recent years: In the past 18 months, the total market capitalization of stablecoins has more than doubled to $250 billion, from $120 billion, and industry forecasts expect it to reach up to $2 trillion by 2028. With major players like JPMorgan Chase experimenting with tokenized deposits and PayPal launching its own stablecoin, digital money is a major story in digital finance.  For individuals and organizations looking to capitalize on the benefits of blockchain-based transactions, what exactly is Stablecoin?

US Political & Social Trends

• The Growing Link Between Marriage, Fertility, And Partisanship   The Institute for Family Studies

  Conservative women born between 1975 and 1979—women who are finished having children—have a completed family size of 2.1, right at replacement. Moderate women in the same age group have 1.8 children, and liberal women just 1.5. Narrower gaps exist between conservatives born between 1985 and 1989, who have a completed fertility rate of 2.1, while moderates are at 1.9 and liberals 1.7. Conservative women born between 1995 and 1999 have, so far, only had 0.7 children, the same as moderates. Liberals in the same cohort average 0.4 so far. Differences between conservative and liberal women should not be overstated. Birthrates are lower for all groups when compared to the state of fertility before 1975. Marriage rates for all groups are lower, too. Yet the differences are large enough that the parties ultimately appeal to manifestly different constituencies.

•  It's Not Just You: Americans Are Still Not Hanging Out      Generation Tech

  The average American spent 38 minutes a day socializing in 2019 and 35 minutes in 2024. In 2024, for the first time, adults 50 and older spent (very slightly) more time socializing in person than teens and young adults. Young people’s social time is at an all-time low in the 21-year history of the survey. Fifteen- to 25-year-olds spend 26 fewer minutes a day socializing in person than they did in 2003. That’s three hours a week, 13 hours a month, and 158 hours a year less getting together with friends, having a face-to-face conversation, meeting for dinner, or chatting before seeing a movie together. No wonder so many more teens now describe themselves as lonely.

• Why do only humans weep? The evolutionary puzzle of crying     BigThink

  In an excerpt from Steven Pinker’s new book, When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows…, Pinker explains that crying is not just an expression of sadness but an evolved signal of surrender, helplessness, and a plea for comfort. However, tears can also mark moments of joy, compassion, and awe, reflecting the emotional opposites of the things that make us laugh.  The unique human capacity to weep may have evolved to strengthen social bonds and generate common knowledge regarding our inner states.
  

• If I Work Harder, Will You Love Me?    Arthur Brooks/The Atlantic

  Between teaching Harvard MBA students and speaking to a lot of business audiences, I’m often interacting with successful people who work extremely long hours. It’s common for me to hear about 13-hour workdays and seven-day workweeks, with few or no vacations. What I see among many of those I encounter is workaholism, a pathology characterized by continuing to work during discretionary time, thinking about work all the time, and pursuing job tasks well beyond what’s required to meet any need. Workaholics feel a compulsion to work even when they are already earning plenty of money and despite getting minimal enjoyment from doing so.

Recommended Weekend Reads

Assessing the EU’s Defense Sector Build-Up, New Studies on the Economic Impact of Trump’s Tariffs, China’s “Anti-Involution” Campaign, and Russia’s Shrewd Focus on Africa 

September 19 - 21, 2025

Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you.  Below is this week’s curated collection.  We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.

The Growth of the EU’s Defense Sector

• Progress and Shortfalls in Europe’s Defense: An Assessment    International Institute for Strategic Studies

  This IISS Strategic Dossier examines important capability areas that European allies need to address in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and overdependence on the US. The aim is to identify existing gaps and challenges but also note where progress has already been made towards a situation where adequate capabilities for the defense of Europe are provided by Europeans in a more autonomous way, while still working with partners and allies.

• Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (2014 – 2025)        NATO

  NATO collects defense expenditure data from Allies and publishes it on a regular basis. Each Ally’s Ministry of Defence reports current and estimated future defense expenditure according to an agreed definition. The amounts represent payments by a national government that have been or will be made during the course of the fiscal year to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of Allies or of the Alliance. In the figures and tables that follow, NATO also uses economic and demographic information available from the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission (DG ECFIN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In view of differences between these sources and national GDP forecasts, and also the definition of NATO defense expenditure and national definitions, the figures shown in this report may considerably diverge from those that are referenced by media, published by national authorities or given in national budgets. Equipment expenditure includes expenditure on major equipment as well as on research and development devoted to major equipment. Personnel expenditure includes pensions paid to retirees. The cut-off date for information used in this report was 3 June 2025. Figures for 2024 and 2025 are estimates.

• The EU’s Road to Economic Security De-Risking, Strategic Investments and Critical Partnerships   Italian Institute for International Political Studies

  The European Union has redefined its strategic priorities through three phases: the rise of geoeconomics, the structuring of de-risking, and its current testing in a shifting global context. Geoeconomics exposed the link between economy, security, and power, driven by US and Chinese strategies to weaponize industrial assets and by renewed geopolitical rivalry. Europe’s dependence on critical raw materials, especially Chinese rare earths, accelerated the push for strategic autonomy. Since 2021, with the European Economic Security Strategy, the Chips Act, and the Critical Raw Materials Act, Brussels has pursued de-risking as diversification rather than decoupling, focusing on semiconductors, green technologies, and critical minerals. Yet US, Japanese, and South Korean industrial policies show de-risking is a broader challenge. The EU must now deliver concrete results, combining competitiveness and resilience with multilateral cooperation. How can Europe secure adequate resources to meet these goals? And how can it balance industrial autonomy with global partnerships?

China’s Competitiveness Challenge

• China Wants to Integrate AI Into 90 Percent of Its Economy by 2030. It Won’t Work.   Carnegie Emissary

  Recently, Beijing debuted its latest strategy for winning the AI race. China’s powerful State Council laid out an ambitious vision to rapidly diffuse AI into six key areas, ranging from accelerating scientific research and development to improving governance capacity. The plan sets striking, concrete targets that include deploying a range of applications across 90 percent of wide swaths of its economy in just five years. China’s latest plan is part of a broader strategic bet. The PRC thinks it can integrate AI throughout its society to turbocharge its economy and secure AI leadership. It’s a playbook the country has used before. During the mid-2010s, China transformed its digital economy by diffusing internet applications throughout what Beijing calls the “real economy.”  But this time could be very different. Chinese leadership is confident in its AI development, but—perhaps counterintuitively—investors are not. China’s venture capital ecosystem is dry at this critical moment for AI, and as a result, Beijing’s aspirations are likely to fall short of the whole-of-society economic transformation the party wants. U.S. policymakers should mostly ignore China’s aspirational rhetoric and focus on what it can achieve in practice.  

• Involution and Industry Self-Discipline: Echoes from the Past    Center for Strategic and International Studies

  No doubt the word of the year in China is “involution.” The term in Chinese really did not exist prior to 2020, but its use has exploded since, particularly in 2025. When the Chinese term first emerged in popular culture in China a few years ago, the initial application was to Chinese students and young people trapped in highly competitive schools and jobs that brought little personal fulfillment, with immense efforts and sacrifices that to many seemed ultimately meaningless, a feeling made more acute by the arrival of the pandemic. This led many to respond by giving up on their ambitions and “lying flat”, which has also been a source of much social debate.   

  In 2025, involution now refers specifically to the widespread phenomenon of continued massive expansion of production in sector after sector, despite any semblance of sufficient domestic demand to absorb these goods. Chinese officialdom has vociferously rebutted charges by foreign governments that China has been suffering from “overcapacity.  As part of this retort, it has been argued that industrial policy and subsidies are not the source of China’s industrial strength, but rather high quality and competitiveness. As a result, governments around the world are wrong to impose any restrictions on Chinese exports.  But while China is rebuffing international charges of overcapacity, it has opened the doors to a domestic debate about involution and how to tackle it. Hence, the emergence of a highly public conversation about “anti-involution policy, a catch-phrase which has also spread like wildfire.

 Updates on Global Trade Wars

• Markets shrug off trade conflicts    Bank for International Settlements

  In a new study, BIS found that global financial markets maintained a risk-on tone during the review period, shrugging off concerns over mounting tariff and policy uncertainty. Despite short-lived bouts of volatility triggered by incoming data and political developments, market sentiment remained upbeat, defying mounting challenges, including unease over the longer-run fiscal outlook in several key jurisdictions. Short-term bonds priced in greater policy easing, but long-term yields stayed high and yield curves steepened at the very long end on fiscal and inflation concerns.  Emerging market assets saw gains, benefiting from the risk-on environment and the weakening of the US dollar.

• The Trump Shock That Wasn’t (At Least Not Yet)   Brad Setser/Council on Foreign Relations

  President Trump’s tariffs have been a profound shock to the global trade rules.  They have generated enormous volatility in measured trade flows. But so far the volatility has essentially come from pharmaceuticals and gold (including gold bars, or imports of “metal forms”). The impact of the tariffs core trade flows—and hence the global economy—has been modest, at least so far. 

• Tariffs, Manufacturing Employment, and Supply Chains    Joseph Steinberg/NBER

  Abstract: I use a dynamic general-equilibrium model with supply-chain adjustment frictions to study the effects of tariffs on manufacturing employment. The model has four distinct manufacturing sectors: upstream goods with high trade elasticities (“oil”); upstream goods with low trade elasticities (“steel”); downstream goods with high trade elasticities (“toys”); and downstream goods with low trade elasticities (“cars”). I find that tariffs can increase overall manufacturing employment in the long run, but are likely to reduce it in the short run, and cause more reallocation of workers across these individual sectors than overall employment growth.

Russian Foreign Policy 

• Russia is Shrewdly Playing the Long Game in Africa    War on the Rocks

  What if Moscow’s most dangerous moves right now aren’t in Europe, but along the Gulf of Guinea? With its resources sunk deep into Ukraine, the Russian military has weighed carefully whether and when to engage elsewhere, standing aside amid recent conflicts in the South Caucasus and Middle East. An exception to this pattern of inaction is in West Africa. After the failed mutiny of Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023, the Russian government established a new paramilitary group called Africa Corps, tethered closely to the military chain of command. The unit then progressively took over most of Wagner’s operations in Africa and expanded into Burkina Faso and Niger. It now seems to be eyeing a presence in Benin and Togo next. These activities suggest that Russia is seeking a West African foothold on which to build once an end to the war on Ukraine frees up additional conventional military forces. Russia may then try to further extend Africa Corps’ presence.

• The Scale of Russian Sabotage Operations Against Europe’s Critical Infrastructure    IISS

  Russia is waging an unconventional war on Europe. Through its campaign of sabotage, vandalism, espionage and covert action, Russia’s aim has been to destabilize European governments, undermine public support for Ukraine by imposing social and economic costs on Europe, and weaken the collective ability of NATO and the European Union to respond to Russian aggression. This unconventional war began to escalate in 2022 in parallel to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Russia has so far failed to achieve its primary aim, European capitals have struggled to respond to Russian sabotage operations and have found it challenging to agree a unified response, coordinate action, develop effective deterrence measures and impose sufficient costs on the Kremlin. IISS has created the most comprehensive open-source database of suspected and confirmed Russian sabotage operations targeting Europe. The data reveals Russian sabotage has been aimed at Europe’s critical infrastructure, is decentralized and, despite European security and intelligence officials raising the alarm, is largely unaffected by NATO, EU and member state responses to date.

Recommended Weekend Reads

Are the CRINKs a Real Global Power Bloc Or Not? Taking a Deep Dive into the US-Japan Trade Deal, and the Projected Impact of Generative AI on Productivity Growth

September 12 - 14, 2025

Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you.  Below is this week’s curated collection.  We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.

What’s Up with The CRINK’s?

• CRINK Economic Ties: Uneven Patterns of Collaboration   Center for Strategic and International Studies

  This brief explores the post-2022 economic ties among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—the so-called CRINK states. Historically, economic alignment among military allies has been uneven and has not necessarily indicated the formation of a cohesive bloc. The World War II–era Axis powers, for instance, had fragmented economic cooperation due to geographic distance, wartime needs, sanctions, mistrust, and a focus on self-sufficiency—factors that also constrain CRINK today. Still, signs, including rising trade in energy and dual-use technologies, point to growing economic coordination. Assessing these ties is difficult, however, due to limited or opaque data (especially from Iran and North Korea) and increased informal trade since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This brief draws from diverse international and industry-specific sources to fill data gaps. Findings show uneven patterns: China-Russia economic ties have grown, especially in energy and dual-use goods, but Chinese investment in Russia remains modest amid concerns over sanctions-related investment risks. Other CRINK members show far weaker economic coordination.
  

• Russia’s New Fear Factor   Foreign Affairs

  Among elites in Russia today, something dark is happening.  According to Novaya Gazeta, the independent Russian newspaper, there have been 56 deaths of successful businesspeople and officials under strange circumstances since February 2022. Many of them have fallen out of windows.  More and more, people who have loyally served Putin’s system are being persecuted, mainly on the grounds of corruption.  As the Putin regime turns on its own people, it, too, has begun to replace them with a new breed of loyalists, people whose primary qualifications are their apparent fealty to the leader, and sometimes their participation in the war. Still, Putin prefers experienced and talented technocrats for the most responsible positions, such as governors and ministers. After more than three and a half years of war and mounting economic challenges, Putin’s aim is not to fight corruption. His goal is to avoid internal threats. And to do that, he needs to turn the elites into a frightened and therefore controllable class.
  

• China’s Anti-Western Bloc? Not So Fast   Center For European Analysis

  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin from August 31-September 1 was filled with carefully curated images of the post-Western world that China is working to construct.  For the men complaining that they, and their peoples, have been poorly rewarded by the global system, this was a big moment. Photographs captured China’s Xi Jinping, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and India’s Narendra Modi in a huddle and holding hands. That in itself was enough to send a not-very-friendly message to the United States and its European and Asian allies.  But that snapshot failed to show intense competing agendas among these countries. For now, at least, it is premature to interpret it as either a significant challenge to the Western order or an alliance of authoritarian states. 

• Why India and China Remain Bitter Rivals    Shyam Saran/Time

  Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary of India and the author of “How China Sees India and the World.”  In this essay, he argues that the visuals of exaggerated cordiality between Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, President Vladimir Putin of Russia, and President Xi Jinping of China at the recently held Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit on September 1 displayed China’s convening power. But the gathering of major non-Western leaders in Tianjin, a city in eastern China, didn’t do much to resolve the long-standing border dispute and ever-growing competition between India and China. 

Update on the Trade Wars

• Investing in Security and Success: Analysis of the US-Japan $550 Billion Strategic Investment Fund    The Hudson Institute

  The centerpiece of the recent trade agreement between the United States and Japan was Japan’s promise to invest $550 billion in a new fund that would help “rebuild and expand core American industries.” On September 4, the US and Japan signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that details the full scope of the investment framework, including:

  • Japan should allocate the $550 billion before President Donald Trump’s term ends on January 19, 2029.

  • Investments should go to key strategic sectors—semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, metals, shipbuilding, energy (including pipelines), artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing.

  • The president will create an investment committee to recommend and oversee investments. The US Secretary of Commerce will chair the investment committee and select its other members.

  • A consultation committee, with designees from both the United States and Japan, will advise an investment committee, which will then recommend projects. The consultation committee will also provide legal and strategic input to the investment committee.

  • The United States Investment Accelerator will execute, manage, and administer the investments. This office is based within the Department of Commerce, and the Secretary of Commerce has the power to appoint its executive director.

  • The US will create a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for each investment. The US or its designees will govern these investment SPVs.

  • With the president’s approval, the US will propose projects and their investment amounts for Japan to review. Japan will have about two months to respond and transfer the necessary funds—in US dollars—to the investment accelerator.

  • Japan has the right to decline to fund all or part of a project. But the US can then impose tariffs on Japanese imports in response.

  • Japan and the US will evenly split profits from the project until Japan recoups its investment. Afterward, profits will be disbursed at a ratio of 90 percent to the US and 10 percent to Japan.

  • The US government will try to arrange leases to federal land, access, water, power, and energy to investment projects, as well as organize offtake arrangements. The federal government will also expedite relevant regulatory processes.

  • When possible, Japanese firms will receive priority over comparable foreign firms to serve as vendors and suppliers for projects.

• A Guide to Trump’s Section 232 Tariffs, in Maps   Council on Foreign Relations

  Section 232 tariffs aim to protect U.S. national security. Created by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Section 232 empowers the president to charge duties pending the results of a Department of Commerce investigation into the imports’ effects on national security. The Donald Trump administration has already used this tool to raise levies on aluminum, cars and car parts, copper, and steel—and has launched Section 232 investigations into nine other types of products. These twelve graphics dive into each sector, laying out the scale of imports, their concentration by country, and the geopolitics of exporting nations, separating friends—NATO members, major non-NATO allies, and free trade agreement (FTA) partners—from potential foes.

Geoeconomics, Data Centers, and Power Generation

• Financial Bubbles Happen Less Often Than You Think   William Goetzman/Wall Street Journal

  Bubbles loom large in our historical understanding of the financial markets. They are memorable. They are colorful. They are scary. They raise questions about investor psychology and the madness of crowds. In good times, we worry if we’re going to be caught in the next big bubble. Looking at financial bubbles since 1790, however, we find that they are much rarer than their presence in the public imagination—and not necessarily purely negative. They sometimes set the stage for major changes in people’s worldviews, upending old ideas about the possibilities and limitations of business. Sometimes bubbles remake society itself, as all that investor money funds technological advances that change the world.

• The New Economic Nationalism: Industrial Policy and National Security in the United States, China, and the European Union    Geoforum

  Abstract: This paper examines the resurgence of industrial policy and national security strategy across the United States, China, and the European Union. We analyze how these major economic powers are implementing distinct approaches to industrial policy while pursuing similar objectives of technological leadership and national economic prosperity. The United States has adopted a hawkish stance with extensive trade policies and subsidies. China has pursued ambitious growth in a range of sectors through long-term planning and strong government control. The European Union has balanced autonomy with trade openness and somewhat less state intervention. Our comparative analysis reveals that while these policies may be successful in strengthening domestic economies, they collectively reshape the world economy in ways that may disadvantage other nations, especially in the global South. However, ‘connector’ countries in the global South are benefiting by forging strategic ties with several superpowers. Additionally, the rise of China gives hope for South-South development cooperation that upend existing imperial arrangements often characterized by North-South relations. We argue that the convergence of industrial policy and national security represents more than a temporary response to recent disruptions; it signals a fundamental shift in the world economy towards more economic nationalism.

• The Projected Impact of Generative AI on Future Productivity Growth   Penn Wharton Budget Model

  The Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM) team estimates that 40 percent of current GDP could be substantially affected by generative AI. Occupations around the 80th percentile of earnings are the most exposed, with around half of their work susceptible to automation by AI, on average. The highest-earning occupations are less exposed, and the lowest-earning occupations are the least exposed. 

  • AI’s boost to productivity growth is strongest in the early 2030s, with a peak annual contribution of 0.2 percentage points in 2032. After adoption saturates, growth reverts to trend. Because sectors that are more exposed to AI have faster trend TFP growth, sectoral shifts during the AI transition add a lasting 0.04 percentage point boost to aggregate growth. 

  • Compounded, TFP and GDP levels are 1.5% higher by 2035, nearly 3% by 2055, and 3.7% by 2075, meaning that AI leads to a permanent increase in the level of economic activity. 

  • Caution is required in interpreting these projections of AI’s impact, which are based on limited data on AI’s initial effects. Future data and developments in AI technology could lead to a significant change in these estimates.

  • In ongoing work, PWBM is estimating the impact of AI on the federal budget. In very preliminary analysis, we estimate that AI could reduce deficits by $400 billion over the ten-year budget window between 2026 and 2035.

• How Retainable are AI-Exposed Workers?     Federal Reserve Bank of New York

  Abstract:  We document the extent to which workers in AI-exposed occupations can successfully retrain for AI- intensive work. We assemble a new workforce development dataset spanning over 1.6 million job training participation spells from all U.S. Workforce Investment and Opportunity Act programs from 2012 to 2023, linked with occupational measures of AI exposure. Using earnings records observed before and after training, we compare high AI exposure trainees to a matched sample of similar workers who only received job search assistance. We find that the average earnings return to training among AI-exposed workers is high, around $1,470 per quarter. Low-exposure trainees capture higher returns, and trainees who target AI-intensive work face a 29 percent earnings return penalty relative to their high-exposure peers who pursue more general training. We estimate that between 25 and 40 percent of occupations are “AI retrainable” as measured by their workers receiving higher pay for moving to more AI-intensive occupations—a large magnitude given the relatively low-income sample of displaced workers. Positive earnings returns in all groups are driven by the most recent years when labor markets were tightest, suggesting training programs may have stronger signal value when firms reach deeper into the skill market.  

• Data Centers Make the Beige Book, Plus Power Problems    Paul Kedrosky Blog

  Recent reports from the Federal Reserve’s Beige Book and five regional Federal Reserve Banks point out that the explosion of data center construction is “causing a step increase in regional electricity loads” – meaning, power generation is the biggest constraint on continued data center capex at the current rate.