Recommended Weekend Reads

Is Trade Uncertainty Boosting Automation? Putin’s Fear of Economic Humiliation, American Soybean Farmers Feeling the Pain of China’s Boycott,  And How Geopolitical Risk Impacts Consumer Spending

September 5 - 7, 2025

Each week, we gather up the best research and reports we have read in the past week and pass them on to you.  Below is this week’s curated collection.  We hope you find them interesting and informative, and that you have a great weekend.

Geoeconomics & Trade

• Will Trade Uncertainty Boost Automation?    Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

  Recent surges in trade policy uncertainty highlight the fragility of global supply chains, prompting businesses to consider reshoring—moving production from abroad to domestic locations. Reshoring can be costly, creating incentives for businesses to automate. Evidence suggests that businesses facing heightened trade policy uncertainty in industries more exposed to international trade reshore more and automate more than those that are less exposed to trade. Automation appears to help mitigate the otherwise negative effects of trade policy uncertainty on production and labor productivity.

• In Tariff Standoff with Trump, China Boycotts American Soybeans    New York Times

  China has rare earth metals. The United States and Brazil have soybeans. For all the chokeholds China maintains on global supply chains, it is overwhelmingly dependent on soybeans from other parts of the world. China imports three-fifths of all the soybeans traded on international markets. Now with China and the United States locked in a tense standoff over tariffs, soybeans have emerged as a central dispute between the trading partners.  China has been boycotting purchases of U.S. soybeans since late May to show displeasure with President Trump’s imposition of tariffs on imports from China. The pain is being felt in Midwest states, especially Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota and Indiana. For the first time in many years, American farmers are preparing to harvest their crop this fall with no purchase orders from China.
  

• Effects of Tariff Uncertainty on the Outlook of Small and Medium-sized Businesses   Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

  A large body of research demonstrates that uncertainty affects many dimensions of firms’ decisions, from investment and hiring to pricing and profitability. To gain a better understanding of how uncertainty induced by shifting trade policy shapes the behavior of small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) the authors surveyed decision-makers at SMBs. Key Takeaways include:

  • Results from the survey indicate that uncertainty about tariffs rose markedly from the first wave to the third for all SMBs, and especially for importers.

  • Survey respondents with greater uncertainty about tariffs in April 2025 – and especially those that import – tended to report greater uncertainty about business operations, particularly about investment and worker head count.

  • The respondents indicated that a hypothetical reduction in business uncertainty would improve their expectations, but another increase in business uncertainty would not lead to further deterioration in their outlook.

  • The muted reaction to a hypothetical increase in business uncertainty suggests that by April 2025, the effect of increased uncertainty on SMBs’ expectations may have already peaked and/or that financial conditions had not tightened enough to notably amplify any negative real effects of further increases in uncertainty.

• The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: An Update    AEI Economic Perspectives

  Immigrants have an overall positive fiscal impact on the US—an effect driven by high-skilled
  immigrants. Low-skilled immigrants, like their US-born counterparts, impose a net fiscal cost.
  However, recent studies show that the indirect fiscal effects of low-skilled immigration are positive,
  partly offsetting the negative direct fiscal impact. Moreover, immigrants will help bear the cost
  of future policy changes required to address the growing national debt. Smaller immigration
  inflows might reduce fiscal pressure on state and local governments, but would increase fiscal
  pressure on the federal government and slow economic growth.

•  The Impact of Geopolitical Risk on Consumer Expectations and Spending  Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Dimitris Georgarakos, Geoff Kenny, and Olivier Coibion / NBER

  Abstract: Using novel scenario-based survey questions that randomize the expected duration of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Middle East conflict, we examine the causal impact of geopolitical risk on consumers’ beliefs about aggregate economic conditions and their own financial outlook. Expecting a longer conflict leads European households to anticipate a worsening of the aggregate economy, with higher inflation, lower economic growth, and lower stock prices. They also perceive negative fiscal implications, anticipating higher government debt and higher taxes. Ultimately, households view the geopolitical conflict as making them worse off financially and it leads them to reduce their consumption.

Russia’s Struggling Economy

•   Can Russia Weather a Fuel Crisis Caused by Ukrainian Drone Attacks?   Carnegie Politika

  Once again, Russia is in the grips of a gasoline crisis. Prices at the pump are rising, and some gas stations have run dry. This isn’t the first time Russia has experienced such shortages, but this time around they could be more serious because of the ongoing war in Ukraine.  There were gasoline crises in Russia both before the full-scale invasion (in 2011,2018, and 2021), and afterward (in 2023). Despite a 2024 Ukrainian drone campaign targeting Russian refineries, the fuel market remained relatively calm. Back then, each refinery was only hit by a single drone, reducing plant capacity but leaving it operational. The damage was dealt with in a matter of weeks, consecutive attacks, were rare and often deflected, and neighboring plants continued to operate without interruption. Ultimately, the 2024 drone attacks caused inconvenience and expense for the Russian oil industry, but did not present a major problem.   This time could be quite different.

• Putin’s Fear of a Humiliating Economic Crisis     Foreign Policy

  Russian President Vladimir Putin has every reason to seek a lifeline for the Russian economy. In recent weeks, a flurry of signs has shown Russia’s war-drained, sanctions-constrained economy to be at an inflection point. For the first time since the start of the war, nonmilitary economic activity has been contracting, bankers are making plans to weather a financial crisis, and energy firms are worrying about losing their largest customer for seaborne oil exports.  Putin’s intensifying economic troubles have important implications for Western policymakers as they begin negotiating with Moscow about the future of Ukraine. Unlike the impression the Russian leader tries to make, time is far from being on his side. In fact, economic pressure remains the best leverage that Ukraine’s supporters have over the Kremlin. It remains to be seen whether Europe and the United States will choose to play the economic ace they still have up their sleeves.

The Global Race for Critical Minerals

• Why Is Renewing AGOA Strategic for U.S.-Africa Minerals Diplomacy?   Center for Strategic and International Studies

  The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), first signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 2000, is a unilateral U.S. trade preference program set to expire in September 2025. Its pending reauthorization has sparked debate over whether—and how—it should be extended and reformed. A failure to extend AGOA could have larger ramifications at a time when the United States is doubling down on its commercial diplomacy—and more specifically, its mineral diplomacy efforts—with Africa.
  

• Europe’s Strategic Access to Battery Minerals in a Changing Geoeconomic Landscape   The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

  Europe’s transition to a low-carbon economy hinges on the rapid deployment of battery technologies. Batteries are essential for stabilizing electricity grids powered by renewables and for enabling the shift from internal combustion engine (ICE) cars to electric vehicles (EV), especially after the European Union’s (EU) 2035 ban on new ICE cars. The successful deployment of batteries in Europe depends on secure supply chains, which are heavily concentrated. China plays a dominant role across the entire battery supply chain. It produces most of the world’s batteries and controls large shares of battery material mining and processing capacity, including graphite, lithium, manganese and phosphate. The Chinese government can use its control over battery supply chains to exert geopolitical pressure on other countries.  To reduce its vulnerability, Europe could choose to look into types of batteries that rely less on raw materials whose supply chain is dominated by China.

Recommended Weekend Reads

Latin America Can De-Risk Semiconductor Supply Chains, Why Russian-Indian Relations Have Remained Steady, and Why Tariffs Led to More Demand for Stablecoins Went Up and Less for the Dollar

August 29 - 31, 2025

Here are our recommended reads from reports and articles we read in the last week. We hope you find these useful and that you have a relaxing weekend.   And let us know if you or someone you know wants to be added to our distribution list. 

Americas 

• Latin America’s Role in De-Risking Semiconductor Supply Chains   Center for Strategic & International Studies

  While the semiconductor supply chain currently spans several continents, China has made efforts to develop a self-sufficient semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem through industrial policies such as “Made in China 2025,” which presents a direct strategic and economic challenge to the United States. De-risking the semiconductor supply chain, particularly that of “legacy chips,” is of paramount importance, particularly at a time in which the Trump administration considers imposing additional sectoral tariffs on semiconductors. Latin America sits at the juncture of possibility and opportunity at a critical time for the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing, providing some of the key elements and capabilities that allow for semiconductor assembly, testing, and packaging as well as final integration into electronics. For companies relying on semiconductor manufacturing, diversifying production sources is key to reducing the risks associated with supply chain disruptions and great power competition.

• Latin America’s Opportunity in the AI Race     Americas Quarterly

  In recent weeks, two starkly different visions of the future of the digital world emerged from the globe’s AI superpowers. These competing philosophies have put Latin America in an uncomfortable position between them. The region now faces a digital dependency trap that could determine its technological fate for decades.  Last month, the Trump administration released “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan,” a comprehensive national AI strategy that frames artificial intelligence as a zero-sum competition where the U.S. must achieve “unquestioned and unchallenged global technological dominance.  China then unveiled its “Action Plan on Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence.” For Latin American policymakers, these manifestos present what appears to be a binary choice. Choosing wrong could mean decades of technological dependency, limited sovereignty, and diminished prospects for indigenous innovation. The tension between the two paths, however, could offer the region an opportunity for growth.

• On the Ground With a Top Mexican Cartel     New York Times

  For the last year, Paulina Villegas, an investigative journalist for The New York Times, had the daunting task of meeting repeatedly with members of the Sinaloa Cartel. The assignment had obvious risks: The Sinaloa Cartel is a U.S.-designated terrorist group. But the meetings, Ms. Villegas said, were vital to her quest to provide readers a clearer understanding of how powerful criminal groups operate, documenting the practices and root causes that both the Mexican and American governments are trying to address.

The Indo-Pacific 

• Why Russian-India Relations Have Been Steady in the Storm    War on the Rocks

  Russia has more friends than Western analysts like to admit, even three years into the Russo-Ukrainian War. While many have paid close attention to Russia’s beneficial partnership with Iran, the introduction of North Korea’s legions into the Ukrainian battlespace, or persistent materiel support from China, Russia’s other rising-power relationship is often underdiscussed — that of India. The Russian-Indian relationship is both of longer duration and deeper history than those Russia has with its other key partners. It is also sometimes ignored as it does not extend to shared adversarial relations with the greater West. This is a mistake, as India is one of Russia’s self-identified civilizational friends. Furthermore, despite various ups and downs, the partnership has proven quite resistant to third-party pressures, including recently from the anti-Russian Western coalition.

• What’s New About Involution?     Carnegie China

  In recent months “neijuan” (内卷), or “involution,” has become one of the most important buzzwords in Chinese policymaking circles. It has come to describe a disruptive process of relentless competition and price cutting among Chinese businesses, and has been increasingly criticized by policymakers, from President Xi Jinping down, for leading to a zero-sum race to the bottom, marked by vicious price wars, large-scale losses, homogenous products, and improper business practices. An August 2 article in Caixin explains:   China’s top economic planner vowed on Friday to intensify its crackdown on “involution,” pledging to curb disorderly corporate competition, rein in wasteful investment and standardize local governments’ business attraction practices to protect fair market order.  The article is referring to the July 30 Politburo meeting that set out Beijing’s priorities for the second half of 2025. Of the three main priorities, two—the need to boost domestic consumption and the promise to support the real estate market—have been proposed regularly in the past three to four years. Much of the focus, however, was on the newest priority, which is to battle deflationary pressures by reducing “disorderly” price competition and overcapacity in manufacturing—measures, in other words, aimed at reining in involution.

• Xi Unleashes China’s Biggest Purge of Military Leaders Since Mao   Bloomberg

  China’s leader has ousted almost a fifth of the generals whom he personally appointed while running the country, something his predecessors never did, according to a Bloomberg News analysis of TV footage, parliamentary gazettes, and other public records. Moreover, Xi’s purge has left the CMC with only four total members, down from seven when his third term started. That’s the fewest in the post-Mao era, the Bloomberg analysis shows.  As more and more of China’s top military leaders fall, it leaves those trying to understand the nation grappling with a near-impossible question, given the opaque nature of the Communist Party: Is this all a sign of Xi’s political strength, or of his weakness? The implications reach around the world and across the global economy.

 Geoeconomics 

• Tariffs, Stablecoins, and the Demand for Dollars    Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

  Several studies have shown that aggregate demand for US dollars fell following the announcement of tariffs by the US government on April 2, 2025. Using data on stablecoins as a proxy for dollar trading, we find that the decline in dollar demand is smaller for investors in countries that saw larger increases in tariffs. Our interpretation is that, as foreign investors anticipate that tariffs will make it more expensive to acquire US dollars in the future, they buy dollars today. This channel is stronger for more liquid stablecoins and for countries with tighter capital controls, consistent with the idea that, when actual dollars are hard to acquire, stablecoins may be regarded as a substitute. Our findings cast light on the effects of the tariffs on global foreign exchange markets, as well as on the degree to which stablecoins are considered a close substitute for dollars.

• America’s Coming Crash:  Will Washington’s Debt Addiction Spark the Next Global Crisis?   Kenneth Rogoff/Foreign Affairs

  For much of the past quarter-century, the rest of the world has looked in wonder at the United States’ ability to borrow its way out of trouble. Again and again, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the government has used debt more vigorously than almost any other country to fight wars, global recessions, pandemics, and financial crises. Even as U.S. public debt rapidly climbed from one plateau to the next—net debt is now nearing 100 percent of national income—creditors at home and abroad showed no signs of debt fatigue. For years after the 2008–9 global financial crisis, interest rates on Treasury debt were ultralow, and a great many economists came to believe that they would remain so into the distant future. Thus, running government deficits—fresh borrowing—seemed a veritable free lunch. Given the dollar’s reputation as the world’s premier safe and liquid asset, global bond market investors would always be happy to digest another huge pile of dollar debt, especially in a crisis situation in which uncertainty was high and safe assets were in short supply.  The past few years have cast serious doubt on those assumptions.

• How Chips Factor Into a De Facto US Sovereign Wealth Fund    OMFIF

  In July 2025, former Intel Chief Executive Officer Pat Gelsinger called for a US sovereign wealth fund to ‘keep America’s technological edge’. Just a month in, a US SWF has materialized under Donald Trump’s administration – owning 10% of Intel Corporation, the only American company manufacturing advanced chips on US soil. Traditionally, sovereign wealth funds are state-owned investment funds that manage national surpluses. Norges Bank Investment Management, for example, manages Norway’s export surplus derived from its natural resources.  However, the US SWF is from a trade deficit country. It is not one single fund authorised by the legislature. Instead, it’s a strategy driven by executive power.  Unlike a conventional SWF, the US SWF has no formal, top-down asset allocation plan. That’s why in the months following Trump’s executive order for establishing the fund, the US SWF appeared first as an ad hoc collection of US stakes in business sectors, ranging from attempted control over TikTok to a golden share in the proposed Nippon Steel-US Steel merger, to equities in bitcoins formerly collected from various criminal and civil actions of the US government.

Recommended Weekend Reads

Did Trump Just Hand China the Tools to Beat the US in AI?, The Strategic Mineral Alliance the West Needs, US Construction’s 5 Decades of Decline, and Democrats Face A Voter Registration Crisis

August 22 - 24, 2025

Here are our recommended reads from reports and articles we read in the last week. We hope you find these useful and that you have a relaxing weekend.   And let us know if you or someone you know wants to be added to our distribution list. 

AI’s impact on National Security and GDP

• Trump Just Handed China the Tools to Beat America in AI   Matt Pottinger & Liza Tobin/The Free Press

  Pottinger, who served as Deputy National Security Advisor to President Trump in his first term, and Tobin, write President Trump’s team just gave China’s rulers the technology they need to beat us in the artificial intelligence race. If he doesn’t reverse this decision, they argue, it may be remembered as the moment when America surrendered the technological advantage needed to bring manufacturing home and keep our nation secure.  They argue we should not believe the claims that these chips aren’t very advanced. China’s lack of unfettered access to U.S.-designed AI chips, they write, is America’s clearest advantage in the AI race. By reversing the ban, the White House is helping Beijing’s Communist regime close the gap.

• Global Compute and National Security   Center for New America Security

  The United States faces a choice: leverage its current lead to promote U.S. AI infrastructure and applications globally, while preserving its edge at the frontier; or continue to primarily focus on protection, while other countries gradually narrow the gap. As Michael Kratsios, President Donald Trump’s science and technology advisor, put it: “It is not enough to seek to protect America’s technological lead. We also have a duty to promote American technological leadership.”  The protect and promote strategy outlined in this report offers a path to sustainable leadership that both safeguards critical capabilities and expands American influence in the global AI ecosystem.

• The Macro Impact of AI on GDP     the Overshoot

  Capital spending related to AI is growing so rapidly that it is now meaningful relative to the $30 trillion U.S. economy. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was about 0.2%-0.3% larger in 2025Q2 than it would have been if businesses’ spending on data center construction, computers and peripheral equipment, and communications equipment had grown in line with the 2011Q1-2022Q31 trend.  Moreover, this impact is likely understated, because existing methodologies are (probably) not fully capturing the investment being done by the five companies responsible for the bulk of the data center buildout: Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Oracle. Those five companies also happen to be the ones with the five largest capex budgets in the entire S&P 500 in 2025Q2.  I estimate that U.S. GDP would be about 0.4% higher than currently reported—or about 0.6% higher than if there had been no AI boom—if the capital expenditures of the big 5 were fully incorporated into the official data. Or put yet another way, the growth in direct AI-related capex by the big 5 since mid-2023 would correspond to about 10% of the total increase in the dollar value of U.S. GDP over the past two years. Including additional capital spending on power plants and electricity generation would lead to an even larger number.

Geoeconomics

• Reform or Realignment? The Geopolitical Lessons of Bretton Woods    Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  The history of Bretton Woods sharpens questions about the issues and interdependencies that can provide the basis for any reform of existing institutions.

• Five Decades of Decline: U.S. Construction Sector Productivity   Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

  Construction labor productivity in the US fell by more than 30 percent from 1970 to 2020, while overall U.S. economic productivity doubled over the same period; Despite potential biases in price deflators, multiple studies confirm that the productivity decline is real, with physical measures like housing units per worker showing similar stagnation, and; Increasing land-use regulations may be a plausible cause for the decline, as more strict land-use regulations disincentivize construction companies from pursuing larger projects, keeping them relatively small. In addition, this reduces incentives for technological innovation and economies of scale.

•  The Ghost in Capitalism's Machine: Industrial policy returns to global trade   Peter Draper/ Hindrich Foundation

  Industrial policy is the ghost in capitalism’s machine — always present, rarely acknowledged. Even laissez-faire economies flirt with it, while denying its existence. It attracts polarized views anchored in ideological conceptions over how much power to accord states, or freedom to markets. Industrial policy is making a comeback as geopolitical contestation amongst the major powers sharpens.

Russia, Ukraine, and the Economic and Security Implications of a Possible Ceasefire

• Tanks, Tech, and Tungsten: The Strategic Mineral Alliance the West Needs     War on the Rocks

  What good is a tank if you can’t get the metals to build it?  This week’s meeting between U.S., Ukrainian, and European leaders showed potential progress towards security cooperation. And while the new U.S.-Ukrainian Reconstruction Investment Fund agreement marks an important step toward increasing the resilience of both U.S. and European supply chains, there is more work to be done. Building on this momentum, the United States and the European Union should seek closer critical minerals supply chain cooperation.  There are several opportunities for the two economies to work together by focusing on defense and security, rather than the economic and clean energy framing of the past. Tighter cooperation could strengthen the E.U. defense-industrial base, enhance military readiness, and strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture while enabling the United States to secure critical minerals, preserve manufacturing capacity, and redirect precious resources to the Indo-Pacific. Supply chain cooperation would also help both sides reduce dependence on China, which dominates the critical minerals market by creating oversupply and using export restrictions. Indeed, the China challenge requires the United States and Europe to work together.

• Russia’s Imperial Black Sea Strategy   Foreign Affairs

  Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and other neighbors is transforming the Black Sea into Eurasia’s strategic frontier. Russia has disrupted flows of energy, food, and other commodities; generated millions of migrants; and heightened insecurity not just in Ukraine but also across the entire Black Sea region. These efforts constitute part of a much longer and larger strategy. Russia does not merely seek to dominate Ukraine. It wants to render each of the other five states that border the Black Sea—as well as Moldova, which borders Romania and Ukraine and whose waters flow into the sea—subservient to its interests so that it can exercise veto power over choices these countries make. Moscow also aspires to use the Black Sea as a platform from which to project power and influence throughout the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Caucasus.

U.S. Politics & Elections 

• The Democratic Party Faces a Voter Registration Crisis    The New York Times

  According to an analysis conducted by the New York Times, the Democratic Party is hemorrhaging voters long before they even go to the polls.  Of the 30 states that track voter registration by political party, Democrats lost ground to Republicans in every single one between the 2020 and 2024 elections — and often by a lot.  That four-year swing toward the Republicans adds up to 4.5 million voters, a deep political hole that could take years for Democrats to climb out of.

• Trump’s Tariffs and ‘One Big Beautiful Bill’ Face More Opposition Than Support as His Job Rating Slips   Pew Research Center

  The latest national survey by Pew Research Center – conducted Aug. 4-10 among 3,554 adults – finds that a 53% majority say President Trump is making the federal government work worse, while only about half as many (27%) say he is making the government work better. (Two-in-ten say he is making things about equally better and worse.)  Both Republicans and Democrats now offer more negative assessments of Trump’s impact on the federal government than they had predicted in a survey conducted in the weeks immediately following Trump’s inauguration. Six months into his second term, public evaluations of President Donald Trump’s job performance have grown more negative. His job approval stands at 38% (60% disapprove), and fewer Americans now attribute several positive personal characteristics to him than did so during the campaign.  Two of the new administration’s signature accomplishments – the rollout of its tariff policies and the tax and spending law known as the “One Big Beautiful Bill” – garner considerably more disapproval than approval:

  • 61% of Americans disapprove of Trump’s tariff policies, while 38% approve.

  • 46% disapprove of the tax and spending law, while 32% approve (23% say they are unsure).

  • 55% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents now say Trump is improving the way the federal government works – while 16% say he’s making things worse and 29% say his effect is a mix of positive and negative. In the weeks after he took office, 76% of Republicans expected he would make government work better.

  • 87% of Democrats and Democratic leaners say Trump is worsening the way government functions, up from 78% who said this at the beginning of his term.

Recommended Weekend Reads

Mexico’s Oil Giant is at a Crossroads, Can Iran Rebuild its Nuclear Program, and Just How Desperate is their Leadership?, Why US House Prices Stayed Resilient Versus the Rest of the World,  and America’s Population Crash

August 8 - 11, 2025

Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting.  Hopefully, you will find them of interest and useful as well.  Have a great weekend.

The Americas 

• Pemex Is at a Crossroads        Americas Quarterly

  Mexico’s government announced a deal to support the deteriorating finances of the state-owned oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos SA (Pemex). By issuing instruments called pre-capitalized notes, the Sheinbaum administration hopes to stabilize the financial performance of a company that has been reporting losses for at least the last 10 years. However, Pemex is besieged not only by mounting financial liabilities but also by a series of issues that compromise its future and, to some extent, its current operations.

• Assessing the Impact of China-Russia Coordination in the Media and Information Space   Ryan Berg/Center for Strategic and International Studies

  Since the announcement between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping of a “no limits partnership” on the eve of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, concerns have swirled over the potential for a new axis of revisionist authoritarian powers. Spearheaded by Moscow and Beijing, such an alliance could not only threaten the Eurasian landmass but reach across oceans to challenge the United States in the Western Hemisphere. However, the full implications and scope of the China-Russia partnership, particularly as it may pertain to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The CSIS Americas Program designed a novel tabletop exercise to better understand the consequences.  The findings found that when given the opportunity to coordinate, China and Russia eagerly did so and were able to secure a favorable outcome to the initial crisis. However, on the subsequent game turn, the United States, which had invested in building more long-term influence in the region, nevertheless secured its preferred policy outcome in both iterations of the game  This suggests that U.S. influence in LAC appears to remain sizeable, but closer China-Russia cooperation should be accorded more gravity than it currently receives in policy discussions.

Iran’s Future

• Damage to Iran’s Nuclear Program—Can It Rebuild?   The Center for Strategic and International Studies

  In the immediate aftermath of the U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities on June 22, “Operation Midnight Hammer,” policymakers and experts launched into a heated debate not only about the physical damage of the strikes but also about their impact on Iran’s long-term nuclear ambitions. Recent satellite imagery allows us to have a more realistic picture of the extent of the damage from the Israeli and U.S. strikes. It also provides insights into Iran’s initial efforts to rebuild its nuclear program and can help identify potential pathways for developing a covert nuclear weapons program, including establishing a third site to process its existing stockpile of 400 kilograms (kg) of highly enriched uranium (HEU). We determined that the U.S. and Israeli strikes inflicted significant damage on Iran’s nuclear program by destroying key infrastructure and human capital. Israel’s broader campaign against Iran also targeted military leaders, Iranian missiles, and defense industrial base targets. The precision of these operations revealed a deep penetration of intelligence, particularly by Mossad, into Iran’s nuclear program. The strikes did not, however, completely eliminate the nuclear program, with some infrastructure remaining intact, and the status of the HEU stockpile remains unknown. But whether or not Iran rebuilds its nuclear program is ultimately a political decision and will depend on three sets of factors: decision-making in Tehran, diplomacy with the United States, and Israel.

• Iran’s Dangerous Desperation: What Comes After the 12-Day War     Suzanne Maloney/Foreign Affairs

  As the writer James Baldwin once remarked, “The most dangerous creation of any society is the man who has nothing to lose.” That description might now apply to the men who preside over the ruins of Iran’s revolutionary system. With their proxy network degraded, their air defenses demolished, and their great-power alignments exposed as hollow, the debilitated guardians of the Islamic Republic require new tools to keep the wolves at bay. It is difficult to predict with confidence how factional dynamics will evolve in the aftermath of the regime’s humbling; further surprises may be in store. But there can be little doubt that the most powerful set of players in Tehran will seek to reconstitute the remnants of its nuclear program and reassert the regime’s dominance over Iranian society.

U.S. Economics and Demographic Changes

• Why U.S. House Prices Stayed Resilient While Prices Fell in Other Countries    Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

  Following decades of low and stable inflation, the period from 2021 to 2024 marked a dramatic global surge in inflation and an unprecedented cycle of monetary tightening. This recent monetary tightening cycle created a puzzle: Why did housing markets across developed countries respond so differently to the same global pressures?  For example, during the 2020-21 expansion, the U.S. and Canada experienced house price appreciation of more than 25% while Sweden recorded increases approximately half as large. (See the first figure.) But when central banks began aggressive tightening in 2022, a striking divergence emerged. The U.S. housing market showed remarkable resilience, with only moderate price adjustments despite Federal Reserve rate hikes that pushed mortgage rates from 2.8% to 6.8%. In stark contrast, Sweden and Canada experienced sharp corrections, with Swedish prices falling substantially below their 2019 baseline levels.

• Sprinters, Marathoners & Skeptics on the Future of AI & Power   War on the Rocks

  Will AI eat the world and America’s defense budget? I think of those who toil at the intersection of AI and national security as being divided into three camps: Sprinters hold the most aggressive assumptions and believe profound disruption via artificial general intelligence is imminent; marathoners believe the technology will diffuse selectively, sector-by-sector; and skeptics draw analogies to the dot-com bubble.  America’s near-term AI strategy should align with one of these three approaches. If the sprinter scenario holds, the United States should go all-out to rapidly acquire artificial general intelligence — defined here as human-level intelligence. If the skeptics are right, however, then the United States should do virtually the opposite and avoid overbuilding and overextension. If the marathoners are most correct, then the United States will conduct a complicated, long-term technological competition with a country four times its population.

• Consumer Inflation Expectations Across Surveys and over Time   Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

  Different survey-based measures of consumer inflation expectations have diverged in recent months. This Economic Commentary compares these measures and the survey questions underlying them. Our analysis suggests that the divergences across survey-based measures of inflation expectations can be attributed to various features and sample characteristics specific to each survey.

• Changes in Milestones of Adulthood     U.S. Census Bureau

  ABSTRACT: This study uses nationally representative data from 2005 and 2023 to examine changes in young adults’ (ages 25-34 years old) experiences reaching five milestones of adulthood: living away from their parents, completing their education, labor force participation, marrying, and living with a child. Changes are considered for individual milestones, as well as for combinations of milestones. The types and combinations of milestones young adults experience have seen major shifts in the past several decades, with growth in the shares experiencing economic markers, and reductions in those who experience family formation events. between 2005 and 2023, the fraction of Americans aged 25–34 who completed their education rose from 74% to 83%, but the percentage of “ever married” fell from 62% to 44%, and the percentage with “a child in the household” fell from 55% to 39%.

• America’s Fertility Crash Reaches A New Low   The Economist

  In recent years, birth rates have dropped only slightly in places where they have long been low. Four of the five least fertile states in 2014, including Connecticut and Massachusetts, have seen their rates decrease by less than the national average. It is in states that have been historically the most fertile where the fall has been precipitous; Alaska, North Dakota and Utah have seen some of the steepest declines. All told, states that had above average fertility rates in 2014 are responsible for more than 80% of the collapse in American birth rates over the past decade.

• As US population growth slows, we need to reset expectations for economic data   Peterson Institute for International Economics

  US population growth has slowed sharply in the last year and a half, as the immigration surge of the early 2020s has ended and the population continues to age. Fewer jobs are needed to keep up with the growth of the labor force, and growth rates of output and consumption will fall even if per capita output and consumption hold steady. The total US population is growing at an annualized rate of 0.5 percent, down from 1 percent in late 2023. With slower population growth, any given level of monthly payroll growth, consumption growth, or output growth reflects a stronger economy than it did a year ago. Population growth is not only slowing; it has also become more volatile and harder to estimate. It is likely that current population estimates for 2025 that statistical agencies are incorporating into economic data are too high and will be revised downward; current population estimates imply much higher immigration in 2025 than is likely under current administration policy. Economic data will need to be reinterpreted and revised in line with future adjustments to population estimates.

Recommended Weekend Reads

The Trump Trade Wars Bring Major Shifts in US Chip Policy, Escalating Risk of Conflict on the Moon, 5 Facts About Global Demographic Changes by 2100, and What’s Going on with the Grid?

August 1 - 3, 2025

Below are a number of reports and articles we read this past week and found particularly interesting.  Hopefully, you will find them of interest and useful as well.  We hope you have a great weekend.

Trade Wars & Semiconductors 

• US alters tech policy, puts chips on the table   Jennifer Lee & Fritz Lodge/The Strategist

  A shift is underway in the Trump administration’s approach to tech policy.  Nvidia said on 14 July that the US government would soon grant it licenses to resume exports of its H20 chips to China. AMD is expecting the same for its MI308 chips. This may appear surprising after multiple statements from Trump administration officials that controls on the export to China of higher-end AI chips, such as the H20, were off the table.  This move doesn’t change the broader bipartisan consensus behind restricting China’s access to strategic tech, but rather fits into a pattern of recent decisions showing that tech export controls—previously viewed as a non-negotiable issue of US national security—can now be used as bargaining chips in trade talks with China.  This shift exacerbates uncertainty for domestic and international tech firms and will encourage Beijing to push for further loosening of controls in future negotiations.
  

• How Does Semiconductor Trade Work?    Chris Miller/American Enterprise Institute

  Trade data on semiconductors is skewed due to the underreporting of imported semiconductors found in finished products like cars and phones. Any tariffs on semiconductors must carefully consider the structure of supply chains to avoid unintended consequences.  Much of the $40 billion of chips the US imports are actually made in the US, packaged abroad, and reimported, so tariffs would senselessly penalize domestic manufacturers. Since the US lacks packaging capacity, higher tariffs would raise costs and hurt competitiveness in key industries.  The US should focus tariffs on Chinese-made chips while striking sectoral trade deals with allies that commit both sides to zero tariffs, reducing non-tariff barriers, and continuing to invest in diversified supply chains.

Demographics

• 5 facts about how the world’s population is expected to change by 2100   Pew Research Center

  Here are five facts about how the world’s population is projected to change in the coming decades, based on a Pew Research Center analysis of the UN’s World Population Prospects. The latest data is from 2023, so the numbers for 2024 and beyond are projections.

1. Global population growth is expected to slow between now and 2100 (the population is expected to peak at 10.3 billion in 2084).

2. The world’s three most populous countries in 2025 are expected to have radically different trajectories in the coming decades (India will grow, China has begun to shrink and fall sharply, and the US is expected to grow slowly and steadily).

3. Five countries are expected to contribute more than 60% of the world’s population growth by 2100 (The Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Tanzania).

4. The world’s population is expected to get older (the median age is projected to rise to 42 by 2100, up from 31 today and 22 in 1950).

5. Africa is currently the world’s youngest region, and it’s projected to stay that way in 2100.

• Why Is Fertility So Low in High Income Countries?    Melissa Schettini Kearney & Phillip Levine/NBER

  This paper considers why fertility has fallen to historically low levels in virtually all high-income countries. Using cohort data, we document rising childlessness at all observed ages and falling completed fertility. This cohort perspective underscores the need to explain long-run shifts in fertility behavior. We review existing research and conclude that period-based explanations focused on short-term changes in income or prices cannot explain the widespread decline. Instead, the evidence points to a broad reordering of adult priorities with parenthood occupying a diminished role. We refer to this phenomenon as “shifting priorities” and propose that it likely reflects a complex mix of changing norms, evolving economic opportunities and constraints, and broader social and cultural forces. We review emerging evidence on all these factors. We conclude the paper with suggestions for future research and a brief discussion of policy implications.

• Depopulation Globally and in the Asia-Pacific: The Shape of Things to Come    Nicholas Eberstadt/Fertility and Sterility

  Abstract: This article addresses the prospect of global depopulation and its far-reaching implications. It argues that the advent of world population decline may come sooner than commonly anticipated, due to remarkable drops in birth rates underway in low-income regions as well as more developed locales. Notwithstanding uncertainties about the precise level of planetary fertility (due mainly to limited statistical capabilities in Africa), it is clear that overall childbearing patterns for our species are at most only slightly above the replacement level today—and might already actually have fallen below that significant threshold. Prolonged sub-replacement fertility will have far-reaching social, economic, and political ramifications. The following pages attempt to describe some of them, and to offer an introductory exploration of the new questions that could face problem-solvers in the future.

• Africa’s future demographic dividend matters to Europe today    ISS/African Futures

  Africa’s demographic surge offers Europe a chance to rethink labor, migration and global partnerships through a lens of long-term interdependence.  Europe’s population is shrinking, while Africa’s is growing. By 2050, Africa will be home to one in four people globally.  Similarly, the EU’s labor force is shrinking and aging, while Africa’s is growing rapidly and becoming younger. By 2050, more than 60% of Africa’s people will be of working age. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the labor force will more than double. It will have increased from 505 million in 2023 to 1,058 million people, while Europe’s labor force will have declined from 370 million to 342 million.

The Growing Electrical Supply Challenge 

• AI Demand Drives Record Electricity Supply Costs In Largest US Market   Financial Times

  The cost of providing electricity in America’s largest power market will hit a record high owing to soaring demand from artificial intelligence data centers and delays in building new power plants, raising energy prices for consumers.  Grid operator PJM said it procured energy supplies for $329.17 per megawatt day, a 22% increase compared with the previous year. The organization will pay power producers $16.1bn to meet its energy needs from June 2026 to May 2027, a 10% increase compared with the previous year. The operator said it expected a 1-5% rise for customers in their energy bills, depending on how utilities and states passed on costs. PJM sets prices at an annual capacity auction where power suppliers bid to provide the region’s projected demand. Earlier this year, PJM and some state governments took steps to try to keep power prices lower after last year’s capacity auction delivered a $269.92 per MW-day price — a more than 800% increase from 2023.

• Power Check: Watt’s Going On With The Grid?   Bank of America Institute

  The US grid is facing an extended period of load growth. And while the drivers of this growth have changed over time, demand is largely due to 1) building electrification; 2) data centers; 3) industrial demand; and 4) electric vehicle (EV) adoption. If load growth forecasts continue to rise, utilities will need to invest to meet required reserve margins and increase spending on both power generation and transmission & distribution capacity. The good news? Deregulation and accelerated permitting may further help get more projects off the starting line, according to BofA Global Research.

• Are Small Modular Reactors Worthy of the Hype?   Oilprice.com

  Nuclear energy is experiencing a political and technical renaissance. Around the world, nuclear fission is gaining traction as a critical piece of the puzzle for maintaining energy security while also slashing greenhouse gas emissions. Much of the renewed excitement over nuclear power comes from advances in nuclear technologies, particularly small modular reactors (SMRs), which are supposed to make nuclear capacity expansion cheaper, safer, and more efficient.  However, Even though there is excitement from investors and policymakers alike, getting SMR models approved is taking much longer than anticipated. Only one model has been approved in the United States, and it is not yet operational. But many, many more designs are waiting in the wings.

Recommended Weekend Reads

June 20 - 22, 2025

Assessing Israel’s Attack and the Limits of Iran’s Missile Strategy, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Fed’s Role in the Fixed Income Market, and Analyzing the Pentagon Pizza Index

Below are the studies and reports we found of particular interest this past week.  We hope you find them of interest, too.  Please let us know if you have any questions or if you or a colleague wants to be added to our distribution list.

The Israel-Iran Crisis

• How Iran Lost – Tehran’s Hard-Liners Squandered Decades of Strategic Capital and Undermined Deterrence    Afshon Ostovar/Foreign Affairs

  Iran’s hard-liners overplayed their hand. After Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, the regime’s leaders opted for a campaign of maximum aggression. Rather than letting Hamas and Israel fight it out, they unleashed their proxies at Israeli targets. Israel, in turn, was compelled to expand its offensive beyond Gaza. It succeeded in severely degrading Hezbollah, the most powerful of Tehran’s proxy groups, and eviscerating Iranian positions in Syria, indirectly contributing to the collapse of the Assad regime. Iran responded to this aggression by unleashing the two largest ballistic missile attacks ever launched against Israel. But Israel, backed by the U.S. military and other partners, repelled those attacks and incurred little damage. It then struck back. With that, the foundation of Iran’s deterrence strategy crumbled. Its ruling regime became more vulnerable and exposed than at any point since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. And Israel, which has dreamed of striking Iran for decades, had an opportunity it decided it could not pass up.

• Israel’s attack and the limits of Iran’s missile strategy   International Institute for Strategic Studies

  Israel’s attack on Iran has exposed critical weaknesses in Tehran’s broader military strategy. While Iran still has untapped shorter-range capabilities it could deploy in its immediate neighborhood, its depleted medium-range missile arsenal and weakened regional allies leave it with limited options for retaliation against Israel.

• Options for Targeting Iran’s Fordow Nuclear Facility    Center for Strategic and International Studies

  In order to achieve its stated objective of dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, Israel will need to take out a key Iranian facility, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. Fordow is buried deep under a mountain near Qom and is believed to be one of the key sites of Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities, about 54,000 square feet in size, with 3,000 centrifuges. Due to its hardening and depth, Israel lacks the ordnance to take out Fordow on its own in the short term; however, multiple strikes from the U.S. GBU-57, carried out by U.S. B-2 bombers, could destroy the facility. There are at least five options for destroying Fordow. All of them will have varying degrees of impact on Iran’s nuclear program, along with unique risks of escalation and international response. Below is an analysis of all five options; however, to avoid escalation while still achieving nonproliferation objectives, Israeli sabotage appears to be an underappreciated option.

Geoeconomics

• Black Swans and Financial Stability: A Framework for Building Resilience    Daniel Barth/Stacey Schreft – Federal Reserve Board of Governors Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS)

  Abstract: This article refines the concept of black swans, typically described as highly unlikely and catastrophic events, by clearly distinguishing between knowable and unknowable events. By emphasizing that black swans are “unknown unknowns,” the article highlights that the realization of new black swans cannot be prevented and motivates a need for policies that build the financial system's resilience to unforeseeable crises. The article introduces a "resilience principle" that calls for policies that are adaptable, universal, and systemic. Examples are provided of policies with these features, none of which relies on the official sector being better positioned than the private sector to anticipate the unknown.

• Bank Financing of Global Supply Chain     Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper Series

  Abstract: Finding new international suppliers is costly, so most importers source inputs from a single country. We examine the role of banks in mitigating trade search costs during the 2018–19 US-China trade tensions. We match data on shipments to US ports with the US credit register to analyze trade and bank credit relationships at the bank-firm level. We show that importers of tariff-hit products from China were more likely to exit relationships with Chinese suppliers and find new suppliers in other Asian countries. To finance their geographic diversification, tariff-hit firms increased credit demand, drawing on bank credit lines and taking out loans at higher rates. Banks offering specialized trade finance services to Asian markets eased both financial and information frictions. Tariff-hit firms with specialized banks borrowed at lower rates and were 15 percentage points more likely and three months faster to establish new supplier relationships than firms with other banks. We estimate the cost of searching for suppliers at $1.9 million (or 5 percent of annual sales revenue) for the average US importer.

• A Hitchhikers Guide to Federal Reserve Participation in Fixed Income Markets    Journal of Economic Perspectives

  The Federal Reserve has historically relied on banks and primary dealers, [but] the landscape for fixed income ownership shifted after the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and again after the March 2020 crisis. As of the end of 2024, [non-bank financial institutions] are more than three times larger than the US banking system. Participation of investment funds—including mutual funds, money market funds, hedge funds, money managers, and investment advisors—in auctions of Treasury securities increased from 1.7% in January 2008 to 67.8% in October 2023, whereas the share attributable to dealers and brokers’ share decreased from 79% to 19.4% during the same period.

• Investment in an increasingly global landscape      Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

  Private business fixed investment has fallen or remained flat in advanced economies for decades, with a recent levelling-off also observed in several emerging market economies.  The recent increase in uncertainty due to trade tensions will dampen investment while also reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy. In the long run, the outlook for private business investment depends on the potential need to reconfigure supply chains disrupted by higher trade tariffs as well as governments’ efforts to boost public investment and implement structural reforms.

Africa

• Africa’s Complicated Democratic Landscape     Center for Strategic and International Studies

  In 2024, the global trend of voters rejecting incumbents was reflected in Africa, where opposition parties made significant gains in countries with relatively strong democratic institutions. These results stemmed from economic frustration, widespread dissatisfaction with poor governance, and changing demographics.  The most critical elections of 2025 will be in countries where incumbents have used constitutional changes and institutional control to stay in power. As elections unfold, how voters engage with the process will be key to shaping the political future of their countries and the continent as a whole. There are several African elections worth watching in late 2025 to help make this determination: Cameroon, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea. Uganda's election in January 2026 is also one to watch.

• 21st-Century Africa: Governance and Growth    The World Bank

  When compared with the average living standards of the rest of the world, GDP per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa has declined over the past three decades. During the period 1990–2022, three distinct periods can be identified in the evolution of Sub-Saharan Africa’s real GDP per capita: a declining trend during 1990–2000 (from 30% to 25% of the world average), stagnant GDP per capita relative to the world during 2000-14 (fluctuating around 25%), and a declining trend from 2014 to 2022 (from 25% to 22% of the world average). The region’s lack of convergence in living standards with the rest of the world largely results from its inability to sustain growth over time. If Sub-Saharan Africa had grown (in per capita terms) at the same pace as the global economy since 1990, its level of income per capita in 2022 would have been more than 40% higher than its actual level. If it had grown at the same pace as emerging East Asia, the region’s income per capita would have been nearly three times its 2022 level. Currently home to 14% of the world’s working-age population, by 2100, Africa is projected to have 39%, representing more than a third of the workforce of the entire world.

• Africa has a new space agency — here’s what it will do    Nature Magazine

  Africa’s first continent-wide space agency, the African Space Agency (AfSA), which was inaugurated in April, is looking to secure funding as its first projects get underway.  AfSA is an initiative of the 55-member African Union (AU) and is headquartered in Cairo. It was established to coordinate the work of Africa’s existing efforts in space — more than 20 African countries have space programs. Priorities will include improving satellite communication, which provides crucial connectivity for rural populations. It also aims to generate and access data from space to track the effects of climate change, provide disaster relief, and aid agriculture, water, and food security.   

China 

• Is China Really Growing at 5 percent?      Federal Reserve Board of Governors FEDS Notes

  Chinese authorities recently announced a growth target of "around 5 percent" for 2025, the same as their 2024 target. Five percent is about half the pace of growth that China sustained from the 1980s to the early 2010s, but it is nonetheless quite high for an economy flirting with deflation and mired in a years-long property bust. The ambitious growth target, given the circumstances, has led many observers of the Chinese economy to once again treat the official GDP data with skepticism. All told, assessing the accuracy of China's GDP growth remains a challenge, and no statistical model can provide a definitive alternative measure. But our analysis suggests that official figures have not recently been overstating GDP growth for three reasons. First, the excess smoothness of official GDP has significantly diminished since the pandemic. Second, our alternative indicator, which relies on a broad set of data series informative about the Chinese business cycle, including consumption and the property sector, closely tracks official GDP. Finally, the supply side of China's economy has performed remarkably well in the context of robust demand for Chinese goods and industrial policies promoting self-reliance.
  

• China’s Car Industry Runs on Empty as Supply Chain Bills Go Unpaid    Financial Times

  In an effort to shore up automotive supply chains, the Chinese government mandated a 60-day supplier payment rule. Most carmakers suffer from negative working capital; only a handful of Chinese EV makers have sufficient net cash to comply with the new rule.

Assessing Geopolitical Risk

• Pentagon Pizza Index: The theory that surging pizza orders signal a global crisis Fast Company

  A different kind of pie chart is being used to predict global crises.  A surge in takeout deliveries to the Pentagon—now dubbed the “Pentagon Pizza Index”—has emerged as an unexpectedly accurate predictor of major geopolitical events. Tracking activity at local pizza joints in Arlington County, the X account Pentagon Pizza Report noted an uptick in Google Maps activity from four pizza places near the Pentagon on June 12. We, The Pizza, District Pizza Palace, Domino’s, and Extreme Pizza all reportedly saw higher-than-usual order volumes around 7 p.m. ET. “As of 6:59 p.m. ET nearly all pizza establishments nearby the Pentagon have experienced a HUGE surge in activity,” the X account posted. The timing? Just hours before news broke of Israel’s major attack on Iran. 

•  Geopolitical Shift: Corporate America’s Growing Focus on Global Risk    U.S. Chamber of Commerce

  Geopolitical risks are no longer a distant concern for businesses—they are a top-tier strategic and financial challenge. From supply chain disruptions to shifting regulations and market volatility, global instability now shapes investment decisions, corporate strategy, and economic security.  As a result, companies across all sectors are reporting more geopolitical concerns in their investor communications since 2009. This trend has accelerated sharply since 2019.  And technology companies show the highest levels of concern, though the increase spans all industries.

Recommended Weekend Reads

What To Do When The START Treaty Expires, China’s Strategy for Countering the US’s New Focus on Latin America, the Economic and Geopolitical Implications of Apple’s Supply Chain, and Why Denmark Raised the Retirement Age to 70

June 6 - 8, 2025

Below is a collection of studies and articles we found particularly interesting and of likely impact on markets and public policy.  We hope you find them helpful and that you have a great weekend.

The Future of Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control 

• No New START     Franklin Miller/Eric Edelman, Foreign Affairs

  The looming expiration of the New START Treaty, the only remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, has focused national security experts on what comes next. At the time it was signed in 2010, New START had some advantages. But New START was written for a geopolitical landscape that no longer exists.  Fifteen years later, the world has changed dramatically. Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have emerged as aggressive and expansionist leaders, both dedicated to building a much more modernized and lethal nuclear weapons system.

• Everything Changes but Nothing Changes: Can France Overcome Its Own Nuclear Doctrine?   War on the Rocks

  In a recent interview broadcast live on French television, President Emmanuel Macron said, “Ever since there has been a nuclear doctrine, Charles de Gaulle, there has been a European dimension of France’s vital interests.  I have remained ambiguous on what those vital interests are…” Does France consider defending European allies part of their vital interests?  Does France believe in extending a nuclear umbrella that covers Europe? These questions have been debated in France for decades, and with Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine, they have risen to a new level of focus and discussion.

Latin America 

• What Will China Do Next in Latin America?   Ryan Berg/Foreign Policy

  The second Trump administration has begun with a flurry of activity in Latin America. In the first 100 days, Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited both Central America and the Caribbean, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth made a visit to Panama, and Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem visited both South America and Central America and Mexico. Another visit to the region by Rubio and a trip by Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins are in the works. Some administration officials have characterized their approach as an “Americas First” foreign policy. The reprioritization of Latin America in the United States’ foreign policy, coupled with the high-level visits by cabinet officials, has placed China on the back foot in the region—at least temporarily. In many ways, Beijing was unprepared for the Trump administration’s considerable focus on the Western Hemisphere and its scrutinizing of countries’ relationships with China.  Curiously, though, despite a revamped U.S. posture in Latin America, China appears to be sticking to a familiar bag of tricks—even as domestic challenges pare back the robustness of its offer.

• Momentum for Red Tape Reform in Chile Picks Up    Americas Quarterly

  The decision by Chile’s government to scrap the massive Dominga copper and iron mining project in January, and the resulting court battles, have roiled debates over red tape and regulation in the country, where natural resources make up 77.6% of exports. These debates—which go far beyond the mining sector—have become a campaign issue ahead of the November general election as the business community demands lighter regulation and President Gabriel Boric defends his record and tries to forge compromises with his critics.

• The War on Trees – How Illegal Logging Funds Cartels, Terrorists, and Rogue Regimes   Foreign Affairs

  Around the world, nefarious state and nonstate actors are extracting enormous value from forests to fund their operations. The unlawful clearing of land and the harvest, transport, purchase, and sale of timber and related commodities have long been dismissed as a niche concern of environmental activists. But this is a mistake. Although unsustainable deforestation imperils the environment, illegal logging also poses an outsize—and underacknowledged—geopolitical threat. Environmental crime constitutes a growing economic and national security threat to the United States and countries around the world. Yet Washington has largely ignored illegal logging’s role in its fight against transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, terrorists, and rogue regimes, as well as China’s part in this illicit trade.

Geoeconomics

• Why Emerging Markets Weathered Federal Reserve Tightening So Well    Steven Kamin/AEI Economic Policy Working Paper Series

  The steep rise in US interest rates that started in 2022 led many observers to anticipate severe difficulties for emerging market economies (EMEs). Unlike after the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s or the bond market turmoil of 1994, however, most EMEs weathered the Fed’s monetary tightening in 2022-23 relatively well. In particular, EME dollar credit spreads, an indicator of potential financial distress, rose only moderately in those years before dropping to historically low levels in 2024. One reason that the EMEs weathered Fed tightening so well is that, simply put, Fed tightening is no longer as injurious to them as commonly believed; this likely reflects improvements in EME policies since the 1980s and 1990s that have bolstered their resilience. A second reason why EME spreads remained relatively contained in the face of rising interest rates is that US corporate credit markets remained buoyant, and their confidence spilled over to EMEs. We show that US high-yield spreads accounted for the lion’s share of the fluctuations in EME spreads over the past couple of decades, dominating not only the effects of monetary shocks but also changes in the VIX and the dollar.

• Connectivity Policy – A Strategic Tool for the EU in its Eastern Neighborhood German Council on Foreign Relations

  Given the shifts in the geopolitical landscape, connectivity is no longer just an economic tool – it has become a strategic instrument used for influence, resilience, and security, as China has demonstrated with its Belt and Road Initiative. The EU must understand that connectivity is central to its engagement with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, where the EU faces growing competition not only from China’s BRI but also from Russia’s infrastructure dominance and Turkey’s regional ambitions. This memo explores the new momentum that connectivity has gained as a part of the EU foreign policy in the EaP and examines its significance in the emerging new regional order. It assesses whether and how connectivity can be reframed as a strategic instrument for the EU’s engagement.

• Apple’s Supply Chain: Economic and Geopolitical Implications    Chris Miller/Vishnu Venugopalan – American Enterprise Institute

  Over the past decade, many electronics firms have talked about diversifying their supply chains. An analysis of Apple—America’s biggest consumer electronics firm—illustrates that most of its manufacturing supply chain remains in China, though there have been limited increases in Southeast Asia and India. China’s role for Apple has grown substantially. Ten years ago, Apple relied on China primarily for final assembly, while today Apple not only assembles devices in China, it also sources many components from the country.  However, Chinese-owned firms generally only play a role in lower-value segments of the supply chain. Many of the higher-value components—even those made in China—are produced in factories owned by Japanese, Taiwanese, or US firms.  

Immigration and Demographics

• America’s Immigration Mess: An Illustrated Guide   Nicholas Eberstadt/American Enterprise Institute

  Immigration was a flashpoint in American politics long before President Biden’s election, but it became a major political fiasco with the Biden Administration’s mismanagement of illegal immigration. Immigration ended up being one of the top issues in the 2024 election and is widely recognized as one of the key factors contributing to the re-election of President Trump. America is poised for a very different set of immigration policies today. But wherever America aims to head with immigration policy, it is essential to guide that policy with accurate information. This illustrated guide is intended to offer a summary snapshot of America’s immigration situation today, and some of the dilemmas attending it. In this illustrated guide we collect what we take to be the most accurate data and information on a number of hotly debated questions: trends in total and illegal immigration; the Biden era migration surge and its components; immigrants’ contributions to the national economy, dependence of US social welfare benefits, and impact on the budget deficit and national debt.

• Why Denmark is raising its retirement age to 70, Europe’s highest  Rangvid’s Blog

  The Danish parliament recently decided to raise the retirement age in Denmark to 70, effective from 2040. This decision attracted significant international attention. In this post, I will explain why the decision was made, the benefits it offers, and why, overall, the Danish pension system is strong, arguably among the best in the world. That said, it is not without its challenges.

Recommended Weekend Reads

What Is President Trump’s Golden Dome and Will It Work?  China’s Investments in EU and UK Rebounded in 2024,  Latin America’s Baby Bust is Coming Early, and Understanding the Two Chinas

Summer is just about here and we are hoping you are having a relaxing Memorial Day Weekend.  Below are our latest recommended reads.  We hope you have a wonderful Easter and a relaxing weekend.  And please let us know if you or someone you know wants to be added to our distribution list. 

President Trump’s Golden Dome

• The Golden Dome and the New Missile Age    Center for Strategic and International Studies Podcast

  President Donald Trump has proposed to create a multilayered defense system capable of intercepting missiles even if they are launched from the other side of the world and even if they are launched from space.  The concept includes both ground and space-based capabilities that would defend the US from attack by detecting and destroying them ahead of launch, intercepting them early in flight, halting them midcourse and stopping them in the last few moments of approaching a target. CSIS’s podcast takes a closer look at the President’s proposal and how it would be implemented, how much it will cost, and how it cannot work unless Canada is a part of it.

• Golden Dome for America: Revolutionizing U.S. Homeland Missile Defense   Lockheed Martin

  Defense contractor Lockheed Martin hopes to be the primary builder of President Trump’s Golden Dome missile defense system.  IN a recent post on their website, they offer an in-depth presentation of the multiple ways the Golden Dome, as they envision it, would be deployed in space, land, sea, and air.

• Bad News for Trump’s Golden Dome: He Can’t Build it without Canada  Politico

  President Donald Trump left out a key detail this week when he outlined his plans for a massive missile and air defense shield over the continent: He can’t build it without Canada. And it’s not clear America’s northern neighbor wants in.

• Can China’s New Stealth Tech Challenge Trump’s Golden Dome?     South Morning Chian Post

  Chinese scientists have unveiled a new material that could undermine the effectiveness of the new US missile defense system – known as the Golden Dome – proposed by President Donald Trump.  The material may be used as a stealth material that is effective against both infrared and microwave detection and could prove suitable for high-speed aircraft and missiles.

Asian-Pacific Economics

• There are Two Chinas, and America Must Understand Both    New York Times

  Two Chinas inhabit the American imagination: One is a technology and manufacturing superpower poised to lead the world. The other is an economy that’s on the verge of collapse.  Each reflects a real aspect of China.  resident Trump, as he tries to negotiate a resolution of a trade war, must reckon with both versions of America’s arch geopolitical rival. The stakes have never been higher to understand China. It’s not enough to fear its successes or take solace in its economic hardships. To know America’s biggest rival requires seeing how the two Chinas are able to coexist.

• A Geo-Economic Conundrum for the Member States of ASEAN    International Institute of Strategic Studies

  When leaders from Southeast Asia meet at a regional summit on 26–27 May in Kuala Lumpur, the sense of imminent crisis will have lifted, given the agreement announced by Beijing and Washington on 12 May to pause for 90 days their ongoing trade dispute. Yet anxiety will still be high. Another 90-day pause – on the ‘reciprocal tariff’ schedule announced by United States President Donald Trump in April – will expire on 8 July. All ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would face significant new tariffs under the schedule, with Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam being the hardest hit. Vietnam, facing a 46% tariff unless it reaches a bilateral deal with the US, might have the most to lose given its increasingly prominent position in supply chains serving the US market.

• Chinese Investment Rebounds Despite Growing Frictions    Mecator Institute for China Studies/Rhodium Group

  Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the EU and UK rebounded last year for the first time since 2016: it reached EUR 10 billion, rising 47 percent from 2023.  Europe remained the leading destination for Chinese investment in high-income economies, drawing 53.2 percent of all Chinese FDI in such markets. In 2024, the EU and UK’s share of total Chinese FDI also rose to 19.1 percent, the first significant increase since 2018.  The growth of Chinese FDI in the EU and UK was driven by a slight recovery in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity and continued appetite for greenfield investment.  Greenfield investment increased for the third consecutive year, rising by 21 percent year-on-year and hitting a record high of EUR 5.9 billion.  2024, five investors—CATL, Tencent, Geely, Envision, and Gotion—accounted for almost half of the Chinese FDI in Europe.

Latin America

• When Recession is Not Mexico’s Biggest Problem     Americas Quarterly

  The “R” word is becoming increasingly popular in Mexico. On the same day that the U.S. reported a surprising quarterly GDP contraction in the first trimester of the year, data released by Mexico’s statistics institute, INEGI, showed an unexpected 0.2% quarterly economic expansion for the same period. Since this initial and seasonally adjusted reading followed a 0.6% decline in economic output in the last quarter of 2024, it appears Mexico barely escaped the curse of a so-called “technical recession” (i.e., two consecutive quarters posting negative changes).  This result, however, is unlikely to settle the issue, particularly in Mexico’s polarized political climate. It can be easily argued, for instance, that the positive reading is explained by an unusually strong 8.1% growth rate posted by the volatile primary sector. This serves as a good reminder that business cycles are a more complex affair than a simple rule of thumb would suggest. More importantly, a discussion about this issue should not be Mexico’s main priority.

• Latin America’s Baby Bust is Arriving Early     Bloomberg

  Data published in the past few weeks confirm the quick decline in the region’s fertility levels, with the number of births in Brazil falling to the lowest in close to 50 years. In Argentina, the number of newborns has almost halved in just a decade, with kindergartens struggling to find pupils. In 2024, Uruguay had more deaths than births for the fourth consecutive year. Even Bolivia, a country of traditionally large families, is about to fall below the 2.1 children-per-woman threshold necessary to keep its population constant.

•  The Spy Factory – Russian Intelligence’s Use of Brazil for Deep Cover Operations    New York Times

  For years, a New York Times investigation found, Russia used Brazil as a launchpad for its most elite intelligence officers, known as illegals. In an audacious and far-reaching operation, the spies shed their Russian pasts. They started businesses, made friends and had love affairs — events that, over many years, became the building blocks of entirely new identities.  Major Russian spy operations have been uncovered in the past, including in the United States in 2010. This was different. The goal was not to spy on Brazil, but to become Brazilian. Once cloaked in credible back stories, they would set off for the United States, Europe or the Middle East and begin working in earnest.  The Russians essentially turned Brazil into an assembly line for deep-cover operatives.

Geoeconomics

• Unconventional Monetary Policies in Small Open Economies   Jesper Lindé/Marcin Kolasa/Stefan Laseen IMF Working Papers

  This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the macroeconomic and fiscal impact of unconventional monetary tools in small open economies. Using a DSGE model, we show that the exchange rate plays a critical role to amplify the favorable impact of unconventional monetary policy while it attenuates the effectiveness of conventional fiscal policy to jointly boost output and inflation. We then use the model as a laboratory to do a case study of the Swedish Riksbank asset purchases and negative policy rates 2015-2019. We find that the Riksbank unconventional policy measures provided meaningful macroeconomic stimulus to economic activity and inflation, with the dual benefit of reducing overall government debt by about 5 percent of GDP. If conventional fiscal policy had been used to provide a commensurate output boost, inflation would have risen notably less, and the fiscal cost would have amounted to a deterioration of the government debt position with nearly 8 percent of GDP.

• What Have We Learned from the U.S. Tariff Increases of 2018-19?     Reserve Bank of St. Louis “On the Economy” Blog

  In the summer of 2018, the normal pace of global trade encountered an important disruption: The United States increased tariffs to a wide set of imported goods from China, which included such diverse products as electronics, furniture, manufacturing equipment and aerospace components. In this way, the imposed tariffs impacted final consumption goods, intermediate inputs and capital goods used by U.S. households and firms.  All told, these measures affected approximately $376 billion of Chinese exports to the U.S., or around 50% of all the country’s imports from China. The scale becomes even more remarkable when one considers that prior to this campaign, most of these goods faced tariffs of just 3% to 4% and that China was the largest trading partner of the U.S. in terms of imports.

Recommended Weekend Reads

BRICS Expansion and What Its Members Want, The Growth of Institutionalized Fraud, Hezbollah’s Latin American Networks, and Does Putin Trust Anyone in Russia Anymore?

April 4 - 6, 2025

Here are our recommended reads from reports and articles we read in the last week. With all that has happened and been written this week on Trump’s new tariff regime, we refrained from including anything on tariffs but we are assembling a special collection of research for next week.   In the meantime, we hope you find these useful and that you have a relaxing weekend.   And let us know if you or someone you know wants to be added to our distribution list. 

Geoconomics

•  BRICS Expansion and the Future of World Order: Perspectives from Member States, Partners, and Aspirants   Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  Among analysts, the significance of the BRICS expansion remains a matter of debate. On paper, “BRICS+” has the potential to become a major geopolitical and geoeconomic force. The bloc already boasts about 45 percent of the world’s population, generates more than 35 percent of its GDP (as measured in purchasing power parity, or PPP), and produces 30 percent of its oil. BRICS countries have also established an extensive and thickening latticework of intergovernmental cooperation. Many analysts, therefore, depict BRICS expansion as a watershed moment in the shift to a more egalitarian international system.

• Demand for College Labor in the 21st Century   Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

  Tracing the evolution of labor demand in the United States, this Economic Commentary reveals that the disproportionate rise in relative productivity of college-educated labor that shaped the latter half of the 20th century has plateaued since 2000. Our analysis suggests that technical change in the 21st century may no longer favor college graduates, in which case further growth in the employment share of college-educated workers would likely lower the premium that college-educated workers receive compared with non-college-educated workers.

• Why extracting data from PDFs is still a nightmare for data experts    Ars Technia

  AI has one enormous challenge.  For years, businesses, governments, and researchers have struggled with a persistent problem: How to extract usable data from Portable Document Format (PDF) files. These digital documents serve as containers for everything from scientific research to government records, but their rigid formats often trap the data inside, making it difficult for machines to read and analyze.

• “Industrialized Fraud”   Excerpt from Stripe’s Annual Letter

  Stripe published their annual letter covering a host of trends the finance company is seeing transform.  But there was one shocking observation – the explosive growth of institutionalized fraud: “Fraud is a bigger drag on the global economy than you might think: one report found that fraud cost 3% of a typical online business’s revenue. Fraudulent actors today operate on an industrial scale, with teams of engineers, managers, and data analysts. (We are yet to verify whether they have HR departments. If you know, please tell us so we can give them some peer feedback.) Fraudulent actors generally target times when fraud teams are offline—we see more fraud on Saturdays, Sundays, and Mondays—but we see subtler patterns, too, like the fraudsters’ own work schedules. Fraudsters are particular about their lunch breaks.”

• The Psychology of Free: How a Price of Zero Influences Decision-making  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

  Why do we get so excited when we see the word “free”? In competitive markets, businesses use strategies to attract customers and increase sales. One effective and appealing tactic is offering something for free. Examples include “Buy one, get one free!” and “Free samples inside!” The power of “free” goes beyond just saving money; it involves psychological factors that influence our decisions without us realizing it. Free items, free shipping, and the psychological impact of “free” reveal much about social norms and human decision-making.

Americas

• Hezbollah's Networks in Latin America: Potential Implications for U.S. Policy and Research   Rand

  Most people have no idea Hezbollah operates in Latin America.  Academic literature and government reports almost universally indicate that Hezbollah's activities in the region pose potential threats to U.S. national security. However, there is a significant knowledge gap in existing assessments. In this paper, the author offers an initial exploration of Hezbollah's operational footprint in Latin America, focusing on illicit funding mechanisms, violent operations, and key operational hubs — particularly in the Tri-Border Area and Venezuela. The analysis situates these activities within the broader context of Iran's regional diplomatic, economic, and cultural activities, which partially facilitate conditions amenable to Hezbollah's operations.

• Assessing Guatemala as a Nearshoring Destination   Center for Strategic and International Studies

  Guatemala’s geographic proximity to the United States and Mexico gives it an advantage when trying to lure North American businesses seeking to shorten and strengthen their supply chain routes. The country, which has the United States as its largest trading partner, has the potential to leverage the nearshoring movement and attract businesses seeking alternative hubs to Mexico, especially as the Guatemalan government continues to make efforts to enhance its competitiveness, promote investment opportunities, and work on reforms to support economic growth.

• Inside the President’s Daily Brief     War Room Podcast

  Ever wonder what goes into the President’s Daily Brief (PDB)? It’s not your average morning news. Stephanie Sellers, a former PDB briefer, is currently the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Representative to the U.S. Army War College and the General Walter Bedell Smith Chair of National Intelligence Studies. She joins host Ron Granieri to share her experiences and describes the job as trying to keep up with “17 different soap operas at once.” This crucial intelligence update is delivered to the president and other senior government leaders, shaping their understanding of critical issues. Sellers, who previously worked on missile systems for the Navy, joined the CIA after 9/11 out of a desire to continue to serve her country and to use and grow her technical and leadership skills in new and exciting assignments. Her journey to becoming a PDB briefer was fueled by a desire for challenge and the opportunity to work at “the nexus of intelligence and policy.”

Russia, China, North Korea, the US, and the Ukraine War

• The Partnership: The Secret History of the War in Ukraine: This is the untold story of America’s hidden role in Ukrainian military operations against Russia’s invading armies    New York Times

  On a spring morning, two months after Vladimir Putin’s invading armies marched into Ukraine, a convoy of unmarked cars slid up to a Kyiv street corner and collected two middle-aged men in civilian clothes. Leaving the city, the convoy — manned by British commandos, out of uniform but heavily armed — traveled 400 miles west to the Polish border. The crossing was seamless, on diplomatic passports. Farther on, they came to the Rzeszów-Jasionka Airport, where an idling C-130 cargo plane waited. The passengers were top Ukrainian generals. Their destination was Clay Kaserne, the headquarters of U.S. Army Europe and Africa in Wiesbaden, Germany. Their mission was to help forge what would become one of the most closely guarded secrets of the war in Ukraine.

• Auditing the Auditors: Does Putin Trust Anyone Now?   Carnegie Politika

  A new type of Russian bureaucrat has emerged in recent years: those appointed by President Vladimir Putin to oversee certain agencies or sectors and keep an eye on the officials formally in charge—even those who ostensibly enjoy the Kremlin’s trust. These “auditors” can now be found everywhere: from the Russian delegation conducting negotiations with the United States to the Defense Ministry, the Emergencies Ministry, and the presidential administration.   While these appointments help to reassure Putin that he remains in control, they also threaten to undermine the viability of Russia’s power vertical. It’s recently become clear, however, that the president does not trust even long-serving officials and has decided to create a new tier of bureaucracy to oversee them.

• Can Trump Channel Nixon to Turn Russia Against China?    Carnegie Politika

  The Trump administration has been quite open about why exactly it wants to get into bed with Moscow: it believes closer ties will prize Russia away from China, which it sees as the real existential threat to the United States. A previous U.S. president—Richard Nixon—came up with a similar plan at the beginning of the 1970s. The only difference is that Nixon’s plan was supposed to work the other way around: improving relations with China to isolate the Soviet Union. Back then, the U.S. strategy worked—more or less. Donald Trump’s modern-day imitation of Nixon, however, is unlikely to succeed.

• China and Russia’s strategic relationship amid a shifting geopolitical landscape   Brookings Institution Commentary

  The geopolitical landscape is shifting at a breakneck pace, raising urgent questions about how the China-Russia strategic relationship—both with each other and with the United States—might evolve, and what this means for the war in Ukraine and the broader global order.  In the conversation that follows, four experts—Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Angela Stent, Tara Varma, and Ali Wyne—join Patricia Kim to unpack these critical developments. They explore topics ranging from the consequences of a potential U.S.-Russia reset or a “reverse Nixon” strategy, to China’s evolving strategic calculus, the future of the China-Russia-North Korea-Iran “axis,” and Europe’s uncertain path forward. Join us as we delve into what’s at stake for Washington, Beijing, and the world.

• Russia-China-North Korea Relations: Obstacles to a Trilateral Axis    Foreign Policy Research Institute

  This paper begins by examining the history of Russia-China-North Korea interactions, highlighting Sino-Russian differences in emphasis regarding North Korea prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine. To assess whether a trilateral axis formed after 2022, the paper examines evidence of institutionalized cooperation, coordination of Chinese and North Korean military aid to Russia for Ukraine, and Russian and Chinese expert perspectives. The paper then addresses the obstacles to the formation of a trilateral axis. Although authoritarian states share an overriding interest in regime security and political survival, this does not necessarily mean that we should expect solidarity among similarly disposed regimes or believe that they would inevitably form an anti-Western axis. Considerable research has been done on the reasons why authoritarian states choose to support one another, but it is important to understand what factors might limit their cooperation. This paper examines how the historical experience of trilateralism, reputational concerns, foreign policy considerations, and domestic factors make a new China-Russia-North Korea axis unlikely.

Recommended Weekend Reads

Guides to Understanding Trump’s Trade and Foreign Policy, What the EU Must Do to Build Up Their Defense Capabilities, the US Workforce Challenge, and Why China Isn’t the Obvious Winner in Latin America

March 28 - 30, 2025

Understanding Trump's Trade and Foreign Policy 

• A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System      Stephen Miran/Hudson Bay Capital

  Stephen Miran is one of President Donald Trump’s top economic advisors.  He chairs the White house Council of Economic Advisors.  He is also the author of a 41-page memo – more a blueprint -  that lays out what can be achieved by what is being billed as a “Mar-A-Lago Accord” which would revise the framework for the global financial system. 

• Trump, Strategy, and Mercantilism   School of War Podcast

  Walter Russell Mead, Alexander Hamilton Professor of Strategy and Statecraft at the University of Florida's Hamilton Center and columnist for The Wall Street Journal, joins the show to talk about the role of economic issues in Trump’s strategic views.  They discuss Mercantilism and physiocracy, the role of Silicon Valley, the dollar, coalitions, tariffs, China, and what President Trump thinks about all of it.

• Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community   Office of the Director of National Intelligence

  In this year’s public annual report – the first of the new Trump Administration and under the oversight of new DNI Tulsi Gabbard- the DNI points out the following: Both state and nonstate actors pose multiple immediate threats to the Homeland and U.S. national interests. Terrorist and transnational criminal organizations are directly threatening our citizens. Cartels are largely responsible for the more than 52,000 U.S. deaths from synthetic opioids in the 12 months ending in October 2024 and helped facilitate the nearly three million illegal migrant arrivals in 2024, straining resources and putting U.S. communities at risk. A range of cyber and intelligence actors are targeting our wealth, critical infrastructure, telecom, and media. Nonstate groups are often enabled, both directly and indirectly, by state actors, such as China and India as sources of precursors and equipment for drug traffickers. State adversaries have weapons that can strike U.S. territory, or disable vital U.S. systems in space, for coercive aims or actual war. These threats reinforce each other, creating a vastly more complex and dangerous security environment. Russia, China, Iran and North Korea—individually and collectively—are challenging U.S. interests in the world by attacking or threatening others in their regions, with both asymmetric and conventional hard power tactics, and promoting alternative systems to compete with the United States, primarily in trade, finance, and security.

The EU’s Move to Build Up Its Defense Capabilities

• Joint White Paper for European Defense Readiness 2030     European Commission

  From the paper’s introduction: The international order is undergoing changes of a magnitude not seen since 1945. These changes are particularly profound in Europe because of its central role in the major geopolitical challenges of the last century. The political equilibrium that emerged from the end of the Second World War and then the conclusion of the Cold War has been severely disrupted. However much we may be wistful about this old era, we need to accept the reality that it is not coming back. Upholding the international rules-based order will remain of utmost importance, both in our interest and as an expression of our values. However, a new international order will be formed in the second half of this decade and beyond. Unless we shape this order – in both our region and beyond – we will be passive recipients of the outcome of this period of interstate competition with all the negative consequences that could flow from this, including the real prospect of full-scale war. History will not forgive us for inaction.

• Defending Europe without the US: first estimates of what is needed    A Joint Publication of Bruegel and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy

  Europe could need 300,000 more troops and an annual defense spending hike of at least €250 billion in the short term to deter Russian aggression.  From a macroeconomic perspective, a debt-funded increase in defense spending should boost European economic activity at a time when external demand may be undermined by the upcoming trade war (Ilzetzki, 2025; Ramey, 2011), though yields and inflation may rise. Ilzetzki (2025) argued that defense spending can also positively contribute to long-term growth via innovation, but a precise quantification of such effects is still needed.

• The Case for Europe    Strategic Europe

  By choosing to vote against a United Nations resolution marking the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States seems intent on abandoning its leadership of the West after eighty years of hegemony. Europe is going through its gravest hour since the Second World War—and most Transatlanticist political leaders are starting to realize it.  At best, Europe will have to defend its territory alone and take responsibility for deterrence. At worst, it will have to fend off great powers actively seeking to subvert it as they assert their respective spheres of influence. This could involve political interference, economic coercion, and open aggression, tearing Europe apart. Europe’s choice lies in between these two scenarios. Rather than predict success or failure, it is worth outlining the building blocks that make the case for a stronger Europe possible and the pitfalls this vision could run into.  

• Germany’s big spending splurge gives EU the jitters    Politico Europe

  European Union governments have expressed fears that the radical spending plans announced by Germany’s chancellor-in-waiting will end up skewing the bloc’s single market and could give the country an unfair competitive edge. A month on from an election that made Friedrich Merz almost certainly the next leader in Berlin, the upper house of parliament on Friday approved a historic change to the country's basic law to exclude defense investment above 1 percent of economic output from the nation’s strict spending rules, along with a €500 billion fund for infrastructure and green energy, clearing the final parliamentary hurdle.  While Germany’s allies in Europe have broadly welcomed Berlin’s long-awaited loosening of the purse strings, there is a sense of unease about the impact it could have at a time when economies are still struggling to recover after the twin shocks of Covid and the Ukraine conflict, and with the looming threat of a trade war with the U.S.

• Why Europe can’t defend itself: Political fragmentation is blocking autonomy   Wolfgang Munchau/UnHerd

  Imagine a world in which Western Europe was actually able to stick it to Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump simultaneously. As if. Back in the real world, there’s a remote possibility the Europeans might get their act together sufficiently to stand up to one, or the other. But not both. They will, in classic fashion, be split. Some of the eastern European countries, the Baltic States, for example, will prioritize a push-back against Russia. Others, like France, are more concerned with driving their independence from the US. Then there is a third group that wants neither. So, where does that leave Europe? What they are agreed on is the plan is to increase military spending. The EU will follow Germany’s example and partially exempt the defense budget from the fiscal rules. But the truth is, no amount of investment will wean the EU off its American dependency any time soon. It will take decades to close the immense defense technology gap. To build entire industries from scratch takes time. You need defense companies, supply chains, and know-how. Europe is far from the cutting edge of 21st century defense technology and its expertise in that sector has been diminished since the end of the Cold War.

• Behind NATO’s 2 Percent: Measuring the True Scope of Alliance Defense Investments and the NATO Defense Deficit    Mackenzie Eaglen & Cole Spiller/American Enterprise Institute

  This working paper examines NATO’s military spending through two key lenses: how NATO allies measure defense expenditures and the strategic implications of the long-term defense deficit created by chronic underfunding. While 21 member states now meet the 2 percent of GDP benchmark, the alliance must look beyond numerical targets to assess whether these investments translate into real military capability.2 Closing NATO’s $2 trillion defense deficit requires greater transparency in accounting to allow for more complete analysis, as well as sustained increases in spending to build credible deterrence against rising threats.

The Changing US Workforce

• Shifting Immigration Toward High-Skilled Workers    Penn Wharton Budget Model

  We evaluate two immigration policies that shift 10 percent of future low-skilled immigration toward either: (i) high-skilled immigrants (“HSI”) that otherwise maintains the current share of STEM workers within the high-skilled group, or (ii) only high-skilled STEM workers (“HSI STEM”) that increases the share of STEM relative to other high-skill workers. The number of total immigrants remains the same under both policies. Both policies grow the economy, reduce federal debt, and increase wages across all income groups: lower-skilled, higher-skilled non-STEM workers, and higher-skilled STEM workers. In fact, this policy change affords the rare opportunity of a “Pareto improvement” benefitting all groups.

• Technology Adoption and the Changing Role and Background of Clerical Workers   Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

  From 1980 through 2015, the share of clerical jobs in the employed labor force declined more significantly in large and expensive cities than in smaller cities. Moreover, the remaining workers performing these occupations in large and expensive cities had, on average, higher education levels and were more likely to perform tasks usually done by managerial and professional personnel when compared to their small-city counterparts. In this Economic Commentary, we show how these patterns are related to the uneven adoption of information communication technologies (ICT) across geographies and discuss adoption’s impact on clerical jobs’ tasks and worker requirements.

• Defensive Hiring and Creative Destruction      Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde/Yang Yu/Francesco Zanetti/National Bureau of Economic Research

  America has long struggled with a lack of productivity growth despite huge investment in research and development. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Yang Yu, and Francesco Zanetti find that the defensive hiring of researchers by incumbent firms with monopsony power reduces creative destruction, which in turn maintains the status quo and leads to stagnant productivity growth.

The Americas 

• China Won’t Be the Obvious Winner in Latin America    Ryan Berg/Foreign Policy

  After a mere two months in office, a narrative on the Trump administration’s policy toward LAC and great-power competition has emerged: Regional influence will accrue to China at the expense of the United States because Washington appears a “bully,” has talked of reviving the controversial Monroe Doctrine, and has occasionally adopted the rhetoric of territorial expansion. A deputy assistant secretary of state in the Biden administration accused the Trump administration of shortsightedness, leading to “an opening for China, made in America.” Even a former staffer in the first Trump administration worried that the current approach to LAC “could unwittingly facilitate the extension of Beijing’s influence.” Will the Trump administration’s more assertive approach toward LAC benefit China?

• What Elections Mean for Canada and the Future of North America    Center for Strategic and International Studies

  On March 23, newly minted Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced snap elections for April 28, kicking off a contest to determine Canada’s future at a critical juncture. The election pits the incumbent Liberal Party, which has received a second wind since January in part due to tariffs and political threats from the United States, against the Conservative Party under the leadership of “Canada First” politician Pierre Poilievre. No matter the outcome, however, the next leader of Canada will inherit a tense relationship with the United States, public pressure to deliver economic gains, and an increasingly fraught global security environment that impinges upon Canada’s sovereignty.