Recommended Weekend Reads
Listen to Venezuelan Opposition Leader Machado Learn She Has Won the Nobel Peace Prize, Preparing for Putin’s Death, How Ukraine has Crippled Russia’s Oil Lifeline, Where Could Reshoring Manufacturers Find Workers?
October 10 - 12, 2025
Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you. Below is this week’s curated collection. We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.
Latin America
“Oh my God… I have no words.” Listen to the emotional moment this year’s laureate, Maria Corina Machado, leader of the Venezuelan democracy movement, finds out she has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Kristian Berg Harpviken, Director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute, shared the news with her directly before it was announced to the world.
Escalation Against the Maduro Regime in Venezuela: Puerto Rico’s Emerging Role in U.S. Power Projection Center for Strategic & International Studies
The United States is overseeing a seismic reordering of defense priorities and assets to the Western Hemisphere. At the time of this writing, four destroyers, one cruiser, one nuclear-powered attack submarine, one landing helicopter dock, two amphibious vessels, and one special operations platform, alongside a host of enablers and support vessels, are present in the Caribbean. In total, more than 10 percent of all deployed U.S. naval assets are currently located in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. These forces are more than a mere show of force; since the first warships entered the region in August, the U.S. military has conducted at least four lethal strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats in international waters, killing at least 21. The next phase of operations could witness strikes within Venezuelan territorial waters or even on land. Reportedly, the Trump administration has already drawn up strike packages for such contingencies, which are currently being reviewed by the president. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has notified Congress of his determination that the United States is involved in a “non-international armed conflict” against drug trafficking groups now designated as foreign terrorist organizations, suggesting that the tempo of operations will only increase in the coming weeks.
Understanding Trump’s Shift on Brazil Americas Quarterly
Donald Trump’s Brazil strategy was not working. Instead of helping former President Jair Bolsonaro avoid prison or be allowed to run again in 2026, a barrage of U.S. tariffs and sanctions was having the opposite effect—hastening Bolsonaro’s conviction while boosting the popularity of his rival, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Brazil’s economy seemed to handle the strains surprisingly well, while a procession of business leaders to the White House in recent weeks warned of risks to U.S. inflation from coffee, beef, and other goods. So the U.S. president did what he has on other occasions: He listened. And then he changed course. Trump’s brief encounter with Lula at the United Nations, after which he proclaimed they had “excellent chemistry,” was not a chance meeting. And then they had a phone call. What comes next?
Russia
Preparing for Putin’s Death The Rand Corporation
Vladimir Putin is the longest-serving Russian ruler since Joseph Stalin. He turns 73 on Oct. 7, old for a Russian, but even if he is fanatical about his health, he cannot continue indefinitely. It is essential to consider who might succeed him. This is a challenging task—under Putin's rule, the Russian political system has, once again, become an authoritarian dictatorship bearing some of the features of a personality cult. Under these conditions, Putin has not, as far as we can tell, been publicly grooming a successor, presumably because his personal authority would begin to ebb to them, and because they would become a target for others who fear losing their influence.
How Russia Recovered Dara Massicot/Foreign Affairs
The story of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been one of upset expectations and wild swings in performance. At the start of the war, most of NATO saw Russia as an unstoppable behemoth, poised to quickly defeat Ukraine. Instead, Russia’s forces were halted in their tracks and pushed back. Then, outside observers decided the Russian military was rotten, perhaps one counterattack away from collapse. That also proved incorrect—Ukrainian offensives failed, and Moscow resumed its slow advance. Now, plenty of people look beyond Russia to understand the state of the battlefield, blaming Kyiv’s troubles on insufficient external backing instead. What many policymakers and strategists have missed is the extent to which Moscow has learned from its failures and adapted its strategy and approach to war, in Ukraine and beyond. Today, the military is institutionalizing its knowledge, realigning its defense manufacturers and research organizations to support wartime needs, and pairing tech startups with state resources.
Ukraine’s Drone War Is Crippling Russia’s Oil Lifeline National Security Journal
Ukraine’s expanding long-range drone fleet has knocked nearly 40% of Russia’s oil refineries offline. According to an analysis by BeefeaterFella, with refined fuels yielding far higher margins than crude, Russia could be losing $3–6 billion annually in revenue, while shortages, rationing, and black markets spread at home. Since January, 21 of Russia’s 38 major refineries have been struck, with successful Ukrainian attacks already 48% higher than in all of 2024, according to the BBC. The cascading effects are being felt far from the battlefield. Owners of small petrol stations in Siberia told Russian media they were forced to close due to supply shortfalls, with one manager in Novosibirsk comparing the crisis to the hyperinflation of post-Soviet Russia.
Trade, Tariffs, and Reshoring of Manufacturing
Where Could Reshoring Manufacturers Find Workers? Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
The announcement of new tariffs this year has reignited the discussion of whether the United States can expand its manufacturing employment by millions of workers. Reversing decades of manufacturing job losses is one explicit goal of the new higher tariffs. This District Data Brief presents measures of employment and demographics as context around the current and potential employment in US manufacturing. Raising manufacturing employment by 4 to 6 million workers would constitute a large increase relative to current levels. However, an increase of this scale would not be large relative to the global growth of manufacturing employment in recent decades, the current US labor force size, or the number of US adults not engaged in high-paying work
SORCE Insights: Tariff-Related Uncertainty and Pass-Through to Pricing The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
In the Survey of Regional Conditions and Expectations (SORCE) fielded in June 2025, the Cleveland Fed asked respondents a set of special questions about the impact of tariffs and tariff-related uncertainty on costs, selling prices, staffing, and capital expenditure plans. Most respondents (64 percent) said that they were incurring costs caused by uncertainty over tariff rates, the direct expenses of paying tariffs, or both. Of these respondents, 68 percent expected to pass through at least some of those costs to their customers. About one in five firms said that they had scaled back plans to hire staff or make capital expenditures because of uncertainty over tariff rates.
Who Will Pay for Tariffs? Businesses’ Expectations about Costs and Prices Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Amid evolving global trade policy and rising tariff uncertainty, understanding how small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) form expectations about future costs and adjust their pricing is critical for assessing how the recently imposed tariffs on US imports could impact consumer prices. To that end, this brief analyzes several waves of a survey of owners and other decision-makers at a nationally representative sample of US SMBs. It focuses on waves conducted during the period of December 2024 to August 2025. Key Takeaways from this paper include:
From December 2024 to April 2025, the share of SMBs expecting larger tariffs increased considerably; expectations about the size of future tariffs also increased over time.
In the August 2025 survey wave, SMBs whose costs are affected by the new tariffs reported paying an average tariff rate in July 2025 (11.4%) that was nearly double the average rate they paid in January 2025 (6.5%).
SMBs that believe the new tariffs will persist for a year or longer expect to pass through as much as three times more of their cost increases into consumer prices compared with SMBs that believe the new tariffs will be short-lived.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests a 0.75 percent near-term increase in core consumer prices stemming from recent tariff increases on directly imported consumer goods.