Recommended Weekend Reads
Assessing the EU’s Defense Sector Build-Up, New Studies on the Economic Impact of Trump’s Tariffs, China’s “Anti-Involution” Campaign, and Russia’s Shrewd Focus on Africa
September 19 - 21, 2025
Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you. Below is this week’s curated collection. We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.
The Growth of the EU’s Defense Sector
Progress and Shortfalls in Europe’s Defense: An Assessment International Institute for Strategic Studies
This IISS Strategic Dossier examines important capability areas that European allies need to address in order to reduce their vulnerabilities and overdependence on the US. The aim is to identify existing gaps and challenges but also note where progress has already been made towards a situation where adequate capabilities for the defense of Europe are provided by Europeans in a more autonomous way, while still working with partners and allies.
Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (2014 – 2025) NATO
NATO collects defense expenditure data from Allies and publishes it on a regular basis. Each Ally’s Ministry of Defence reports current and estimated future defense expenditure according to an agreed definition. The amounts represent payments by a national government that have been or will be made during the course of the fiscal year to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of Allies or of the Alliance. In the figures and tables that follow, NATO also uses economic and demographic information available from the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission (DG ECFIN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In view of differences between these sources and national GDP forecasts, and also the definition of NATO defense expenditure and national definitions, the figures shown in this report may considerably diverge from those that are referenced by media, published by national authorities or given in national budgets. Equipment expenditure includes expenditure on major equipment as well as on research and development devoted to major equipment. Personnel expenditure includes pensions paid to retirees. The cut-off date for information used in this report was 3 June 2025. Figures for 2024 and 2025 are estimates.
The EU’s Road to Economic Security De-Risking, Strategic Investments and Critical Partnerships Italian Institute for International Political Studies
The European Union has redefined its strategic priorities through three phases: the rise of geoeconomics, the structuring of de-risking, and its current testing in a shifting global context. Geoeconomics exposed the link between economy, security, and power, driven by US and Chinese strategies to weaponize industrial assets and by renewed geopolitical rivalry. Europe’s dependence on critical raw materials, especially Chinese rare earths, accelerated the push for strategic autonomy. Since 2021, with the European Economic Security Strategy, the Chips Act, and the Critical Raw Materials Act, Brussels has pursued de-risking as diversification rather than decoupling, focusing on semiconductors, green technologies, and critical minerals. Yet US, Japanese, and South Korean industrial policies show de-risking is a broader challenge. The EU must now deliver concrete results, combining competitiveness and resilience with multilateral cooperation. How can Europe secure adequate resources to meet these goals? And how can it balance industrial autonomy with global partnerships?
China’s Competitiveness Challenge
China Wants to Integrate AI Into 90 Percent of Its Economy by 2030. It Won’t Work. Carnegie Emissary
Recently, Beijing debuted its latest strategy for winning the AI race. China’s powerful State Council laid out an ambitious vision to rapidly diffuse AI into six key areas, ranging from accelerating scientific research and development to improving governance capacity. The plan sets striking, concrete targets that include deploying a range of applications across 90 percent of wide swaths of its economy in just five years. China’s latest plan is part of a broader strategic bet. The PRC thinks it can integrate AI throughout its society to turbocharge its economy and secure AI leadership. It’s a playbook the country has used before. During the mid-2010s, China transformed its digital economy by diffusing internet applications throughout what Beijing calls the “real economy.” But this time could be very different. Chinese leadership is confident in its AI development, but—perhaps counterintuitively—investors are not. China’s venture capital ecosystem is dry at this critical moment for AI, and as a result, Beijing’s aspirations are likely to fall short of the whole-of-society economic transformation the party wants. U.S. policymakers should mostly ignore China’s aspirational rhetoric and focus on what it can achieve in practice.
Involution and Industry Self-Discipline: Echoes from the Past Center for Strategic and International Studies
No doubt the word of the year in China is “involution.” The term in Chinese really did not exist prior to 2020, but its use has exploded since, particularly in 2025. When the Chinese term first emerged in popular culture in China a few years ago, the initial application was to Chinese students and young people trapped in highly competitive schools and jobs that brought little personal fulfillment, with immense efforts and sacrifices that to many seemed ultimately meaningless, a feeling made more acute by the arrival of the pandemic. This led many to respond by giving up on their ambitions and “lying flat”, which has also been a source of much social debate.
In 2025, involution now refers specifically to the widespread phenomenon of continued massive expansion of production in sector after sector, despite any semblance of sufficient domestic demand to absorb these goods. Chinese officialdom has vociferously rebutted charges by foreign governments that China has been suffering from “overcapacity. As part of this retort, it has been argued that industrial policy and subsidies are not the source of China’s industrial strength, but rather high quality and competitiveness. As a result, governments around the world are wrong to impose any restrictions on Chinese exports. But while China is rebuffing international charges of overcapacity, it has opened the doors to a domestic debate about involution and how to tackle it. Hence, the emergence of a highly public conversation about “anti-involution policy, a catch-phrase which has also spread like wildfire.
Updates on Global Trade Wars
Markets shrug off trade conflicts Bank for International Settlements
In a new study, BIS found that global financial markets maintained a risk-on tone during the review period, shrugging off concerns over mounting tariff and policy uncertainty. Despite short-lived bouts of volatility triggered by incoming data and political developments, market sentiment remained upbeat, defying mounting challenges, including unease over the longer-run fiscal outlook in several key jurisdictions. Short-term bonds priced in greater policy easing, but long-term yields stayed high and yield curves steepened at the very long end on fiscal and inflation concerns. Emerging market assets saw gains, benefiting from the risk-on environment and the weakening of the US dollar.
The Trump Shock That Wasn’t (At Least Not Yet) Brad Setser/Council on Foreign Relations
President Trump’s tariffs have been a profound shock to the global trade rules. They have generated enormous volatility in measured trade flows. But so far the volatility has essentially come from pharmaceuticals and gold (including gold bars, or imports of “metal forms”). The impact of the tariffs core trade flows—and hence the global economy—has been modest, at least so far.
Tariffs, Manufacturing Employment, and Supply Chains Joseph Steinberg/NBER
Abstract: I use a dynamic general-equilibrium model with supply-chain adjustment frictions to study the effects of tariffs on manufacturing employment. The model has four distinct manufacturing sectors: upstream goods with high trade elasticities (“oil”); upstream goods with low trade elasticities (“steel”); downstream goods with high trade elasticities (“toys”); and downstream goods with low trade elasticities (“cars”). I find that tariffs can increase overall manufacturing employment in the long run, but are likely to reduce it in the short run, and cause more reallocation of workers across these individual sectors than overall employment growth.
Russian Foreign Policy
Russia is Shrewdly Playing the Long Game in Africa War on the Rocks
What if Moscow’s most dangerous moves right now aren’t in Europe, but along the Gulf of Guinea? With its resources sunk deep into Ukraine, the Russian military has weighed carefully whether and when to engage elsewhere, standing aside amid recent conflicts in the South Caucasus and Middle East. An exception to this pattern of inaction is in West Africa. After the failed mutiny of Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023, the Russian government established a new paramilitary group called Africa Corps, tethered closely to the military chain of command. The unit then progressively took over most of Wagner’s operations in Africa and expanded into Burkina Faso and Niger. It now seems to be eyeing a presence in Benin and Togo next. These activities suggest that Russia is seeking a West African foothold on which to build once an end to the war on Ukraine frees up additional conventional military forces. Russia may then try to further extend Africa Corps’ presence.
The Scale of Russian Sabotage Operations Against Europe’s Critical Infrastructure IISS
Russia is waging an unconventional war on Europe. Through its campaign of sabotage, vandalism, espionage and covert action, Russia’s aim has been to destabilize European governments, undermine public support for Ukraine by imposing social and economic costs on Europe, and weaken the collective ability of NATO and the European Union to respond to Russian aggression. This unconventional war began to escalate in 2022 in parallel to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Russia has so far failed to achieve its primary aim, European capitals have struggled to respond to Russian sabotage operations and have found it challenging to agree a unified response, coordinate action, develop effective deterrence measures and impose sufficient costs on the Kremlin. IISS has created the most comprehensive open-source database of suspected and confirmed Russian sabotage operations targeting Europe. The data reveals Russian sabotage has been aimed at Europe’s critical infrastructure, is decentralized and, despite European security and intelligence officials raising the alarm, is largely unaffected by NATO, EU and member state responses to date.
