Fulcrum Perspectives
An interactive blog sharing the Fulcrum team's policy updates and analysis.
Recommended Weekend Reads
Looking at How the Iran War is Impacting the Rest of the World, Will a Tax on Billionaires Have the Desired Effect? and Why Brazil’s Lula is Struggling Ahead of the October Elections
March 13 - 15, 2026
Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting. Hopefully, you will find them of interest and useful as well. Have a great weekend.
The Growing Global Impact of the US-Israel- Iran War
The Other Global Crisis Stemming from the Strait of Hormuz’s Blockage Carnegie Endowment
The Gulf region is a key producer not only of liquified natural gas (LNG) and oil products but also of fertilizer. About one-third of global seaborne trade in fertilizers typically passes through the Strait of Hormuz, which has been nearly entirely closed since the United States and Israel attacked Iran on February 28. In particular, Gulf countries are important producers of nitrogen fertilizers, which depend primarily on natural gas burned at high pressure in the presence of hydrogen to synthesize ammonia. (The hydrogen usually comes from natural gas as well.). But it’s not just that Gulf fertilizer can’t make it to export markets such as Sudan, Brazil, or Sri Lanka. It’s also that fertilizer producers elsewhere lack key ingredients. This is where the second-order effects of a supply chain crisis appear, just as they did during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which sent fertilizer prices soaring. Deprived of their natural gas supplies from Qatar, fertilizer firms in India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have had to shut down production. Egypt, another important producer, has lost its gas imports from Israel and must turn to the ever-pricier LNG market. The benchmark price of urea, the most widely traded fertilizer, is up about 30 percent in the last month.
Germany’s Stress Test Markus Ziener/German Marshall Fund
The outbreak of armed conflict between Iran and the United States and Israel has become a direct stress test of Chancellor Friedrich Merz's government. It is once again exposing the fragility of Germany's post-2022 energy strategy and the dilemmas of European support for Ukraine. Further, it raises the question of whether Germany can be a security provider in an era of hard conflict.
How Azerbaijan Views the Iran War The National Interest
After two Iranian drones struck Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave last week, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev demanded that Tehran apologize and punish those responsible. Threatening to respond with an “iron fist” if it refused, he ordered the armed forces to prepare “retaliatory measures.” The White House quickly condemned the strikes, declaring: “Attacks on the territory of our partners in the region are unacceptable and will be met with resolute US support for those partners.” The keyword in that statement is partner. America is drafting a new strategic map—tracing a line from Central Asia through the Caucasus to Europe—and Azerbaijan sits squarely at its center. Azerbaijan is the only country that borders both Russia and Iran. Any land route linking Europe with East Asia—if it is to avoid control by Moscow or Tehran—must pass through the South Caucasus and across Azerbaijani territory. In a world increasingly shaped by strategic competition between the United States and its allies on one side and China, Russia, and Iran on the other, this territory could decide the winners.
Shockwaves Across Asia: The Iran War’s Strategic Fallout The Diplomat
The Israeli-U.S. military strikes on Iran that began on February 28 have done more than ignite a Middle Eastern war. They have sent shockwaves rolling across Asia, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Sea of Japan, exposing the brittle underpinnings of regional energy systems, straining diplomatic balancing acts, and forcing governments to make hard choices they have long deferred. The conflict is, at its core, a distant war for most of Asia. But the consequences are arriving fast and close.
Europe’s Disjointed Response to the U.S.- Israeli War with Iran Council on Foreign Relations
The speed and scale of the Iran took most European governments by surprise. After leaving Europe in the dark about the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, the United States launched a major military operation in the Middle East with little to no consultation with its allies in Europe, while expecting to use their bases and receive their broad support. Once again, European leaders found themselves scrambling to react to a conflict they had neither anticipated nor prepared for—and one in which they had little direct leverage. The result has been a strikingly disjointed European response.
What Is the Endgame in Iran? Colin Kahl/Foreign Affairs
The fog of war is thick in Iran, but two things are already crystal clear. No one can question the unrivaled military prowess displayed by the United States and Israel. Since February 28, U.S. and Israeli forces have killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, struck thousands of military targets across Iran. Nor should anyone doubt the cruelty of the Iranian regime they are targeting, which has spent decades killing Americans, brutalizing its own people, threatening its neighbors with missiles and terrorist proxies, and racing to build up its nuclear program. But so much else about this war of choice remains unclear, and the biggest questions have gone unanswered by the Trump administration. In particular, how will this war end? And what will be the ultimate strategic implications of the Iran gamble?
The Potential Impact of a Billionaire Tax
The Net Present Value of the Billionaire Tax Act: An Assessment of the Fiscal Effects of California's Proposed Wealth Tax Benjamin Jaros, Joshua Rauh, Greg Kearney, John Doran, et al. Stanford University
The California Billionaire Tax Act of 2026 proposes a one-time 5% tax on the worldwide net worth of individuals exceeding $1 billion. This measure applies to tangible and intangible assets, including those held through trusts and certain recent transfers. Our proxy for these taxable assets in this dataset is the “Net Worth” of each California-based billionaire listed in the 2025 Forbes Billionaires listing. Our preferred revenue estimate implies that approximately 55% of the billionaire income tax base has or will avoid the tax, nearly double the 30.7% break-even threshold under even [proponent’s optimistic] assumption of six confirmed departures at a 1.5% real discount rate and approaching the 61.4% threshold at 3%. The wealth tax has positive net present value only if the one-time revenue exceeds the present value of foregone income taxes from departing billionaires. We simulate draws from uniform distributions over the plausible ranges for discount rates, revenue from the wealth tax, and lost income tax collections; 71% of draws yield a negative net present value, with a mean of [-] $24.7 billion, with a median of −$19.1 billion, and standard deviation of $38.4 billion. [See Figure 3 in gallery]. These estimates are conservative in that we exclude all non-income-tax fiscal spillovers, including lost sales tax, property tax, and business activity, such as employing other income taxpayers.
Why a Billionaire Wealth Tax Is the Most Direct Policy Tool To Curb The Growing Concentration of Wealth Emmanuel Saez & Garbiel Zucman, Professors of Economics, University of California, Berkeley (via the press release of the legislation via the website of the Office of Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT)
The two UC-Berkely economics professors analyze Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) legislation proposing an annual 5% wealth tax. In their analysis, the believe it would raise approximately $4.4 trillion over the coming decade. They also argue that if such a tax had been in place since 1980, the current top 10 wealthiest Americans would be worth $888 billion, about 1/3 of the $2,562 trillion they currently possess as of the end of 2025.
The Limits of New York’s “Tax the Rich” Policy E. J. McMahon Manhattan Institute
As the nation emerged from the Great Recession in 2010, the capital gains of income millionaires were disproportionately concentrated in the four most populous states: California, New York, Texas, and Florida. Between 2010 and 2022, taxpayers earning $1 million or more in these states accounted, on average, for 50% of the nation’s total capital gains realizations. At the start of the period, California led all states, with 16% of capital gains among all U.S. income millionaires. New York ranked second, at 14%, while Texas and Florida trailed at 8.7% and 8%, respectively. The next 12 years saw a significant shift in the rankings. By 2022, Florida had topped the list, with 16.7% of capital gains income among millionaire earners, followed by California at 14.9% and Texas at 9.7%. New York had dropped to fourth place, with 8.9%—essentially changing places with Florida.
How Much Revenue Would Senator Sanders’ Wealth Tax Proposal Really Raise? The Tax Foundation
According to the Tax Foundation analysis of Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) recently introduced 5% wealth tax on billionaires, the projected $4.4 trillion of revenues raised over 10 years would be significantly less. The analysis also points out that most European countries have repealed wealth taxes due to limited revenue and administrative and compliance challenges.
The Americas
Why Lula is Struggling: Brazil’s October Election Now Looks Like a Coin-Flip Brian Winter/Americas Quarterly
As recently as six weeks ago, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva seemed to be cruising to reelection. Unemployment was at record lows; the stock market at record highs; inflation had closed 2025 at its lowest level in seven years. Lula’s archrival, former President Jair Bolsonaro, was in prison—and had just chosen Flávio, widely seen as the least charismatic of his four sons, to be his preferred candidate in October’s vote. Today, there is nary a breeze. A Datafolha survey published Sunday showed Lula with just a three percentage point lead in a hypothetical runoff against Flávio Bolsonaro, down from a 15-point advantage in December. Other polls have shown similar dynamics. The tightening is in some ways a return to familiar battle lines; after all, Lula won the 2022 election by just a 51%-49% margin. But there are signs that the Lula of 2026 is struggling to connect with voters and could be at genuine risk.
Latin American Small States in the Belt & Road Initiative: Narrating Status Amidst US-China Tensions Zara Albright/Diego Telias/Tom Long – Cambridge Review of International Affairs
Abstract: Starting in 2017, most small states in Latin America and the Caribbean joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Near-uniform membership contrasts with variation in the Asian power’s importance to regional economies. The BRI has brought little new investment in these states; recently, participation has risked retaliation from the United States. What explains these states’ affinity for the BRI, despite heterogeneous material costs and benefits? We argue that the region’s small states have approached the BRI less for its immediate material benefits than for the salient discursive resources that it offers. Political leaders mobilize these resources to construct status narratives that justify, especially to domestic audiences, how BRI participation will improve national status. We analyze paired case studies during each of two temporal waves: Chile and Ecuador (wave 1, 2017–2019) and Honduras and Nicaragua (wave 2, 2020–2025). In addition, we consider Panama as the first Latin American signatory (wave 1) and the only country in the region to renounce BRI membership (wave 2).
Recommended Weekend Reads
Germany’s China Shock, Trump’s Monroe Doctrine is Aimed at China, How The U.S. Population Has Shifted, Why China Doesn’t Want A U.S – Iran Deal, and How AI is Both Helping and Replacing Workers
February 27 - March 1, 2026
Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting. Hopefully, you will find them both interesting and useful. Have a great weekend.
The Americas
Trump's latter-day Monroe Doctrine is aimed at China Peterson Institute for International Economics
The US intervention in Venezuela, attacks on vessels in the Caribbean, financial squeeze on Cuba, and its bailout of Argentina should perhaps have come as no surprise. After all, the Trump administration has made no secret of its intentions, as laid out in the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) document: To "reassert and enforce the 'Monroe Doctrine' to preserve U.S. preeminence in the [Western] Hemisphere and deny outside powers control of strategic locations and assets." It would certainly appear that the administration is currently achieving the goals set out in the NSS, entrenching Latin America as the main stage for a geopolitical confrontation between the United States and China. But these actions could also introduce further turbulence into a region mired in political and economic problems. China is heavily invested in Latin America through various channels, notably its "green" Belt and Road Initiative. The framework has enabled China's public banks and state-owned enterprises to underwrite massive projects in renewable energy sources, critical minerals, and infrastructure. It is estimated that since 2010, China has invested around $35 billion in renewable energy projects alone. The figure does not include the $1.3 billion spent to finance the massive Port of Chancay in Peru, which connects South America's Pacific Coast to Shanghai.
Population drops and gains in every state FlowingData
The Census Bureau released population estimates for 2025. Most states gained population, but a few states saw more people move out than move in, with births not enough to compensate. By percentage, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and West Virginia decreased in population the most since 2020. By total change, New York and California decreased by about 200,000 people each. The population in Louisiana, Illinois, and Mississippi also dropped. Idaho went the other direction with the largest increase over 10%. Texas and Florida populations increased the most, with total increases of 2.56 million and 1.92 million, respectively.
How Trump’s 15% Tariff Move Impacts Latin America Americas Quarterly
Latin American economies seem relatively well-positioned following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to invalidate last year’s tariffs on imports of goods and services and President Donald Trump’s announcement of a new 15% global tariff. Trump's previous levies were invalidated on February 20, after a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court’s justices (6-3) ruled that the president exceeded his authority to issue them, dealing the government a major setback. That day, Trump set a replacement global tariff of 10%, which was increased to 15% the next day.
Europe, China, and Iran
Germany’s China Shock Internationale Politik Quarterly
The China shock is here,” the German Economic Institute declared last July. Indeed, 2025 will go down as the year in which it could no longer be denied. Germany's trade deficit with China reached a record level of €87 billion—an increase of €20 billion compared to the previous year. And German exports to China continue to be in free fall. The United States, France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Italy have by now become more important export markets for Germany than China. At the beginning of this century, China accounted for 6 percent of global industrial production. Today, the figure stands at around 30 percent. China’s economic model is firmly geared toward global dominance in industries where Germany has been traditionally strong, such as automotive, mechanical engineering, and chemicals—as well as in future industries such as robotics and biotechnology. Beijing not only leverages the economies of scale of its vast domestic market but also makes forward-looking investments in research and development.
Why China Doesn’t Want the US and Iran to Make Peace The Diplomat
While Beijing publicly advocates restraint, sustained tensions between the U.S. and Iran serve its strategic interests. China's broader perspective on Iran is unlikely to change absent a major shock. Beijing views Tehran as a useful strategic partner in its long-term effort to counter Western – especially U.S. – dominance of the international system. As a result, China supports Iran diplomatically and economically, while also offering limited and discreet military-related assistance. This support does not typically take the form of overt arms sales, but rather the provision of dual-use components and technologies that can be used in Iranian drone and missile production. These activities allow Beijing to strengthen Iran’s resilience without incurring the costs associated with formal military alliances or large-scale weapons transfers.
What It Will Take to Change the Regime in Iran Behnam Ben taleblu/Foreign Affairs
The Islamic Republic of Iran is, quite possibly, at its weakest point since its founding in 1979. In June, Israeli and U.S. attacks destroyed its uranium enrichment capacity and many of its air defense systems. In December and January, the country experienced the most widespread domestic uprising since the birth of the Islamic Republic. Throughout, it has faced spiraling economic and environmental crises that it cannot fix. None of these events has knocked out the Islamic Republic. But there is no doubt it is down. It is easy to see why the Trump administration is prioritizing diplomacy and limited strikes. The Islamic Republic may be weak, but it is still lethal and capable of harming U.S. forces and civilian targets throughout its region. Such measures could inspire the masses of Iranians who took to the streets in December and January to do so again. Just this week, Iran witnessed smaller-scale campus protests, showing that animosity against the regime very much remains. If regular protests resume, American military power could level the playing field between the street and the state, giving the country’s demonstrators a chance to succeed.
Geoeconomics
Living With Mom And Dad At 30 Aziz Sunderji Home Economics
The share of American 30-year-olds living with their parents or roommates nearly doubled btw 1990 and 2025, from 17% to 32%. Aziz Sunderji finds that this group is largely responsible for the age cohort’s 15pp decline in homeownership over that period.
The New Global Tariffs Are Also Unlawful Philip Zelikow/Hoover Institution’s Freedom Frequency
On February 20, the Supreme Court ruled that President Trump’s tariffs imposed under an emergency powers law were unlawful. After raging at the court, the president imposed a new set of global tariffs using a different statutory authority. Now, the Trump Administration has moved to use Section 122 to carry on the tariff policy. And the author – who was involved in the recently decided case – argues the use of 122 is both obsolete and illegal.
The 2028 Global Intelligence Crisis Citrini Research
In this widely-hailed essay, Alap Shah of Citrini Research models a scenario that the author writes about the potential impact of AI on society. Shah’s vision is that “In every way AI was exceeding expectations, and the market was AI. The only problem… the economy was not…. AI capabilities improved, companies needed fewer workers, white collar layoffs increased, displaced workers spent less, margin pressure pushed firms to invest more in AI, AI capabilities improved… It was a negative feedback loop with no natural brake. The human intelligence displacement spiral. White-collar workers saw their earnings power (and, rationally, their spending) structurally impaired. Their incomes were the bedrock of the $13 trillion mortgage market - forcing underwriters to reassess whether prime mortgages are still money good.”
Speed Can Reindustrialize America Austin Vernon Blog
High US wages for skilled workers constrain robot adoption in manufacturing. “Many less productive US manufacturing firms could buy a robot, but couldn’t attract the talent to program it.” The US can’t “emulate” the low-wage, high-skilled China model.
AI Is Simultaneously Aiding and Replacing Workers, Wage Data Suggest J. Scott Davis Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
For occupations with a very low experience premium, AI exposure lowered wage growth, likely due to substitution of AI for costly experienced workers. At the top of the experience distribution, AI raised wage growth, as it complements experienced workers.
The Flawed Paper Behind Trump’s $100,000 H-1B Fee Economic Innovation Group
Abstract: Do H-1B visa holders earn more or less than Americans? There are two different ways to answer this. If we compare H-1B holders to the average native-born worker, the answer is unequivocal that the visa holder is paid more. Median H-1B pay in 2024 was $120,000 per USCIS, compared to $67,000 for the average native-born worker. However, when we compare H-1B holders to otherwise similar native-born workers, the question becomes more complex. Answering it correctly requires careful examination. Unfortunately, a recent attempt at answering this question from Harvard economist George Borjas contains major errors.
Recommended Weekend Reads
Trump’s IEEPA Tariffs Are Dead. Now What?, Iran: What Happens Next if the US Launches Attacks, How A BRICS Currency Could Happen, and the Looming Fiscal Crisis in the Western World
February 20 - 22, 2026
Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting. Hopefully, you will find them of interest and useful as well. Have a great weekend.
U.S. Trade Policy After the IEEPA Decision
Trump’s Options After the Supreme Court Said His Tariffs Are Illegal Bloomberg
On Friday, the U.S. Supreme Court President Trump had illegally used of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for his April 2025 “Liberation Day” calls into question what Trump will do next. Trump has at least five tools he can use to offset the IEEPA tariffs; however, none of them offer the latitude that Trump’s interpretation of IEEPA allowed. Section 338 of Smoot-Hawley, which has never been used, likely has the broadest scope.
State of U.S. Tariffs: February 20, 2026 Yale University Budget Lab
The Budget Lab estimates the effects of all US tariffs and foreign retaliation implemented in 2025 after the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that President Trump exceeded his authority to invoke the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose reciprocal tariffs. Without IEEPA tariffs, consumers will face an overall average effective tariff rate of 9.1%, which remains the highest since 1946 excluding 2025. (If IEEPA tariffs had been allowed to stay in effect, this figure would have been 16.9%.) All tariffs to date as of February 2026 are projected to raise about $1.2 trillion over 2026-35, though slower economic growth reduces revenues and brings the net dynamic revenue to $1 trillion. (With IEEPA, these figures would be more than twice as large.) The economic implications of the SCOTUS decision are complicated by two major factors. First, in the short-term, firms will be aggressively seeking refunds on tariffs paid in 2025, which has large revenue effects and uncertain distributional effects. Second, the current Administration has stated its intent to replace IEEPA tariffs with tariffs using other authorities, but there remain timing and other questions regarding these steps.
Implications of Growing U.S. – Iran Military Tensions
The Day After Khamenei: Iran’s ‘Liberation’ Will Begin as an IRGC Power Struggle Charbel Antoun/National Interest
Many imagine the day after Ali Khamenei as a moment of sudden liberation: Iranians shaking off the mullahs and deciding their own destiny. The likelier opening act is far less romantic. The immediate aftermath will probably look less like a velvet revolution and more like the opening round of an insider power struggle—staged and refereed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its allies. The institutions that have grown strongest under Khamenei are not parliaments, parties, or independent courts, but the security state and its sprawling economic empire. Those are the actors best positioned to inherit the republic he leaves behind.
Iran’s regime is suffering from strategic vertigo. Its next misstep may be its last The Atlantic Council
Tehran appears to be suffering from a case of strategic vertigo. As Iranian leaders continue to see their major decisions backfire over the course of two and a half years, a disorienting dizzy spell may be the best way to describe the state of Iranian foreign policy. Negotiations between the United States and Iran are ongoing, with US President Donald Trump Thursday that he expects a resolution within ten to fifteen days, as he also undertakes a massive military buildup for a possible conflict. The talks provide the regime with a rare opportunity—a gift, even—to escape from yet another predicament. The question right now is whether leaders in Tehran grasp the magnitude of the moment and refrain from their old habits of obstinacy, or whether they will add another strategic error to their string of missteps—one that could be their last. With the United States preparing for strikes if negotiations fail, the question arises of how Iran reached the precipice in the first place.
What War With Iran Would Look Like Arash Reisinezhad/Foreign Policy Magazine
Washington and Tehran may be closer to military confrontation than at any point in memory, but they are not on the brink of war in any conventional sense. The most plausible outcome of the current standoff is not a U.S. invasion of Iran or a full-scale regional war. It is a limited, carefully calibrated strike designed to reshape bargaining dynamics rather than end them.
Iran: What Challenges face the country in 2026? House of Commons Library
In 2025, the US and Israel struck Iran’s nuclear program, the UN reimposed sanctions against the country and its economy continued to struggle. Iran’s regional position also worsened. Established leaders of many Iran-backed armed and proscribed terrorist groups have been eliminated, and their strength weakened in the regional conflict that has been ongoing since 2023. Some Iran-backed groups are facing renewed local and international calls to disarm. This briefing for UK Members of Parliament surveys the situation in Iran, including the challenges facing its government; the status of Iran’s nuclear program and the potential for further strikes in 2026; and pressures on Iran-backed groups in the region.
Iran Oil And Gas Market Size & Share Analysis - Growth Trends and Forecast (2026 - 2031) Mordor Intelligence
According to Mordor’s recent research, Iran’s oil and gas market size in 2026 is estimated at USD 39.18 billion, growing from 2025 value of USD 37.10 billion with 2031 projections showing USD 51.51 billion, growing at 5.62% CAGR over 2026-2031. Robust reserve availability, state-backed capital deployment, and resilient export flows underpin this trajectory even as sanctions pressure persists. The upstream sector anchors revenue, as Iran is the fourth-largest crude producer in OPEC. Meanwhile, the downstream segment is growing faster, with domestic firms adding fluid catalytic cracking and condensate-splitting capacity to increase product yields. Onshore production remains the backbone of the Iranian oil and gas market, but offshore investments at South Pars are accelerating to protect reservoir pressure and sustain natural-gas output. Asset deployment overwhelmingly favors development projects, yet exploration spending is rising because reserve replacement has become a policy imperative. High market concentration persists: The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its subsidiaries continue to dictate most decisions, although private and quasi-state contractors now win multi-billion-dollar tenders that were once the domain of foreign major oil companies.
Geoeconomics and Global Markets
Could a BRICS Currency Work? Jim O’Neill/ Project Syndicate
O’Neill – who coined the acronym “BRICS” – argues Economists have long dismissed the idea that a BRICS common currency could challenge the US dollar's role in the global economy, and for good reason. But that doesn't mean there couldn't be new common rails for settling trade between countries that want to escape the long arm of the US government.
Across The Rich World, Fiscal Crises Loom The Economist
The Economist calculates that most rich countries could still run small primary deficits [deficits net of interest payments] and keep debts stable as a share of their economies, even if they had to refinance all their debt immediately at today’s rates. The largest primary surplus required to balance debts is in Britain, at just 0.3% of GDP. That is not large for countries in a pinch. In the late 1990s Italy ran primary surpluses of 3-6% of GDP to bring down debts before joining the euro. In Britain and America, deficits are large. The belt tightening needed to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 2% of GDP; in France it is greater than 3% of GDP. Things look worse still when you consider the coming wave of spending on ageing populations, defense and the climate transition. And higher debt interest costs to come are not yet fully accounted for.
Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? Zhengyang Jiang, Hanno Lustig, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Mindy Xiaolan National Bureau of Economic Research
Abstract: We analyze real returns on U.S. and U.K. government debt during major wars and the COVID-19 pandemic over the past three centuries. Wars are associated with sharply negative real returns on outstanding government debt, with returns falling far below economic growth, in contrast to peacetime periods when returns exceed growth. Elevated surprise inflation and financial repression account for a cumulative 31% wedge between returns and growth over four years of war, implying that bondholders bear a substantial share of wartime fiscal costs. During wartime, government bonds also systematically underperform risky assets.
When Houses Outrun Paychecks: The Lost Decades of Housing Affordability Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ON the Economy Blog
Abstract: In this blog post, we analyze how housing affordability has evolved over the past 20 years. For most U.S. counties, the story is remarkably similar: Home values have risen much faster than the incomes of the people living in them. From 2000 to 2024, median per-capita income has grown steadily but modestly, at around 155% in nominal terms. Over the same period, median home prices—when measured carefully and adjusted for local composition—have increased at a much faster pace, at around 207% in nominal terms. This divergence helps explain why younger households struggle to buy their first home, while longtime owners increasingly view housing as their primary source of wealth.
Weekend Reads
Mexico – US Relations Get More Tense, Russia Hitting a Critical Inflection Point Internally, How American First Investment Pledges Are Structured – But Will It Work? , And the Impact of Inflation on Fertility
January 30 - February 1, 2026
Below are several reports and articles we read this past week that we found particularly interesting. Hopefully, you will find them of interest and useful as well. Have a great weekend.
Americas
‘What the hell do we do with this issue’: Mexico confronts Trump’s Cuba pressure Politico
President Donald Trump’s increasingly overt attempts to bring down the Cuban government are forcing Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum into a delicate diplomatic dance. Mexico is the U.S.’s largest trading partner. It is also the primary supplier of oil to Cuba since the U.S. seized control of Venezuela’s crude. Now, Sheinbaum must manage her relationship with a mercurial Trump, who has at times both praised her leadership and threatened to send the U.S. military into her country to combat drug trafficking — all while appeasing her left-wing party Morena, factions of which have historically aligned themselves with Cuba’s communist regime.
Washington’s Sharpening Stance on Mexico Americas Quarterly
There is a deep shift underway in Washington—one that redefines Mexican organized crime not primarily as a law-enforcement problem or a bilateral cooperation challenge, but as a direct national security threat to the U.S. That redefinition is already reshaping U.S. policy tools, institutions, and expectations vis-à-vis Mexico, with potentially profound consequences for the bilateral relationship.
Can anything halt Latin America’s lurch to the right? Financial Times
“It’s because of the expansion of the major criminal markets in the region,” says Council on Foreign Relations Fellow Will Freeman. “The huge increase in the size of the cocaine trade, the boom in illegal gold mining, for a time, the wave of human smuggling, and the way that has seeded a lot of new gangs and criminal outfits in different parts of the region that didn’t previously have to deal with this.” The dramatic capture of Venezuela’s authoritarian president, Nicolás Maduro, by US commandos in the early hours of January 3 has, if anything, reinforced the swing to the right in most of the region, pollsters say.
Is Russia at a Critical Inflection Point?
Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine Center for Strategic and International Studies
Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data show that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. At current rates, combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026. After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of 15-70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, growth slowing to 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to drive long-term productivity.
Russian Economy’s “Unholy Trinity”: Recession, Inflation, Budgetary Crisis Free Russia
The Russian economic situation has reached a breaking point in 2026, facing the “unholy trinity” of challenges:
The ongoing budget crisis, which is set to exacerbate in 2026 due to a shortfall of oil and gas export revenues as well as under-collection of domestic taxes due to cooling of the Russian economy;
High inflation, which has not been brought under control - contrary to widespread public misconception, and which still requires maintaining prohibitively high interest rates thus diminishing Russians’ real incomes;
A looming recession, which seems inevitable given the lack of sources of potential major economic revival (no fiscal stimulus, an inability to access international investment and financial markets, expensive credit, shrinking corporate profits, etc.).
Geoeconomics
The America First investment pledges: How are they structured and are they realistic? The Peterson Institute for International Economics
In pursuit of President Donald J. Trump's "America First" agenda, the administration has pressured allies and partners to invest in US industrial and infrastructure projects. The White House has announced commitments by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, several Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and others, to import specific amounts of goods and services from the United States and to make sizable investments on US soil. These agreements resulted from a more coercive US foreign policy than in the past. Because the administration is helping select the targets of foreign investment, it is embarking on a major expansion of US industrial policy—one paid for by allied countries. This Policy Brief shows that much about investment pledges, worth more than $5 trillion, remains unclear or aspirational.
Making Industrial Strategy Great Again Foreign Affairs
The author argues that the Trump administration has embraced industrial policy in all the wrong ways. Instead of organizing policy around missions—explicit public goals that define the problem to be solved and the outcomes to be delivered—and then aligning the state’s tools to get there, it has treated industrial policy as a set of sector deals to be cut and announced. It has stripped away conditions on government support for private industry that could ensure the socialization of rewards. The government has taken a ten percent stake in the semiconductor manufacturer Intel for $5.7 billion in CHIPS Act funding; a 15 percent stake in the rare-earth mining and processing company MP Materials for a $400 million investment; a five percent stake in Lithium Americas, the company developing the Thacker Pass lithium project in Nevada, through loan restructuring; and a “golden share” in U.S. Steel, granting the government permanent veto power over headquarters relocation and production offshoring. But it is using these unprecedented equity stakes not to steer strategy or secure public value but to extract value retroactively. Industrial policy will fail, economically and politically, unless it is organized around clear missions to create public value. When the state socializes risks through public funding, the public must share in the rewards.
Economic Statecraft Is Back. Is America Ready? War on the Rocks
America still has enormous economic leverage. What it lacks is a plan. A new War on the Rocks series, launched with the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, explores how economic statecraft should be organized, led, and integrated into defense planning.
Inflation and Fertility in the United States Institute for Family Studies
Over the past several years, American households have experienced one of the sharpest increases in the cost of living in decades. Rising prices for housing, childcare, healthcare, and education have coincided with heightened economic uncertainty following the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, U.S. fertility rates have continued their long-run decline, prompting renewed debate about whether economic pressures are reshaping family formation decisions. While discussions often focus on cultural change or shifting preferences, the affordability of raising children in an era of elevated and unpredictable prices may be an underappreciated part of the story.
Recommended Weekend Reads
How Maduro’s Capture Puts Cuba at an Inflection Point, Mexico’s Morena Party is Floundering, The Iranian Regime Will Break – Then What Happens?, and the Geography of Science
January 23 - 25, 2026
Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting. Hopefully, you will find them interesting and useful as well. Have a great weekend.
The Americas
The Geopolitics of Maduro’s Capture: Cuba’s Inflection Point Christopher Hernandez-Roy/Center for Strategic and International Studies
The release of the US 2025 National Security Strategy that declared a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, along with the early January U.S. military action in Venezuela, is altering political calculations across the Western Hemisphere, with deep implications for Cuba. The January 3, 2026, military operation to capture Nicolás Maduro and bring him to the United States to face terrorism charges, and the subsequent coercive management of the remaining Chavista regime, is a signal to the region that challenges long-standing assumptions about U.S. restraint, regime durability, change, and the use of external pressure in Latin America. Rather than pursuing traditional regime change centered on rapid democratization or wholesale dismantling of authoritarian systems, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to employ coercive power to manage regimes—controlling their behavior, extracting concessions, and preserving sufficient institutional continuity to avoid collapse.
Mexico’s mighty left-wing government is floundering The Economist
Mexico’s Morena Party has no serious rivals in Mexico. The party has dominated Mexican politics. Together with its allies, it controls 24 of Mexico’s 32 states. It holds supermajorities in both legislative houses, more than two-thirds of the seats in each. It draws comparisons with the Institutional Revolutionary Party that ruled Mexico as a one-party state for seven decades until 2000. But under Morena, Mexico has no money. Its economic growth has long lagged behind that of its neighbors in Latin America and comparable emerging economies in Asia, but the Morena years have been the most sluggish in a quarter-century. The IMF thinks the economy will grow by 1.5% in 2026, about half the Latin American average. Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum’s Plan México, a flagship development strategy, is faltering: in 2025, investment reached 22% of GDP, short of the 25% target. With weak growth and little sign of a turnaround, few believe the government can maintain expansive welfare payments until the end of her term, in 2030.
Sheinbaum’s Cuba policy is testing Washington’s patience Washington Post
At a moment of extraordinary tension in the U.S.-Mexico relationship, the Mexican government is choosing to remain Cuba’s oil lifeline. For decades, Venezuela filled that role, sending up to 100,000 barrels of oil per day at the height of Hugo Chávez’s rule. In recent years, as Venezuela’s oil output faltered, Mexico has stepped up. According to industry data, it became the top supplier of oil to Cuba last year — well before the ouster of Nicolás Maduro. While the Trump administration has not publicly detailed its full strategy toward Cuba, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has signaled that the U.S. intends to bypass the Cuban government and direct assistance toward the Cuban people. Some members of Congress say Mexico’s approach points in the opposite direction.
Delcy Rodríguez and the Architecture of Venezuela’s Kleptocracy Felix Maradiaga Substack
According to an investigative report recently written by “Transparency International Venezuela in Exile” under the title “Delcy Rodríguez se blindó para la era post Maduro,” Acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez has been a central operating executive within the machinery that turned a nation’s wealth into private enrichment, political leverage, and international bargaining chips. The report notes that the Venezuelan vice presidency under Rodríguez, she received a staggering share of the national budget—40% in 2024 and 44% in 2025—concentrating extraordinary spending discretion around Rodríguez’s office.
The Iranian UprisingHow the Iranian Regime Breaks Foreign Affairs
Over the last few weeks, the Iranian regime has faced remarkable challenges—and displayed remarkable unity. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians have taken to the streets to protest the Islamic Republic in what has become the most significant internal challenge the state has faced in its 47-year history. But the elite has not yet fractured. Instead of squabbling over how to handle the demonstrations, Iran’s reformist and hardline leaders have worked together to suppress them. To date, none of the regime’s elites objected to the killings of thousands of innocent civilians by security forces. In fact, figures from across the political spectrum have all outwardly (and falsely) blamed the violence on foreign infiltrators. But behind the scenes, the picture is undoubtedly more tense. Unless they exclusively watch state television and believe their own false narratives, Iranian officials understand that the domestic system is under existential stress.
Iran’s Uprising: What’s the endgame? Brookings Institution Podcast
In recent days, the Iranian regime has conducted an unprecedented and bloody crackdown on protests across Iran. In this episode, Brookings Fellow Aslı Aydıntaşbaş is joined by two Iran experts, vice president of Foreign Policy Suzanne Maloney and visiting fellow Mara Karlin, to discuss the unique nature of the protests and the regime’s violent response, options for U.S. military action, and President Trump’s possible endgame.
Iran’s coming reckoning: Regime collapse is likely — democracy is not Middle East Institute
Since tens of thousands of Iranians took to the streets in protest and then experienced intense and gruesome repression by state security forces, the question is now: what next? Much will depend on four factors: 1) Foreign intervention 2) The behavior of the opposition 3) Information control and connectivity, and 4) Elite dynamics within the regime itself. But, as the author argues, the Islamic Republic as we know it cannot endure. However, its collapse or transformation does not guarantee liberation. What Iran is entering is not a revolution’s endgame but a dangerous interregnum — one in which brutality has proven effective, legitimacy has evaporated, and the future remains profoundly contested. But, as the author makes clear, the Islamic Republic as we know it cannot endure.
Geoeconomics
The Hollow Dollar? Alexander Evans/The British Academy & Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract: This paper explores whether the US dollar’s dominance in global finance – long a pillar of American geopolitical influence – is being quietly eroded. While the dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency, its centrality in international payments is increasingly contested. The weaponization of the dollar, particularly through sanctions and the extraterritorial reach of the New York banking license, has prompted strategic responses from states such as China, Russia, and India. These strategic responses include the development of alternative payment systems, local currency trade settlements, and digital infrastructure. The paper argues that a ‘hollowing’ of the dollar’s infrastructural dominance is underway – (perhaps very) gradual, partial, but geopolitically significant. This shift may not end dollar supremacy, but it could fragment the global financial system, weaken US sanctions leverage, and diminish the centrality of New York and London as financial hubs. The implications for global order are subtle but potentially profound. A less dollar-dependent system may facilitate a more multipolar world yet diminish liberal democratic power.
The Geography of Science Abhishek Nagaraj & Randol Yao/
Abstract: Science has long been concentrated in the Western world, but the global research landscape is undergoing a profound reorganization. Using data on 44 million publications from 1980 to 2022, we document the geography of science in terms of who produces it, what it studies, and where it diffuses. The share of publications produced in the United States has fallen from 40% in 1980 to 15% in 2022, while China’s share has risen from near-zero to 32%. This pattern extends even to elite outlets, with China now producing over 35% of top-journal publications. Notably, this is driven not only by an expanding researcher base but also—to a large extent—by increases in individual productivity. Similar to China, other middle- and low-income countries (including India, Russia, and Brazil) have also expanded output producing as much research as high-income European Union countries combined (about 21% overall), but they remain underrepresented in top-tier journals. Overall, our findings highlight both the democratization and fragmentation of global science, raising important questions about the future of the global scientific enterprise.
The Macroeconomic Consequences of Capital Constraints Office of Financial Research, US Treasury Department
Abstract: This working paper quantifies the effect that regulatory capital requirements have on bank lending and real economic activity. Exploiting a change in capital requirements by the Federal Reserve at the onset of the pandemic recession, it establishes causally that looser requirements increased the ability for banks to extend credit to consumers. On average, banks that received relatively more balance sheet space from the policy change passed this along to their customers in the form of relatively higher credit limits from Q2 2020 to Q1 2021. This also led to relatively higher credit card borrowing among these customers. Using a general equilibrium quantitative model calibrated to match the empirical findings, the paper shows that absent the Federal Reserve policy change, consumption would have fallen by an extra 2.7% in the three years following the pandemic recession. Motivated by these estimates, this paper evaluates the efficacy of countercyclical capital requirements and finds that such policy could lower consumption volatility over the business cycle by as much as 12%.
Macroeconomic Implications of Immigration Flows in 2025 and 2026: January 2026 Update The Brookings Institution
Abstract: The first year of the second Trump administration has seen dramatic changes in immigration policy, resulting in a sharp slowdown in net migration to the United States. Building on work released in late 2024 and mid-2025, we use available data combined with judgment to estimate a range of likely outcomes for net migration for the years 2025 and 2026. We conclude that net migration was likely close to zero or negative over calendar year 2025 for the first time in at least half a century. Specifically, we estimate that net migration was between –295,000 and -10,000 for the year. For 2026, we project net migration is likely to remain in negative territory. The downward pressure on population stemming from negative net migration has important implications for the macroeconomy. In recent years, growth in the U.S.-born working-age population has been weak, and nearly all growth in the labor force has stemmed from immigration flows.
Recommended Weekend Reads
What Does Russia’s Inability to Support Its Allies Mean for Its Own Future?, The Massive Industrial Challenge To Modernize the U.S. Navy, Was Pandemic Fiscal Relief Effective Stimulus? And An Assessment of China’s Military Buildup
January 16 - 18, 2026
Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting. Hopefully, you will find them interesting and useful as well. Have a great weekend.
The Future of Russia
Putin’s great-power project faces the ‘end of an era’ Politico EU
Moscow was also seemingly unable to protect its closest friend in South America earlier this month when the United States captured Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, a leader who had dutifully made the trip to Moscow for Putin’s Victory Day Parade in May last year. Embarrassingly, Moscow wasn’t even able to fend off the unprecedented U.S. seizure of an oil tanker flying a Russian flag. Just a year ago, Putin signed a 20-year strategic partnership agreement with Tehran. Now the regime — which supplied Russia with killer Shahed drones for its fight in Ukraine — is in danger of being toppled by protesters whom Trump has indicated he could intervene militarily to defend. Russians have taken notice. “An entire era is coming to an end,” wrote a pro-war military blogger under the pen name Maxim Kalashnikov on Sunday, reflecting growing criticism of the Russian leadership.
Russia Is the World’s Worst Patron Foreign Affairs
For the last 20 years, Moscow has demonstrated an ability to inject itself as a player in regions with strong anti-American sentiment. But the Kremlin’s costly adventures have yet to show any practical benefits for enhancing Russia’s genuine security interests or boosting its economic prosperity. Involvement in places such as Venezuela serves only Putin’s vanity, a few votes of solidarity with Moscow at the UN General Assembly, and money-making opportunities for corrupt Russian officials. The result has been that from Syria to Venezuela to Iran, Putin has overpromised and underdelivered.
Why Didn’t the Ukraine War Turn Russia’s Ruling Class Against Putin? Carnegie Politka
The answer is that Russia’s ruling class is disillusioned and fragmented. And, as the writer points out, the apparent suicide of the dismissed transport minister Roman Starovoit in 2025 was a reminder of the fragility of everyone’s position. For another, the idea that had brought together much of the establishment, “autocratic modernization”—that despite the authoritarian system, a rational state, capable of learning lessons and balancing interests, could still emerge in Russia—has obviously turned out to be a failure.
The Massive Challenge to Modernizing the U.S. Navy
Helming A Sea Change: Building The Future Workforce For US Shipbuilding McKinsey & Company
According to the US Department of Labor, the shipbuilding industry may require about 200,000 to 250,000 additional maritime workers in critical occupations, such as welding, soldering, and front-line management, to satisfy demand over the next decade. If demand for ships increases, the labor gap will be even wider.
Outlining the Challenges to the U.S. Naval Shipbuilding Center for Strategic and International Studies
Growing the size of the Navy has been a bipartisan goal of successive administrations and Congress over the last decade. The service faces capacity limitations as it struggles to meet the demands of its current aggressive operational tempo with a fleet that is small by historical standards and faces delays in conducting maintenance. The demand to increase the Navy’s ship count has only grown as China’s navy has overtaken the U.S. fleet in terms of size, with the blistering rate of production of its own shipbuilding industry. Despite the Navy’s plans for growing the fleet and bipartisan efforts and funding from Congress, the U.S. shipbuilding enterprise—including the Navy, Department of Defense (DoD), Congress, and industry—has failed to consistently produce ships at the scale, speed, and cost demanded. These longstanding challenges stem from a series of interwoven, systemic issues within both the U.S. government and industry, as well as broader socioeconomic trends. This report outlines the challenges facing the U.S. naval shipbuilding enterprise, their underlying drivers, and some efforts the government has taken to mitigate them.
Geoeconomics and Technology
Was Pandemic Fiscal Relief an Effective Fiscal Stimulus? Evidence from Aid to State and Local Governments Journal of Macroeconomics
Abstract: We use an instrumental-variables estimator reliant on variation in congressional representation to analyze the macroeconomic effects of federal aid to state and local governments during the COVID-19 pandemic. Through December 2022, we estimate statistically insignificant impacts of federal aid on employment. Our baseline point estimate suggests that $603,000 were allocated for each state or local government job-year preserved, and the bounds on our baseline confidence interval rule out estimates smaller than $220,400. Our estimates of effects on aggregate income and output are centered on zero and imply modest, if any, spillover effects onto the broader economy.
When Trade Compresses: The Impact of Liberalization on Wage Inequality Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Abstract: We study the effects of trade liberalization on the full wage distribution, exploiting Spain's 1993 entry into the European Single Market. Using employer-employee data, we identify the causal effects of trade across the entire wage distribution, using a novel shift-share instrument embedded in an unconditional quantile regression. We find that the liberalization reduced wage inequality, leading to wage compression through earnings gains at the bottom of the distribution and wage losses at the top. We trace this compression to two asymmetric channels: import competition disproportionately harmed high earners, while export opportunities benefited low earners. The key mechanism is an import-driven “skill-downgrading.” A multi-region multi-sector model shows that the key insight for understanding these empirical results is that trade's distributional effects depend on the skill intensity of a country's tradable sector, and Spain's was relatively low-skill-intensive back then.
Foreign Affairs: The Myth of the AI Race Colin Kahl/ Foreign Affairs
In July, the Trump administration released an artificial intelligence action plan titled “Winning the AI Race,” which framed global competition over AI in stark terms: whichever country achieves dominance in the technology will reap overwhelming economic, military, and geopolitical advantages. As it did during the Cold War with the space race or the nuclear buildup, the U.S. government is now treating AI as a contest with a single finish line and a single victor. But that premise is misleading. The United States and China, the world’s two AI superpowers, are not converging on the same path to AI leadership, nor are they competing across a single dimension. Instead, the AI competition is fragmenting across many domains, including the development of the most advanced large language and multimodal models; control over computing infrastructure such as data centers and top-of-the-line chips used to train and run models; influence over which technologies and standards are used throughout the world; and integration of AI into physical systems such as robots, factories, vehicles, and military platforms. Having an edge in one area does not automatically translate into an advantage in the others. As a result, it is plausible that Washington and Beijing could each emerge as leaders in different parts of the AI ecosystem rather than one side decisively outpacing the other across the board.
China’s Military Capability
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025 U.S. Department of Defense
Abstract: China’s historic military buildup has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable. China maintains a large and growing arsenal of nuclear, maritime, conventional long-range strike, cyber, and space capabilities able to directly threaten Americans’ security. In 2024, Chinese cyberespionage campaigns such as Volt Typhoon burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure, demonstrating capabilities that could disrupt the U.S. military in a conflict and harm American interests. The PLA continues to make steady progress toward its 2027 goals, whereby the PLA must be able to achieve “strategic decisive victory” over Taiwan, “strategic counterbalance” against the United States in the nuclear and other strategic domains, and “strategic deterrence and control” against other regional countries. In other words, China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027.
The World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Assessment
Global Risks Reports 2026 World Economic Forum
In advance of the World Economic Forum (WEF) meetings in Davos ,Switzerland this coming week, the WEF released their 21st edition Global Risks Report 2026. The report analyses global risks through three timeframes to support decision-makers in balancing current crises and longer-term priorities. Chapter 1 presents the findings of this year’s Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS), which captures insights from over 1,300 experts worldwide. It explores risks in the current or immediate term (in 2026), the short-to-medium term (to 2028) and in the long term (to 2036). Chapter 2 explores the range of implications of these risks and their interconnections, through six in-depth analyses of selected themes. Below are the key findings of the report, in which we compare the risk outlooks across the three-time horizons.
Recommended Weekend Reads
Understanding Trump’s Latin American Military Buildup, The Secret and Massive Drug Smuggling Routes into the US, Young Adults Are Spending Less Time Together, and The Desperate Search for Safe Havens
October 31 - November 2, 2025
Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting. Hopefully, you will find them interesting and useful as well. Have a great weekend.
The Americas
Understanding Trump’s Military Buildup in Latin America Americas Quarterly Podcast
The recent deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford, the U.S. Navy’s largest aircraft carrier, has intensified speculation about Washington’s true objectives in the Southern Caribbean. In this episode of the Americas Quarterly Podcast, we examine what’s really behind the Trump administration’s escalating military activity. Is it a hardline campaign against drug cartels, or the opening moves of a broader effort to pressure Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro? What do we know about dynamics within the Venezuelan military? And to what extent could this impact Washington’s relations with Colombia and other countries in the region? Our guest is Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
From Posture to Purpose: Rethinking U.S. Strategic Aims in Venezuela FIU Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy
The U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean reflects a strategic confusion between counter-narcotics and regime-change objectives in Venezuela. Current operations project power but lack coherence, risking escalation without achievable outcomes. A sustainable strategy must align U.S. means and ends, favoring intelligence, law enforcement, and targeted financial tools over military coercion. Even limited “surgical strikes” risk hardening regime cohesion, triggering regional instability, fueling migration flows, and creating governance vacuums with grave humanitarian consequences. To avoid these pitfalls while focusing on transnational criminal organizations, Washington should prioritize multilateral law-enforcement cooperation, expand Coast Guard and intelligence capabilities, and strengthen sanctions enforcement targeting the regime’s illicit revenue streams. Aligning coercive, diplomatic, and economic instruments toward realistic, proportional goals offers the only path to sustainable results without deepening Venezuela’s crisis on entangling the United States militarily.
After Argentina’s Midterms, a New Chapter for U.S.-Argentina Relations Center for Strategic and International Studies
Argentina’s midterms may also herald a new era of U.S. relations with the country and Latin America as a whole. In the weeks leading up to the election, the United States announced a major financial assistance package, giving Argentina access to a total of $40 billion in U.S. dollar currency swaps, with $20 billion coming from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund, and a further $20 billion from banks and sovereign wealth funds. In addition to this, the Trump administration announced plans to purchase Argentine beef, a move that was deeply unpopular with U.S. ranchers but offered a powerful signal of the importance Washington places on its relationship with Buenos Aires
See the Secret Networks Smuggling Drugs to the U.S. From Latin America The Wall Street Journal
These interactive reports and accompanying maps show how demand in America for illegal drugs such as fentanyl and cocaine fuels sophisticated systems for smuggling them in. Traffickers deploy everything from fast-moving fiberglass boats to stealthy “narco-subs” to cargo ships to get their products to users without losing shipments to seizures or couriers to arrest. With decades of experience, according to U.S. counternarcotics officials, the traffickers are usually a step ahead of America and its allies in Latin American and Caribbean waters
Youth and Family Trends and Their Future Impact on the Economy
Cognitive Skills Beyond Childhood The Economic Journal
Data from a British birth cohort followed since 1958 show that cognitive skills early in life predict wages at age 50 better than cognitive skills at age 50. Early cognitive skills likely allow for higher educational attainment or on-the-job learning.
Young Adults Are Spending Less Time With Friends Institute for Family Studies
In post-pandemic America, young adults are spending a record amount of time alone. But even before the pandemic, young adults began spending less time with friends. In 2010, young adults ages 18 to 29 on average spent 12.8 hours a week with friends. By 2019, that number nearly halved, falling to 6.5 hours a week. The pandemic exacerbated this trend with a low point of 4.2 hours a week with friends in 2020. And while we’ve seen a slight increase since, socializing has not nearly recovered. Today, young adults spend just 5 hours a week with friends. Lingering effects of pandemic-era isolation are certainly at play, but the role of technology cannot be ignored.
Mind the Fertility Gap: Why people stopped having babies and how economic freedom can help Institute for Economic Affairs
n a new paper published by the Institute, British women are falling at least 0.4 children short of their own stated family goals, according to fertility data through 2011, with this gap likely widening as fertility now hits record lows of 1.44 while desired family size remains stable at 2.2. New report shows how pro-natal policies that focus on cash incentives, such as baby bonuses, subsidies, and maternity pay, may have some short-term effect but are often found wanting and prohibitively expensive. Evidence shows policies affecting economic freedom, including Labour market, childcare and housing liberalization, can have profound effects on fertility through their impact on work-family compatibility
Geoeconomics & Financial Markets
The Role of Single-Family Rentals in the U.S. Housing Market Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
When homeownership and home sales plummeted in 2010 in the wake of the housing market collapse, investors responded by purchasing single-family homes and renting them out to households that could not afford to buy such homes but still desired this type of housing. Subsequently, investor-owned single-family rentals (SFRs) increased as a share of total single-family properties, and they continue to increase as a housing supply shortage and higher mortgage rates make homeownership difficult for many first-time homebuyers. This blog post summarizes economic research that has been done on the role of investor-owned SFRs in the U.S. housing market. Such research has found that the vast majority of SFRs are owned by small-scale investors. Properties owned by large-scale investors tend to increase prices of nearby homes, while ownership by small-scale investors appears to have the opposite effect. Research has also found that investor-owned SFRs expand housing options available to renters but may negatively impact renter welfare in terms of eviction filings4and rent increases.
The Desperate Search for Safe Havens Robin Brooks Substack
Countries with low debt burdens are outperforming ones with lots of debt. The right chart above shows this dynamic. Since Jackson Hole, the Swedish Krona (red line) is the best performing currency against the Dollar, followed by the Norwegian Krone (orange line) and Swiss Franc (black line). The Euro (pink line) is flat against the Dollar, no surprise since it consists mostly of high-debt countries, with Germany’s recent move to soften up its debt brake and pursue big fiscal stimulus a major destabilizer for the region. The Japanese Yen (blue line) is down over two percent against the Dollar, no surprise given that gross government debt is 240 percent of GDP. The fact that Sweden is at the top of the pack makes sense. The Krona is massively undervalued (it’s at the same level against the Euro as during the global financial crisis), while Sweden has also managed to steer clear of endlessly rising debt levels that so bedevil the Euro periphery.
As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting The Economist
According to the Citizens Budget Commission New York state’s share of American taxpayers reporting more than $1m in income declined from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022. Such people paid $34bn in income tax to the state and city in 2022, a figure that would have been $13bn higher if New York’s share of millionaires had held up. Estimates from Goldman Sachs suggest that fully 10% of households in New York City with incomes of more than $10m established residency elsewhere between 2018 and 2023. As the ultra-rich have headed for the exit, the city’s employment growth has become concentrated in much worse-paid industries than finance. Since the end of 2019, New York has added more than 268,000 jobs in health care and social assistance, particularly home health care. Employment as a whole rose by just 220,000 over the same period, meaning that, if it was not for that industry, overall employment would have shrunk.
Recommended Weekend Reading
Looking at U.S. - China Policy Challenges in Advance of the Xi-Trump Meeting, Will the AI Data Center Boom Threaten the Trump Manufacturing Revival?, and Looking at the Supply Chain Chokepoints in Quantum
October 24 - 26, 2025
Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting. Hopefully, you will find them both interesting and useful. Have a great weekend.
A Look at Major Policy Issues for Both the U.S. and China
China’s Two Economy Problem Semafor
At a glance, China’s export-focused manufacturing sector is buoyant, racing away from the US and other advanced economies in areas including batteries, robotics, and biotechnology. And yet its domestic economy is in deep crisis, suffering from spiraling levels of joblessness, plunging consumer confidence, and falling business investment in the midst of a real estate collapse. To understand China is to believe all these things to be true. It is an economy moving fast and slow at the same time, a tech superpower that creates opportunities for PhD scientists but not its underclass of rural workers, a nation that manufactures a third of everything made in the world but can’t stir demand at home. Its growth model is so lopsided it is unbalancing the global economy. In short, China is at war with itself; taking the long view, the current US-China trade spat is a sideshow.
How China Raced Ahead of the U.S. on Nuclear Power New York Times
While U.S. nuclear construction costs skyrocketed after the 1960s, they fell by half in China during the 2000s and have since stabilized, according to data published recently in Nature. (The only two U.S. reactors built this century, at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Waynesboro, Ga., took 11 years and cost $35 billion.) China’s nuclear companies build only a handful of reactor types, and they do it over and over again. That allows developers to perfect the construction process and is “essential for scaling efficiently,” said Joy Jiang, an energy innovation analyst at the Breakthrough Institute, a pro-nuclear research organization. “It means you can streamline licensing and simplify your supply chain.”
Taiwan Is Not for Sale David Sacks/Foreign Affairs
When U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the coming weeks and months—likely starting next week at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in South Korea—the immediate focus will be on how to de-escalate the latest round of export restrictions and tariff threats that the United States and China have wielded against each other. But Trump and Xi are also likely to consider a more ambitious deal to reset bilateral relations, which would seek not only to stabilize economic ties but also to reevaluate geopolitical flash points—above all, Taiwan.
How U.S. Can Outcompete China Daniel Bob/RealClearWorld
Leadership in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, robotics, advanced materials, biotechnology, and aerospace will determine who leads the world economically and strategically in the decades ahead. These technologies spur productivity gains, provide supply chain resilience, and shape military strength that sustain national security and prosperity.
China Against China Jonathan Czin/Foreign Affairs
Thirteen years after Xi Jinping ascended to the top of China’s leadership hierarchy, observers in Washington remain deeply confused about how to assess his rule. To some, Xi is the second coming of Mao, having accumulated near-total power and bent the state to his will; to others, Xi’s power is so tenuous that he is perpetually at risk of disgruntled elites ousting him in a coup.
Technology, Trade, Immigration, and Geopolitical Power
The Fiscal Impact of Immigration The Manhattan Institute
Using a methodology aligned with the congressional budget window, this report estimates the fiscal, economic, and population effects of immigrants by age, education, and category of admission. It updates previous Manhattan Institute research by incorporating more recent census data, more precise life-expectancy and fertility adjustments, economic and capital stock growth, and the fiscal effects of the descendants of immigrants. This report estimates fiscal impact in nominal dollars over a 10- and 30-year horizon. This report also updates and fixes several assumptions from previous research on the fiscal impact of immigrants, including the calculation method for interest on the debt and correctly adjusting tax credits for inflation. It uses an updated method for accounting for public-goods spending. Overall, the average new immigrant reduces the federal budget deficit and expands the economy, but this is not true of all categories of immigrants. Immigrants without college degrees receive more government benefits than they pay in taxes, even when we consider only their preretirement years. By contrast, immigrants who finished college or obtained an advanced degree contribute millions of dollars more in federal taxes than they receive in government benefits, and they save substantial amounts of interest on the debt while growing the economy.
AI Data Center Boom Threatens Trump’s Manufacturing Revival Bloomberg
The AI boom is coming to America’s industrial heartland, which speaks to how the economy is being transformed—even propped up—by a surge in investment in software, chipmaking and data centers. But the Lordstown plant’s reinvention raises the question: Is the exuberance around the technology that Trump has enthusiastically endorsed getting in the way of his goal of making America great again at churning out things like gasoline-powered cars, steel and furniture? Access to capital, power and people is key to the success of any construction or manufacturing project—and right now AI is gobbling up all three.
The Supply Chain Chokepoints in Quantum War on the Rocks
As quantum technologies move from proof-of-concept to deployment, supply chain resilience becomes just as critical as qubit coherence times. Resilience includes redundancy, domestic capacity, and timely alternatives when foreign manufacturers face disruptions or reprioritize their customers. Expertise and capital are key to driving technological innovation, but mean little if a company or research lab does not have access to the necessary inputs and reliable supply chains. Lack of access to one aspect of the supply chain can grind further research and development to a standstill, a red flag for investors and potential researchers. If the United States is to remain on the leading edge of quantum technologies, ensuring companies, government labs, and academic projects can consistently access critical supplies is a prerequisite.
Recommended Weekend Reads
Listen to Venezuelan Opposition Leader Machado Learn She Has Won the Nobel Peace Prize, Preparing for Putin’s Death, How Ukraine has Crippled Russia’s Oil Lifeline, Where Could Reshoring Manufacturers Find Workers?
October 10 - 12, 2025
Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you. Below is this week’s curated collection. We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.
Latin America
“Oh my God… I have no words.” Listen to the emotional moment this year’s laureate, Maria Corina Machado, leader of the Venezuelan democracy movement, finds out she has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Kristian Berg Harpviken, Director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute, shared the news with her directly before it was announced to the world.
Escalation Against the Maduro Regime in Venezuela: Puerto Rico’s Emerging Role in U.S. Power Projection Center for Strategic & International Studies
The United States is overseeing a seismic reordering of defense priorities and assets to the Western Hemisphere. At the time of this writing, four destroyers, one cruiser, one nuclear-powered attack submarine, one landing helicopter dock, two amphibious vessels, and one special operations platform, alongside a host of enablers and support vessels, are present in the Caribbean. In total, more than 10 percent of all deployed U.S. naval assets are currently located in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. These forces are more than a mere show of force; since the first warships entered the region in August, the U.S. military has conducted at least four lethal strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats in international waters, killing at least 21. The next phase of operations could witness strikes within Venezuelan territorial waters or even on land. Reportedly, the Trump administration has already drawn up strike packages for such contingencies, which are currently being reviewed by the president. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has notified Congress of his determination that the United States is involved in a “non-international armed conflict” against drug trafficking groups now designated as foreign terrorist organizations, suggesting that the tempo of operations will only increase in the coming weeks.
Understanding Trump’s Shift on Brazil Americas Quarterly
Donald Trump’s Brazil strategy was not working. Instead of helping former President Jair Bolsonaro avoid prison or be allowed to run again in 2026, a barrage of U.S. tariffs and sanctions was having the opposite effect—hastening Bolsonaro’s conviction while boosting the popularity of his rival, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Brazil’s economy seemed to handle the strains surprisingly well, while a procession of business leaders to the White House in recent weeks warned of risks to U.S. inflation from coffee, beef, and other goods. So the U.S. president did what he has on other occasions: He listened. And then he changed course. Trump’s brief encounter with Lula at the United Nations, after which he proclaimed they had “excellent chemistry,” was not a chance meeting. And then they had a phone call. What comes next?
Russia
Preparing for Putin’s Death The Rand Corporation
Vladimir Putin is the longest-serving Russian ruler since Joseph Stalin. He turns 73 on Oct. 7, old for a Russian, but even if he is fanatical about his health, he cannot continue indefinitely. It is essential to consider who might succeed him. This is a challenging task—under Putin's rule, the Russian political system has, once again, become an authoritarian dictatorship bearing some of the features of a personality cult. Under these conditions, Putin has not, as far as we can tell, been publicly grooming a successor, presumably because his personal authority would begin to ebb to them, and because they would become a target for others who fear losing their influence.
How Russia Recovered Dara Massicot/Foreign Affairs
The story of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been one of upset expectations and wild swings in performance. At the start of the war, most of NATO saw Russia as an unstoppable behemoth, poised to quickly defeat Ukraine. Instead, Russia’s forces were halted in their tracks and pushed back. Then, outside observers decided the Russian military was rotten, perhaps one counterattack away from collapse. That also proved incorrect—Ukrainian offensives failed, and Moscow resumed its slow advance. Now, plenty of people look beyond Russia to understand the state of the battlefield, blaming Kyiv’s troubles on insufficient external backing instead. What many policymakers and strategists have missed is the extent to which Moscow has learned from its failures and adapted its strategy and approach to war, in Ukraine and beyond. Today, the military is institutionalizing its knowledge, realigning its defense manufacturers and research organizations to support wartime needs, and pairing tech startups with state resources.
Ukraine’s Drone War Is Crippling Russia’s Oil Lifeline National Security Journal
Ukraine’s expanding long-range drone fleet has knocked nearly 40% of Russia’s oil refineries offline. According to an analysis by BeefeaterFella, with refined fuels yielding far higher margins than crude, Russia could be losing $3–6 billion annually in revenue, while shortages, rationing, and black markets spread at home. Since January, 21 of Russia’s 38 major refineries have been struck, with successful Ukrainian attacks already 48% higher than in all of 2024, according to the BBC. The cascading effects are being felt far from the battlefield. Owners of small petrol stations in Siberia told Russian media they were forced to close due to supply shortfalls, with one manager in Novosibirsk comparing the crisis to the hyperinflation of post-Soviet Russia.
Trade, Tariffs, and Reshoring of Manufacturing
Where Could Reshoring Manufacturers Find Workers? Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
The announcement of new tariffs this year has reignited the discussion of whether the United States can expand its manufacturing employment by millions of workers. Reversing decades of manufacturing job losses is one explicit goal of the new higher tariffs. This District Data Brief presents measures of employment and demographics as context around the current and potential employment in US manufacturing. Raising manufacturing employment by 4 to 6 million workers would constitute a large increase relative to current levels. However, an increase of this scale would not be large relative to the global growth of manufacturing employment in recent decades, the current US labor force size, or the number of US adults not engaged in high-paying work
SORCE Insights: Tariff-Related Uncertainty and Pass-Through to Pricing The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
In the Survey of Regional Conditions and Expectations (SORCE) fielded in June 2025, the Cleveland Fed asked respondents a set of special questions about the impact of tariffs and tariff-related uncertainty on costs, selling prices, staffing, and capital expenditure plans. Most respondents (64 percent) said that they were incurring costs caused by uncertainty over tariff rates, the direct expenses of paying tariffs, or both. Of these respondents, 68 percent expected to pass through at least some of those costs to their customers. About one in five firms said that they had scaled back plans to hire staff or make capital expenditures because of uncertainty over tariff rates.
Who Will Pay for Tariffs? Businesses’ Expectations about Costs and Prices Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Amid evolving global trade policy and rising tariff uncertainty, understanding how small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) form expectations about future costs and adjust their pricing is critical for assessing how the recently imposed tariffs on US imports could impact consumer prices. To that end, this brief analyzes several waves of a survey of owners and other decision-makers at a nationally representative sample of US SMBs. It focuses on waves conducted during the period of December 2024 to August 2025. Key Takeaways from this paper include:
From December 2024 to April 2025, the share of SMBs expecting larger tariffs increased considerably; expectations about the size of future tariffs also increased over time.
In the August 2025 survey wave, SMBs whose costs are affected by the new tariffs reported paying an average tariff rate in July 2025 (11.4%) that was nearly double the average rate they paid in January 2025 (6.5%).
SMBs that believe the new tariffs will persist for a year or longer expect to pass through as much as three times more of their cost increases into consumer prices compared with SMBs that believe the new tariffs will be short-lived.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests a 0.75 percent near-term increase in core consumer prices stemming from recent tariff increases on directly imported consumer goods.
Recommended Weekend Reads
The Geopolitics of Trump’s War on Drugs, America Loves Cocaine Again, What is Stablecoin?, How Many Manufacturing Jobs Will Tariffs Create, and The Growing Link Between Marriage, Fertility, and Partisanship
September 26 - 28, 2025
Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you. Below is this week’s curated collection. We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.
The Geopolitics of Trump‘s War on Drug Cartels
The Wrong Way to Fight the Cartels Ryan Berg/Foreign Affairs
Since returning to the White House, U.S. President Donald Trump has pledged to defeat the Western Hemisphere’s violent drug traffickers by any means necessary. In a March address to Congress, Trump declared, “The cartels are waging war in America, and it’s time for America to wage war on the cartels.” Washington has left behind its traditional conception of the fight against transnational criminal organizations as a matter of law enforcement with its threats of “war” and consideration of military action against the cartels. A militarized approach may be a politically attractive way for Trump to project strength. And indeed, the United States can, and should, draw on many valuable lessons from the last two decades of counterterrorism missions during the “war on terror” in its campaign against the cartels. But there is a more productive path forward than drastically shifting the rules of engagement with transnational criminal groups.
The Geopolitics of Trump’s War on Drugs Americas Quarterly
Half a century after former U.S. President Richard Nixon launched the war on drugs, global cocaine output and consumption are at record highs. According to the UN’s latest drug report, cocaine production jumped roughly a third in 2023 to over 3,700 tons, with usage rising to an estimated 25 million people. Over the past decade, narcotics supply chains have diversified, and demand has hardly blinked. President Donald Trump’s second term has repackaged the drug war with sharper geopolitical edges. While fentanyl from Chinese sources seemed to be the president’s main focus during his campaign, the more traditional target of cocaine has lately become more prominent. Washington has pledged to “disrupt the supply chain from tooth to tail” and to “partner with – or otherwise hold accountable” source countries, language mirrored in the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) National Drug Threat Assessment 2024.
America Loves Cocaine Again—Mexico’s New Drug King Cashes In The Wall Street Journal
Cocaine sold in the U.S. is cheaper and as pure as ever for retail buyers. Consumption in the western U.S. has increased 154% since 2019 and is up 19% during the same period in the eastern part of the country, according to the drug-testing company Millennium Health. In contrast, fentanyl use in the U.S. began to drop in mid-2023 and has been declining since, according to data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. For new users, cocaine doesn’t carry the stigma of fentanyl addiction. Middle-class addicts and the tragic spectacle of homeless crack-cocaine users in the 1990s helped put a lid on America’s last cocaine epidemic.
Geoeconomics
‘Capital absorption’ is big in economic development. But what is it? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
The term “capital absorption” is not well-known or easily understood. But it’s critical in the local economic development world, and I recently heard an analogy I think can help people understand it. Picture an irrigation system designed to direct the flow of money to the projects that need it most. Such a system frees communities from merely hoping that the unpredictable “rainfall” of funding falls in the right place. Instead, the system guarantees it gets there. That’s what capital absorption is. It’s coordination that helps local places absorb capital investments in the kinds of projects that can literally change what these places look like – things like child care centers, or housing, or downtown building renovations. Reliable systems are established and run by prepared partners to accept the funding when it appears and move it exactly where it’s needed, so the work can get done in ways that strengthen local economies.
How Many Manufacturing Jobs Will Trump’s Tariffs Create? And at What Cost? AEI Center for Technology, Science, Industry, and the State Project
Secular decline in the share of manufacturing jobs in the labor force largely reflects the shift of consumer expenditures from goods to services. High tariffs cannot restore manufacturing jobs to the 27 percent share of the labor force experienced 60 years ago. Achieving Trump’s objective for eliminating the trade deficit in manufactures would require tariffs at least twice as high as those imposed through September 2025. The annual cost to American consumers of shifting each job from service employment to manufacturing employment through high tariffs exceeds $200,000.
What is a Stablecoin? McKinsey & Company
In the rapidly evolving world of digital assets, one innovation stands out for its potential to bring stability and reliability to the historically volatile blockchain-based currency market: the stablecoin. As the name suggests, a stablecoin is a type of digital currency designed to maintain a stable value. These digital currencies are pegged to a traditional fiat currency like the US dollar. Stablecoin use has increased significantly in recent years: In the past 18 months, the total market capitalization of stablecoins has more than doubled to $250 billion, from $120 billion, and industry forecasts expect it to reach up to $2 trillion by 2028. With major players like JPMorgan Chase experimenting with tokenized deposits and PayPal launching its own stablecoin, digital money is a major story in digital finance. For individuals and organizations looking to capitalize on the benefits of blockchain-based transactions, what exactly is Stablecoin?
US Political & Social Trends
The Growing Link Between Marriage, Fertility, And Partisanship The Institute for Family Studies
Conservative women born between 1975 and 1979—women who are finished having children—have a completed family size of 2.1, right at replacement. Moderate women in the same age group have 1.8 children, and liberal women just 1.5. Narrower gaps exist between conservatives born between 1985 and 1989, who have a completed fertility rate of 2.1, while moderates are at 1.9 and liberals 1.7. Conservative women born between 1995 and 1999 have, so far, only had 0.7 children, the same as moderates. Liberals in the same cohort average 0.4 so far. Differences between conservative and liberal women should not be overstated. Birthrates are lower for all groups when compared to the state of fertility before 1975. Marriage rates for all groups are lower, too. Yet the differences are large enough that the parties ultimately appeal to manifestly different constituencies.
It's Not Just You: Americans Are Still Not Hanging Out Generation Tech
The average American spent 38 minutes a day socializing in 2019 and 35 minutes in 2024. In 2024, for the first time, adults 50 and older spent (very slightly) more time socializing in person than teens and young adults. Young people’s social time is at an all-time low in the 21-year history of the survey. Fifteen- to 25-year-olds spend 26 fewer minutes a day socializing in person than they did in 2003. That’s three hours a week, 13 hours a month, and 158 hours a year less getting together with friends, having a face-to-face conversation, meeting for dinner, or chatting before seeing a movie together. No wonder so many more teens now describe themselves as lonely.
Why do only humans weep? The evolutionary puzzle of crying BigThink
In an excerpt from Steven Pinker’s new book, When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows…, Pinker explains that crying is not just an expression of sadness but an evolved signal of surrender, helplessness, and a plea for comfort. However, tears can also mark moments of joy, compassion, and awe, reflecting the emotional opposites of the things that make us laugh. The unique human capacity to weep may have evolved to strengthen social bonds and generate common knowledge regarding our inner states.
If I Work Harder, Will You Love Me? Arthur Brooks/The Atlantic
Between teaching Harvard MBA students and speaking to a lot of business audiences, I’m often interacting with successful people who work extremely long hours. It’s common for me to hear about 13-hour workdays and seven-day workweeks, with few or no vacations. What I see among many of those I encounter is workaholism, a pathology characterized by continuing to work during discretionary time, thinking about work all the time, and pursuing job tasks well beyond what’s required to meet any need. Workaholics feel a compulsion to work even when they are already earning plenty of money and despite getting minimal enjoyment from doing so.
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